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ABSTRACT 
MAINE* S NEW JUVENILE CODE:
A CASE STUDY IN JUVENILE JUSTICE BEFORE
by
Dennis William MacDonald
University of New Hampshire, December, 1985
The history of juvenile justice in the United States is 
largely a history of failed reform efforts. The most sig­
nificant of these efforts was the establishment of the juve­
nile court at the turn of the century and the idea of "so­
cialized" juvenile justice on which it was based. Because 
the objective was rehabilitation rather than punishment, 
constitutional rights applicable in criminal justice pro­
ceedings were deemed unnecessary. In response to a wave of 
criticism of "socialized justice," the "post-Gault era" of 
juvenile justice reform emerged in the early 1960’s. These 




The major question this dissertation seeks to answer is 
whether this most recent reform era fulfills its promises or 
shares the fate of earlier efforts. rising a case study ap­
proach, this dissertation examines post-Gault reform in 
Maine. The revision of the Maine Juvenile Code in 1977 ex­
emplifies these reform efforts. An assessment of the juve­
nile justice system which emerged from the revision of the 
Code suggests strongly that post-Gault reform continues the 
pattern of failure.
Various explanations of the failure of juvenile justice 
reform are examined. Explanations most consistent with the 











wing abbreviations are used in the text.
..Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study
..Blaine Commission to Pevise the Statutes 
Relating to Juveniles
..Children and Youth Services Planning Project
..Department of Cental Health and Corrections
..Governor's Committee on Children and Youth
..Governor's Task Force on Corrections
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1960's a long simmering concern with -juvenile 
justice in the Unite! States swelled into a national move­
ment to reform juvenile justice. A number of events spurred 
this reform movement. Among the most significant was a se­
ries of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, most, notably, In Re 
Gault. In Gault and related cases, the Supreme Court called 
into question the constitutionality of the prevailing "so­
cialized" justice of the juvenile court for its failure to 
provide due process of law.
At about the same time, the President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, a response by 
the executive branch of government to the apparently growing 
concern with the ineffectiveness of the criminal and juve­
nile justice systems, recommended major changes in society’s 
approaches to the problem of juvenile delinquency. (1967a, 
1967b) These recommendations, backed up with federal funds 
for States which undertook reform efforts, further contrib­
uted to the move to reform juvenile justice systems.
In general terms, the move to reform juvenile justice 
urged that juveniles be accorded constitutional protections 
normally guaranteed to adults in criminal proceedings and
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that they be provided with the services necessary to reha­
bilitation.
The purpose of this research is to assess the efficacy of 
post-Gault reform through the analysis of one typical in­
stance of it, the revision of the juvenile justice system in 
the State of Maine. Such an approach is necessary because 
juvenile justice is largely a matter that falls within 
state, rather than federal, jurisdiction. Consequently, 
while it is possible to discuss "American juvenile justice" 
in general in a meaningful way, there is considerable varia­
tion from state to state in the details of juvenile justice 
systems- On the other hand, a particular juvenile justice 
system cannot be fully understood apart from the larger his­
torical and national context out of which it emerges. This 
research then, of necessity, i.ust look in several directions 
in attempting to understand post-Gault juvenile justice.
In the early 1970’s, the State of Maine began a series of 
studies of its juvenile justice system with a view toward 
developing reform recommendations. Such efforts appear to 
have resulted both from attempts to bring its system in line 
with federal requirements and from concerns within the State 
over the apparent ineffectiveness of the system. In 1975, 
the State Legislature appointed a "Commission to Revise the 
Statutes Relating to Juveniles" for the express purpose of 
proposing statutory changes in juvenile justice and related 
areas. Their efforts culminated in the enactment of a new
3
Juvenile Code in 1977, bringing about perhaps the most dra­
matic change in juvenile justice in Maine since the estab­
lishment of the juvenile court in 1971.
The changes brought about in juvenile justice in Maine as
a result of this effort are best summarized in the words of
the Commission to Revise the Statutes in their Final Report.
Essentially the proposed code would reorganize 
Maine’s juvenile justice system so that juveniles 
who commit acts which would be felonies...if they 
were adults will be handled in almost all respects 
as if they were adults. Juveniles who commit acts 
which would be misdemeanors.. .or "juvenile crimes"
- i.e., possession of marijuana, alcohol or pros­
titution will be handled in some, but not all, re­
spects as if they were adults. For example, under 
the proposed code a hearing on a delinquency peti­
tion that alleges felony conduct will be open to 
the public; a hearing about alleged misdemeanor 
conduct will not. On the other hand, once a juve­
nile is adjudicated delinquent for a "juvenile 
crime" or misdemeanor, the juvenile court judge 
will have a full spectrum of dispositional alter­
natives available to him —  not simply a fine as 
is the case under Maine's criminal code for cer­
tain drug and alcohol related offenses.
The proposed code would decriminalize behavior 
that is not delinquent -- e.g, "incorrigibility", 
running away from home, and truancy- Instead, it 
mandates the provision of services to these chil­
dren and their families....
Under the proposed code, hearings in juvenile 
court would be conducted in all procedural re­
spects, except jury trials, as are adult criminal 
proceedings. [1977:1-2)
Thus, the reforms attempted to provide "the best of both 
worlds" for juveniles before the law, due process and reha­
bilitative services rather than what Justice Fortas called 
the "worst of both worlds" in Kent. v_ U.S. (U.S. Supreme
Court, 1^67:1054) Although the Legislature made a number of
a
substantial changes in the code as proposed by the Commis­
sion, the above statement of the Commission accurately re­
flects the intent of the Legislature in its enactment of a 
new Juvenile Code.
The extent to which Maine’s juvenile justice reform and 
post-Gault reform more generally have succeeded in address­
ing these concerns is open to question. It has been sug­
gested that these reforms have failed or are likelv to fail 
as have so many similar efforts in the past. Vhile promis­
ing the "best of both worlds" (the constitutional guarantees 
accorded adults in the criminal justice process and the re­
habilitative services traditionally promised by the juvenile 
justice system), post-Gault reforms are criticized as a re­
turn to the criminal prosecution of children, as providing 
formal due process rights without the substance of due pro­
cess, and as promising services without providing resources 
necessary for them. In the words of critics of Maine's new 
Code, "the due process problem...has simply been shift­
ed...from the courtroom to the intake process," and the 
promised rehabilitative service system is one "whose subs­
tance is a collection of lofty philosophical statements" be­
cause of the failure of the Legislature to back up its rhet­
oric with resources. (MacDonald and Eiskup, 1979: 18) Faust 
and Orantingham (1979:456) have noted the prophetic nature 
of Justice Stewart's dissent in Gault in which he expressed 
fear that juveniles would be returned to criminal prosecu­
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tion. Empey (1979:296) expressed concern that post-Gault 
reform was "freeing children from the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court" without "indicating what new institutional 
devices are more suitable for them." Early in the post- 
Gault era, Fox (1970:1236) pointed to fundamental problems 
in both due process and rehabilitative services. Feferring 
to due process, he writes, "Central among the reasons for 
the failure of the revolution is the role of counsel.... As a 
practical matter, there are indications that defense law­
yers do not defend." Further, he notes "the disquieting 
thought that historical continuities...raay extend to the re­
source starvation that has characterized both juvenile and 
adult justice."
At present, the reform era that began with Gault appears 
to be drawing to a close. The reaction that so often fol­
lows reform is setting in and criticism of "Post-Gault" ju­
venile justice and calls for its abandonment are on the 
rise. The P.eagan Administration, for example, has engaged in 
extensive efforts to dismantle the Office of Juvenile Jus­
tice and Delinquency Prevention in favor of more punitive 
measures for addressing "serious juvenile crime." (Washina- 
ton Post, 198H:A?1; Thornton, 1983:A5) Such a reform-reac- 
tion cycle is not unique to the "Post-Gault" era. The his­
tory of juvenile justice in the United States seems in many 
respects to be characterized by such cycles. In other words, 
the history of juvenile justice may be seen as a long series
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of reforms that failed engendering yet further reforms that 
in turn failed. With each such reform and its perceived 
failure comes a cry for a different approach. The assump­
tion that accompanies such an effort is that the prevailing 
juvenile justice system is in fact an objectification of the 
reform ideals, that the approach as articulated by reformers 
was tried and failed, and that a new approach is thus re­
quired. Statements of the current Director of the Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention exemplifies the 
argument.
We have done a good deal of work with delinquency 
prevention. It’s a nice idea, but no one has re­
ally been able to figure out how to do it. We’ve 
spent tens, maybe hundreds of millions of dollars 
on delinquency prevention programs. [Put] none are 
in the least bit effective. [quoted in Thornton,
1983:A5)
History reveals, however, that such assumptions may be pro­
blematic. Historically, changes in juvenile justice have 
often resulted from reform efforts. But such changes have 
more often than not embodied the rhetoric of reform ideals 
without the substance. If a just and effective system of 
juvenile justice is genuinely desired, it is appropriate and 
necessary that the assumption that post-Gault reform ideals 
have been tried and were found to have failed be put to the 
test. This is the central purpose of the present research. 
To what extent have the ideals of post-Gault juvenile jus­
tice reform been embodied in the resulting juvenile justice 
svstems?
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The answers to such a question have important implica­
tions for public policy, for social change, and for the so­
ciology of juvenile justice- If in fact the system of juve­
nile justice that has developed does not substantially re­
flect. the approach envisioned by its proponents, the prudent 
public policy course might well be to attempt to implement 
such an approach in substance as well as in theory, rather 
than to abandon the apnroach for another. If social change 
is more apparent than real in this case, might it be appro­
priate to examine our assumptions of reform in others? For 
all of our concern with "data", social scientists all too 
often work on the basis of assumption rather than fact. In 
his insightful history of the so-called "Progressive Era," 
Kolko alerts us to this penchant of historians for assuming 
rather than discovering "what really happened" (emphasis in 
original; Kolko:1963;1). Quite obviously, such a question 
has direct relevance to the sociological understanding juve­
nile justice which, as the societal reactionists have point­
ed out, is crucial to our understanding of the problem of 
juvenile delinquency.
Methodology
The nature of the research question and the nature of the 
object of our investigation requires that a variety of meth­
ods be utilized in this research. The fact that juvenile
justice in Maine today is intimately bound up with the his­
torical development of juvenile justice requires that this
research be in part historical. The process of reform is
not one of "causally related variables" but rather one of 
evolutionary development involving numerous institutions, 
ideas, ideals, and organizations. Thus, the documentary ev­
idence must be examined in order to understand the reform 
process. More rigid statistical techniques are of some use 
in attempting to determine the differences —  in terms of 
the actual processing of juvenile offenders -- between the 
old and new juvenile justice systems in Maine. Furthermore, 
interviewing and related techniques are necessary to discov­
er some aspects of the reform process as well as to arrive 
at some determination of present views of the efficacy of 
the new system from the points of view of participants.
Perhaps the most fundamental methodological issue is the
question of the "generalizability" of finding in Maine to 
post-Gault reform in the United States more generally. K 
number of points can be made here.
First, Maine is not in fact particularly unique. It is 
our contention that the differences among states and locali­
ties, and, indeed, among nations, are frequently exaggerat­
ed. In point of fact, Maine shares in a common socio-cul- 
tural system with the nation as a whole. It does not have a 
unique system of govern me n t, a different economic system, or 
peculiarly distinctive values from its neighbors. In other
9
words, the institutional network out of which juvenile jus­
tice reform emerged in Maine is not altogether different 
from that of Massachusetts, California, Kansas, or Wiscon­
sin. Indeed, there are some differences. These, however, 
appear to be largely differences in detail, not in fundamen­
tals. Thus, it is our view, that one could fruitfully study 
the reform process by examining its operation in any state. 
In our case, Maine is convenient.
at the same time, juvenile justice is legally a matter of 
state, not federal, jurisdiction. Thus, while what happens 
in Maine may not be particularly unique, juvenile laws and 
juvenile justice systems are products of legislation at the 
state level. In order to examine such systems and changes 
in such systems in concrete detail it is necessary to exam­
ine them in the context of an actual system in some state. 
Juvenile justice systems in various states have historically 
shared a common philosophical orientation, but the practice 
of juvenile justice requires examination of how this philos­
ophy gets translated in actuality. One cannot then fully 
understand juvenile justice in exclusively general terms. 
Neither can it be understood in exclusively particular 
terms.
Finally, the reform process in Maine reflects the ideals 
of the post-Gault era nationally. The Juvenile Code the re­
sulted from this process is based largely on standards and 
models developed natior.allv. (Commission to Revise the 
Statutes Relating to Juveniles, 1976a:Appendix XVI)
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Oraan ization
The dissertation begins with a discussion of the history of 
juvenile justice in the United States with particular emoha- 
sis on those aspects of its history related to reform. 
Through this discussion, the historical failure of reform in 
juvenile justice is documented and an attempt is made to ex­
plain this failure. This is a prerequisite for understand­
ing the nature of post-Gault reform and assessing its pros­
pects.
Chapter Three discusses the history of juvenile justice 
in Maine from the establishment of the juvenile court to 
post-Gault reform. Chapters Four and Five examine the major 
documents of the post-Gault, movement in Maine in an attempt 
to ascertain the ideals or goals to which the reform efforts 
were directed. Chapter Four focuses on ’’due process" and 
"fairness" more generally as post-Gault ideals and Chapter 
Five focuses on the rehabilitative ideal in post-Gault re­
form. Chapter Six is an assessment of the extent to which 
the ideals of post-Gault reform are embodied in the system 
of juvenile justice which emerges from the reform effort.
The final chapter is a discussion of the findings, some 
explanation of them, and speculation on the implications of 
such findings for the future of juvenile justice in Maine 
and the United States.
Chapter II
JUVENILE JUSTICE REF03H: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
An assessment of nost-Gault. reform generally and in Maine in 
particular necessarily entails an understanding of the his­
tory of juvenile justice in the United States, particularly 
those aspects of its history revolving around attempts to 
reform American juvenile justice.
In reviewing the historv of American juvenile justice, 
one of the more striking lessons is that so many of the 
"burning" issues in juvenile justice in the post-Gault era 
have been "burning" issues for many decades, many originat­
ing at least as far back as the early eighteenth century. 
As Rothman (1979:34) puts it, "One vital function that a 
historian concerned with social policy performs is to remind 
his contemporaries that their particular concerns are not 
particularly novel." Clearly, this is the case with so many 
of the "concerns" of students, practitioners, and critics of 
juvenile justice today. One such concern which illustrates 
this point is the practice of incarcerating juveniles in 
adult jails. Despite attempts of Maine's new Juvenile Code 
to address this concern, the issue has once again become the 
subject of considerable controversy in Maine, one sparked by 
publicity surrounding the decision of a judge to jail two
- 1 1 -
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boys, ages 11 anl 14. (Associated Press, 1982:1) This was, 
of course, a major consideration in the founding of the 
houses of refuge in the early nineteenth century and again 
was a major concern of the "child savers" who were instru­
mental in the establishment of the first juvenile courts at 
the beginning of this century. Although not all of our con­
cerns have such exact historical parallels, they all have a 
history, a history from which would-be reformers might learn 
of the pitfalls of reform.
The issues, problems, and concerns which entered into the 
efforts to revise Maine's Juvenile Code as well as as the 
system of juvenile justice which ultimately emerged from 
these efforts are properly understood only in the context of 
history and the national debate on juvenile justice.
The history of American juvenile justice being largely a 
history of failed reforms, examination of post-Gault reform 
in the historical context is of even greater importance. In 
so doing, we may be better able to understand why reform so 
often fails and how these problems might be overcome in or­
der to allow for the emergence of a just and effective sys­
tem of juvenile justice.
Juven ile Justice Def ined
In the present context, we use the term "juvenile justice" 
not in any larger philosophical sense, but merely as a label
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denoting the organized response of society to what it re­
gards as crime and misbehavior of young people. Tt is an im­
portant point to keep in mind because “juvenile justice in 
this somewhat arbitrary and relative sense may have nothing 
or little to do with "justice" in any ideal sense. Indeed, 
the lack of a close connection between the actual and ideal 
meanings may have a great deal to do with what so many see 
as the perpetual failure of juvenile justice systems. As 
Sarri (in Bartollas and Miller, 1978:xv) writes.
We speak of the juvenile justice system in a glib 
manner as if such really existed, but from the 
perspective of thousands or perhaps millions of 
youths in many countries, the system is viewed as 
one only for control and punishment, not "jus­
tice! "
Our concern here is primarily with describing American juve­
nile justice in its own terms. The extent to which it might 
approximate genuine juvenile justice for juveniles will be 
addressed later.
While as Mennel (1972:xvii) notes, "children have always 
misbehaved and committed crimes," a special, distinct system 
for societal response to these problems is of relatively re­
cent origin, dating to the early nineteenth century. Prior 
to that time, such problems were generally handled by exist­
ing institutions, most often the family, but in the case of 
serious juvenile crime, the criminal legal system. The 
emergence of an urban, industrial America combined with mas­
sive immigration resulted in, among other things, if n o t  an 
intensification of the problems of juvenile delinquency, at
14
least a greater visibility of the problem and a greater 
awareness of the problem and its seriousness. What emerged 
in response to these perceptions over the course of the cen­
tury from roughly 1825 to 1°25 was "socialized juvenile jus­
tice", epitomized by the juvenile court.
Faust and Brantingham (1979; 1-25) detail the controversy 
surrounding the question of the origin of socialized juve­
nile justice, and, in particular, the socialized juvenile 
court. There are two major opposing interpretations of its 
history as well as their own which is essentially a synthe­
sis of the two. Proponents of the socialized system argue 
that it was essentially the result of a humanitarian effort 
to end the harsh treatment of juveniles at the hands of the 
criminal justice system. It was, they claim, invented for 
the purpose of saving, helming, protecting, guiding, and 
treating children in trouble, not for the purpose of punish­
ing them for crimes. Critics of socialized juvenile jus­
tice, on the other hand, tend to subscribe to the revision­
ist interpretation which argues that allegations of harsh 
treatment are exaggerated and, in Empey's (1979:5) words, 
viewed juvenile justice, particularly the juvenile court, as 
nothing more than a device for protecting the capitalist 
class from the unruly children of the working class. In­
deed, as Faust and Erantingham (1979:1-25) suggest, both po­
sitions reflect aspects of the reality from which the so­
cialized juvenile justice system emerged.
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Despite differences of interpretation with respect to the 
motivations behind the emergence of the socialized system 
and differences with respect to the appropriateness of so­
cialized juvenile justice principles and the extent to which
these were actually implemented, there is general agreement 
as to what the socialized system claimed as its basic prin­
ciples, assumptions, and ideals.
Since the turn of the century, socialized juvenile jus­
tice, in the form of the socialized juvenile court, has been 
the dominant socio-legal institution in the United States 
for preventing, controlling, and correcting juvenile crime 
and misbehavior. The hallmarks of its approach, notes Ryer-
son (1973:3)
were relatively few and simple: children -- even
children who broke the criminal law —  differed 
from adults. They required not only separate but 
different treatment before the law. The state, 
acting through the juvenile court, must treat 
children not as responsible moral agents subject 
to the condemnations of the community but as wards 
in need of care. A special court for children 
should be of civil jurisdiction, with fiexible 
procedures adapted to diagnosing and preventing as 
well as to curing delinquency.
Socialized juvenile justice, then, differs rather dramati­
cally from criminal justice in philosophy, procedures, and 
aims. The juvenile court, according to Brantingham 
(1979:37-4 8), was philosophically rooted in the "Positive 
School" of criminological thought which assumed a determin­
istic view of human behavior, rejecting the free will as­
sumptions and the consequent legalisms of the "Classical
School" in favor of "treatmen
delinquent. Such "treatment"
scientific rather than legal p
nal proceeding, the -juvenile j
vehicle for protecting the juv
criminal justice process. As
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The Nature of the Child
The fundamental difference between children and adults is 
seen to be a matter of maturation, not only with respect to 
the obvious physical immaturity of children, but also their 
incomplete emotional, psychological, rational, and moral de­
velopment. Children through the teens are referred to as in 
their "formative" years, the years in which their "charac­
ters" or personalities develop. Implicit in this view are 
both the notion that children do not possess all of the ca­
pacities of adults and that children are somewhat more 
"plastic", more susceptible to influences from the world 
about them, than are mature adults. Both aspects have im­
portant implications for the development of socialized juve­
nile justice.
A major aspect of the child's immaturity is the lack of 
the full capacity to reason, to judge, to decide as would, 
presumably, a mature person in acting. This notion has been 
incorporated into law in some form for centuries. Faust and 
Brantingham (1979:457) describe the legal doctrine as it ex­
isted in American criminal justice prior to the emergence of 
the juvenile court.
Delinquents were entitled to criminal procedural
protections and to the substantive law doctrine of 
doli incapa x which denied the possibility of mens
rea to children under the aqe of seven, and so
prevented their prosecution and conviction for 
crime, and presumed that children aged seven to 
fourteen could not form mens rea, thus requiring 
the show of evidence of the capacity to form mens 
rea before a prosecution could go forward.
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Tn some respects the juvenile court expanded this notion 
such that the juvenile court had jurisdiction in all cases 
{with few exceptions) involving children under a certain age 
(typically IS years). Thus, in theory, if not in nractice, 
no juvenile could be prosecuted or convicted for any crimi­
nal offense.
The susceptibility of children to influences, good and 
bad, during their formative years also had major implica­
tions for juvenile justice. Among the many problems per­
ceived in the processing of juveniles in the criminal jus­
tice system was the contact that juveniles had with adult 
criminals, in the courts and particularlv in jails and pris­
ons. Such contact was considered as almost a guarantee that 
such juveniles woull subsequently enter into criminal ca­
reers. There was also concern with the possible effects on 
the child of the stiama attached to the "criminal" label.
Finally, as Empey (1979: 33) writes, the view of the na­
ture of childhood was considerably different from previous 
views. The difference had important implications for juve­
nile justice.
Though we now find ourselves intellectually at 
odds with, if not morally repulsed by, the benefi­
cent presumtuousness of nineteenth century child 
savers, we must also ask whether that presumtuous­
ness was somehow worse than the practices of in­
fanticide, abandonment, sexual exploitation, and 
indifference to children in the Middle Ages. As 
recently as a century or two ago American colo­
nists were inclined to blame the innate depravit.y 
of the child for sins and to punish him severely. 
Later, reformers tended to externalize blame and 
to seek "treatment" rather than punishment. in­
deed, given the whole history of punishment, one
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of the most significant elements of the first ju­
venile court act may he its justification on the 
grounds that its principal purpose was child care, 
not retribution. Such changes in perspective were 
considerable.
Thus, from assumptions about the nature of childhood and 
changes in the predominant view of it come four key operat­
ing principles of socialized juvenile justice:
1. Children should not be subject to criminal prosecu­
tion and conviction.
2. Children accused of criminal or other misbehavior 
should never be confined with or allowed contact with 
adult criminals. Seoarate facilities and procedures 
are called for.
3. There should be no stigma attached to those coming 
into contact with juvenile justice.
4. Juvenile justice systems should be in the business of 
caring for children, not punishing them.
The Nature of Human Behavior
A detailed discussion of the changes in views of the nature
of human behavior is obviously beyond the scope of this pa­
per. Nevertheless, at the risk of oversimplification, the 
significance of these views to the development of socialized
justice necessitates comment. Of the many factors involved
in the change of perspective, the most important was the 
emergence of social science and its application to crininol-
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ogv by the so-called "Positive School" in the work of Ga­
briel Tarde, Cesare Lombroso, and others.* The underlying 
principle of positivism, particularly as stated by Auguste 
Comte and Herbert Spencer (see Lenzer, 1975; Carneiro, 
1967), was that human society operates like the objects of 
other sciences on the basis of natural laws, or laws similar 
to natural laws. In other words, the principle of causality 
underlies human social life as well as it does purely natu­
ral life. Stated most simply (perhaps too simply), human 
behavior is determined.2 This is in sharp contrast to the 
"classical" view of human action as the result, of conscious, 
rational decision based in free will. The implications for 
criminal justice are radical indeed.
The American system of criminal justice, based as it is 
on "classical" views, adheres to the basic tenets of utilit­
arian social theory. At base is rationality , free will, 
and the social contract. In committing criminal acts, we 
are violating the contract into which we freely entered. We 
freely choose to so violate it, presumably because of an ex­
1 Our discussion of the "Positive" and "Classical" perspec­
tives is based on Paul Brant ingham's article, "The Classi­
cal and Positive Schools of Criminology: Two Ways of
Thinking about Crime" (1979:36-4 8).
2 This is by no means the clear and consistent position as­
sumed throughout the social sciences. While it is the po­
sition taken by most early sociologists, there is clear 
evidence of discomfort with its implications as evidenced 
by inconsistency. Emile Durkheim and Lester Ward exempli­
fy the struggle on this issue in their efforts to "have it 
both ways." Human social life is and is not determined. 
(Durkheim, 1933; Commaaer, 1967)
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pectation of increased personal gain, happiness, pleasure, 
etc. Positive theory, on the other hand, regards such acts 
as "caused” by some physical defect, by poor upbringing, by 
environmental factors, and the like. Without free will, ra­
tional choice, there is, obviously, no blame. Dsing the 
medical analogy which figured heavily in the positivist ap­
proach, we generally do not "blame” a person for being ill.
Criminal law from the classical (utilitarian) perspective 
is an elaboration of the social contract. In the absence of 
any blame and punishment, there would be no deterrent to 
proscribed behavior and the contract, society itself, would 
presumably disintegrate. On the basis of the utilitarian 
view of human nature as hedonistic, the deterrent prescribed 
is punishment (pain) proportional to the presumed pleasure 
gained in violating the social contract. If, however, the 
positivist view of crime as caused is a'hered to, punishment 
is clearly inappropriate because there can be no deterring 
of action not freely, rationally chosen.
A number of other features of criminal justice are im­
plicit in the classical view. The law must be unambiguous 
and understandable (in Bentham's term, "cognoscible”). 
Clearly, people cannot choose to refrain from illegal behav­
ior when they do not know what it is. The utilitarian view 
also mandates equality before the law and certainty of pun­
ishment if it is to guarantee the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number and deter threats to that aim. Again, be­
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cause of the inapplicability of deterrence to the positivist 
view of justice, such features of law are not only unneces­
sary, but perhaps even counterproductive. While if classi­
cal law is to have its intended effect, it is essential that 
extraordinary efforts be undertaken to ensure that punish­
ment is not inflicted upon the innocent, in "treating" the 
"sick" it is perhaps better to err in the opposite direc­
tion.
The positivist perspective has had some influence on 
criminal justice in the United States. Certainly, the "cor­
rections" end of the criminal justice system claims adher­
ence to this perspective in theory, if not in practice. 
Nevertheless, as Faust and Brantingham (1979:1) note, juve­
nile justice is "the most important example of socialized 
justice developed from the infant social sciences of the 
late 19th Century." In adopting the positivist assumptions, 
juvenile justice reolaces the principles of classical crimi­
nal law with the following:
1. The task of the juvenile court is not to determine 
blame, but to diagnose problems.
2. The appropriate response of the juvenile justice sys­
tem to illicit behavior is not punishment, but treat­
ment.
3. "Legalisms" (i.e. due process of law) stand in the 
way of proper scientific diagnosis and treatment and 
are inappropriate where no punishment is involved.
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4. Different diagnoses require different treatment. In­
dividualized treatment replaces equality before the 
law.
5. As in physical disease, the earlier the detection and 
treatment, the better. Thus, it is unnecessary and, 
indeed, irresponsible, to act only after an offense 
has been committed (the disease has become acute). 
The pee- delinquent should be a primary focus of the 
juvenile justice system.
The Nature of the "Cause™
The third assumption, that the family is the primary cause 
of delinquency, is not as clear-cut as the other assump­
tions, largely because of the variety of "causes" indicated 
in the literature. Despite the lack of unanimity on this 
point, there is sufficient evidence that socialized juvenile 
justice has assumed a strong connection between the family 
and delinquency. There were, of course, those like Jane Ad- 
dams (1925), Shaw and McKay (1942), and others who saw larg­
er problems as causing delinquency as well as family disor­
ganization. And there were those at the other end of the 
spectrum, such as William Healy, who saw psychological de­
fect as the most immediate cause (Mennel, 197 2:166-167). 
Rothman (1979:40) makes a distinction between the "environ­
mentalism" of the Jacksonian era reformers and that of the
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Progressives. While the former located "the roots of delin­
quency in the very structure and organization of their soci­
ety, " the Progressives "trace! delinquency to more limited 
and specific causes," namely, the lower class, immigrant 
family. As Sophonisba Breckenridge and Edith Abbott wrote 
in their book. The Delinquent Child and the Home, delinquen­
cy quite naturally results in children raised in homes
in which they have been accustomed from their ear­
liest infancy to drunkedness, immorality, obscene 
and vulgar language, filthy and degraded condi­
tions of living, (auoted in Pothman, 1979:41)
As Bothman seems to imply, the family provided a convenient 
"cause" that avoided the obvious problems of a purely psy­
chological approach while at the same time avoided blaming
the problem on any "inherent failings in the organization of 
American society" (1979: 42).
Perhaps the most significant indication of the role of
the family assumed by socialized -juvenile justice is found
in the law itself, in the doctrine of parens £atriae3 which 
saw the role of the State in juvenile justice as a substi­
tute for defective parents. The legal justification of the 
juvenile court implied that the State had the obligation to 
provide a proper "family" for delinquent, dependent, and 
neglected children who by definition lacked such.
3 The controversy over the actual role of the parens patriae 
doctrine in the evolution of juvenile law is noted. Even 
those who argue that it was largely superfluous, e.g. 
Schlossman (1977) and Fox (1979), recognize that family 
intervention was the objective and that parens patriae was 
not necessary to justify it, that the law already offered 
sufficient rationale for such action.
25
Several operating principles of juvenile justice follow 
from the assumption that the family is the major influence 
in delinquency, among them, the following:
1. The juvenile justice system has the responsibility to 
intervene into family affairs to ensure that proper 
child rearing occurs. This is accomplished through 
"social investigations", probation supervision, etc.
2. The State is the ultimate parent and must assume the 
burdens of child rearing when natural parents abdi­
cate their responsibilities. The State accomplishes 
this function through institutions, placement of 
children with foster parents, etc.
3. State intervention into "good”' families is unjusti­
fied.
Implicit in the doctrine of parens patriae is the fourth as­
sumption of socialized juvenile justice, the benevolence of 
the State.
The Nature of the State
The State through the instrument of the juvenile court is 
seen as the savior of troubled youth (i.e. those from inade­
quate families). It was assumed that "individual welfare 
coincided with the well-being of the state" (Bernard Flexner 
quoted in Rothman, 1979:36) and that the state reflected the 
consensus of all segments of society. This is in sharp con­
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trast to earlier and subsequent views of the State as worthy
of suspicion. As Fothman (1979:37) writes,
the rhetoric of benevolence, more than any single 
element, legitimated the [juvenile courtj move­
ment, giving it public standing as a reform de­
serving enactment.
The implications of this view of the State for the operation
of the juvenile justice system include:
1. The State must assume its protective role whenever it 
believes children are in jeopardy, providing them 
with care, guidance, treatment, etc.
2. Because of the State’s benevolence, there is no need 
for protection from it in the form of formal proce­
dures and other ’’legalisms".
3. As the ultimate protective and benevolent parent, the 
State has the obligation to protect not only juvenile 
offenders, but all juveniles in need of its solici­
tous care.
Throughout its history, juvenile justice as ideally de­
fined has experienced considerable difficulty in being actu­
alized as a working system. The wide gulf that has histori­
cally separated the ideal and the actual has been the basis 
for more than a century of reform efforts.
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Criticisms of socialized juvenile justice have taken a 
number of forms, among them:
1. That the much hailed reforms of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, particularly the juvenile 
court, represented not so much change as continuity. 
(Pox, 1970)
2. That the ideals of socialized juvenile justice were 
ill-conceived. They are hopelessly flawed, based as 
they are on naive assumptions of official benevolence 
and blindness to the classist nature of American so­
ciety. (Platt, 1973; Rothman, 1979)
3. That the motive of the self-styled reformers are su­
spect. Whatever humanitarian impulses they mioht 
have had, their overriding purpose was to make socie-
ral debate in juvenile justice revolves around 
and to what extent the socialized juvenile justice 
s above defined represents substantial reform in the 
ety responds to juvenile crime and misbehavior. The 
form" implies both change and progress; the social- 
tem has been said by critics to represent neither, 
ominance of the juvenile court for much of the twen- 
ntury bears testimony to the effectiveness of the 
ive rhetoric and to popular support, the vehemence 
Gault era reform testifies to the riaor of its crit-
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ty safe for the middle class. (Platt, 1973; Empey, 
1979)
4. That the particular ideals of the reformers were com­
promised, co-opted, and subverted by the establish­
ment, thus ensuring failure. (Fox, 1970; Senna and 
Siegel, 1981)
5. That when and to the extent that reform ideals did 
get embodied in policy, the policies failed to bring 
about the desired results. (Ryerson, 1978)
6. That for all the progressive reforms, crime and de­
linquency continues unchecked. (Ryerson, 1978)
As Sanford Fox (1970: 11 87) points out, there ha7e been
"three claims of major reform in the means for dealing with
juvenile deviants."
The opening of the New York House of Refuge in 
1825 has been denominated 'the first great event
in child welfare* in the period before the Civil
War. The second reform, probably the better known 
of the two, was the institution of the juvenile 
court by the Illinois legislature in 1899. Gault 
appears to mark a third great humanitarian effort.
These three major reforms may also be viewed as three phases
in the development of socialized juvenile justice: the era
of its emergence (1825-1899), the era of its domination
(1900-1967), and the era of its refinement (1967-present).
In this chapter, we will examine each of these developments
in light of criticisms leveled aaainst socialized juvenile
justice.
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The House of Refuae and the Emergence of Juvenile Justice
The opening of the New York House of Refuge by the Society 
for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents in 1825 marks 
the beginnings of socialized juvenile justice in the United 
States. It, in effect, represented the recognition of de­
linquency as a special problem that required a special re­
sponse, distinct from that of the criminal justice system 
which responded to similar behavior on the part of adults.
The period from 1825 to the turn of the century may be 
viewed as the era of the emergence of socialized juvenile 
justice. The primary vehicle for its emergence was the spe­
cialized correctional institution for juveniles, including- 
houses of refuge, reform schools, juvenile reformatories, 
industrial schools, juvenile asylums, and the like. Not 
surprisingly, given the variety of institutions involved and 
their development under different auspices in different ju­
risdictions over a relatively long period of time, it is 
difficult to characterize these institutions in general 
terms. Indeed, many of the later institutions were developed 
in direct response to the perceived failure of the earlier 
ones. Among the differences between institutions were those 
with respect to treatment orientation, some, particularly 
the earlier ones assuming a more authoritarian approach 
which emphasized military drill and stern discipline, while 
many of the later institutions assumed a family style ap­
proach, particularly those which adopted the so-called cot­
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tage system. Some of the institutions vere operated under 
private auspices while others were publicly funded and oper­
ated. Some concentrated their efforts on the "unfortunate" 
while others focused on the youthful criminal. Some viewed 
their major responsibility as the protection of society and 
the discipline of the youth in their care, while others 
viewed themselves as primarily the protectors and educators 
of their charges. The difficulty in characterizing these 
institutions in general terms is further complicated by the 
seemingly inconsistent objectives of the reformers and the 
institutions they helped to establish.
There are, nevertheless, a number of ideals, goals, and 
objectives common to most, if not all, of the reformers and 
institutions of the era. Against these the actual operation 
of juvenile justice in the nineteenth century may be judged. 
Tn this process, we make no effort to read the minds of the 
reformers, assuming as does Platt their "benign motives." 
(1969:4)4 We focus on their statements and their institu­
tions.
The first and most obvious concern of juvenile justice 
reformers throughout the century was the persistence and ap­
parent increase in juvenile crime and other troublesome be­
♦ Despite his condemnation of juvenile justice reformers, 
Platt writes that they viewed themselves "as altruists and 
humanitarians dedicated to rescuing those who were less 
fortunately placed in the social order." He further sug­
gests benign motives in writing of his attempt "to recon­
cile the intentions of the child savers with the institu­
tions they created." (1973:3-4)
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havior. In 1823, James Gerard of the Society for the Pre­
vention of Pauperism in the City of New York, the organiza­
tion most influential in the establishment of the New York 
House of Refuge, claimed that juvenile crime had doubled in 
the previous five or six years. (Ryerson, 1978:16) In 1854, 
Charles Loring Brace of the New York Children’s Aid Society 
described "the outcast, vicious, reckless multitude of New 
York boys, swarming now in every foul alley and low street," 
and expressed the fear that the day might come when "they 
come to know their power and use it." (quoted in Ryerson, 
1978:16) Clearly, the perception, whatever its basis in 
fact, that juvenile crime was constantly on the rise and, in 
any case, there was just too much of it, encouraged reform­
ers in their view that the status quo approach to the prob­
lem was inadequate and that something new and different was 
needed. Special institutions for these juvenile criminals 
would make of them productive members of society and would, 
presumably, result ultimately in a decrease in crime, juve­
nile and adult.
Closely linked to this concern with a perpetually rising 
wave of juvenile crime was a similar and, in the view of the 
early reformers, related rise in pauperism. In discussing 
the relation of pauperism and delinquency in the views of 
early nineteenth century reformers. Fox (1970:1199) writes, 
"These two social ills had come to be virtually synonymous." 
Both problems were laid to the moral defects of the individ-
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ual. Exemplifying this view is the statement by the Quaker 
reformer Thomas Eddy, chairman of the Humane Society's com­
mittee on pauperism. who wrote in an 1810 report of the
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century reformers, it provided a rationale for "saving" all 
"unfortunate" and/or "wicked" children. Whether they were 
considered as victims or victimizers, they were the proper 
objects of institutional efforts.
Although somewhat inconsistent with other views, particu­
larly of the early reformers, there was considerable concern 
throughout the century (and, in fact, to the present day) 
with the presumed contagious nature of pauperism and crimi­
nality. Central to efforts to establish separate institu­
tions for juveniles were the problems of juveniles being 
housed with adult paupers and criminals in jails, prisons, 
and almshouses. According to Mennel (1972:9-10), the pres­
ence of children in almshouses concerned the philanthropists 
even more than did their presence in jails. In their view, 
the practice would "guarantee a future supply of paupers and 
deviants." Confining children in jails and prisons with 
adult criminals was also, of course, a major preoccupation. 
The 1822 Report on the Penitentiary System in the United 
States submitted by the Society for the Prevention of Paupe­
rism "called public attention to the corruptive results of 
locking up children with mature criminals, citing this con­
tamination of innocence as one of the major evils that had 
resulted from prison reform." (Fox, 1970:1189) One reform­
er, John Pintard, characterized the state prisons as places 
of
promiscuous intercourse where little Devils are 
instructed to become great ones and at the expira­
tion of their terms turn out accomplished vil­
lains. (quoted in Mennel, 1972:8)
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Schlossman (1977:23) argues that this was in fact the cen­
tral issue in nineteenth century juvenile justice reform.
No theme emerge! with greater clarity in the cor­
rectional thought of the period than the dangers 
of housing children with adult of fenders.... Before 
all else, the House of Kefuge was the institution­
al embodiment of this line of argument.
A fourth concern was with what was considered by some to 
be undue severity of the criminal justice system in dealing 
with juveniles. The managers of the New York House of Bef­
uge, for example, pleaded:
Never let them be made victims of the law, their 
years and their inexperience forbid the idea of 
making them the subjects of retributive justice.
The vengeance of the law, when inflicted upon them 
as a terror to others, is altogether misplaced, 
and has neither vindication for its practice, nor 
apology for its severity. (quoted in Schlossman,
1977: 26)
Of perhaps even greater concern to a number of reform advo­
cates was what Fox (1970: 1 194) refers to as "nullif icat ion, " 
the reluctance of the public and the courts to respond to 
juvenile offenses because of the likely severity of the out­
come. Houses of refuge and other alternatives "would close 
the gaps through which children were escaping apprehension 
and conviction."
All of these concerns imply a preoccupation with delin­
quency prevention, not so much through the "deterrence" in­
volved in punishment as in Classical criminology, but 
through moral education, reform, and rehabilitation of de­
linquents and, especially, predelinquents (dependent, neg­
lected, and minor offenders). This, as well as the above
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concerns, is well illustrated in the 1823 report by the So­
ciety for the Prevention of Pauperism in the City of New 
York.
Every person that frequents the out-streets of 
this city, must be forcibly struck with the ragged 
and uncleanly appearance, the vile language, and 
the idle and miserable habits of great numbers of 
children, most of whom are of an age suitable for 
schools, or for some useful employment. The pa­
rents of these children, are, in all probability, 
too poor, or too degenerate, to provide them with 
clothing fit for them to be seen in at School; and 
know not where to place them in order that they 
may find employment, or be better cared for. Ac­
customed, in many instances, to witness at home 
nothing in the way of example, but what is degrad­
ing; early taught to observe intemperance, and to 
hear obscene and profane language without disgust; 
obliged to beg, and even encouraged to acts of 
dishonesty, to satisfy the wants induced by the 
indolence of their parents— what can be expected, 
but that such children will, in due time, become 
responsible to the laws for crimes, which have 
thus, in a manner, been forced upon them? Can it 
be consistent with real justice, that delinquents 
of this character, should be consigned to the in­
famy and severity of punishments, which must in­
evitably tend to perfect the work of degradation, 
to sink them still deeper in corruption, to de­
prive them of their remaining sensibility to the 
shame of exposure, and establish them in all har­
dihood of daring and desperate villainy? Is it 
possible that a Christian community, can lend its 
sanction to such a process without any effort to 
rescue and to save? (quoted in Fox, 1970:1189)
Considering the variety of concerns to which the reform­
ers intended the institutions to respond, it is hardly sur­
prising that there was confusion over the proper roles of 
such institutions. The central theme echoed throughout the 
century was that refuges, reform schools, and other similar 
institutions had as their primary objective, not punishment 
for some offense, but the "rescue" or "salvation" of unfor-
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tunate children. The managers of the Philadelphia House of 
Refuge, for example, claimed that their institution was "an 
asylum for friendless and unfortunate children, not a prison 
for young culprits." (quoted in Kennel, 1972:12) In mid- 
century, the International Penitentiary Congress expressed a 
similar view in resolving that delinquents should be educat­
ed, not punished, so that they might "gain an honest liveli­
hood and to become of use to society instead of an injury to 
it." (quoted in Platt, 1969:50) The idea of punishment, how­
ever, was never far from the surface. As Kennel (1972:12) 
notes of the Philadelphia House of Refuge, the institution 
with its high walls, tiny cells, and constant surveillance 
"hardly resembled a schoolhouse." The Mew York House of 
Refuge was characterized by James Dixon as "half prison and 
half school." (quoted in Kennel, 1972:12) The essentially 
penal nature of the New York House of Refuge is further in­
dicated in statements of its managers.
These little vagrants, whose depredations provoke 
and call down upon them our indignation are yet 
but children who have gone astray for want of that 
very care and vigilance we exercise towards our 
own. They deserve our censure, and a regard for 
our property, and the good of society, requires 
that they should be stopped, reproved, and pun­
ished. (quoted in Fox, 1970:1194)
At the same time, the vast majority of juveniles confined 
in the New York House of Refuge were not found guilty of any 
serious crime, but rather of exhibiting signs of future 
criminality —  "the conditions of misery, minor law break­
ing, and the habits of ignorance and vice." (Fox, 1979:11R2)
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As Schlossman [1977:27) writes, juvenile institutions in 
general "received not only convicted lawbreakers, but depen­
dent, neglected and recalcitrant youth committed by their 
parents for incorrigibility."
In general, then, these institutions had dual objectives; 
on the one hand, the care, treatment, education, rehabilita­
tion, etc- of juveniles, and on the other hand, the punish­
ment of such juveniles. In other words, both the protection 
of juveniles and the protection of society were considered 
essential objectives.
The objectives of these institutions are further illumi­
nated in their design and regimen. While, again, it is im­
portant to note that significant differences did exist among 
various institutions, the following descriptions and state­
ments of institutional objectives are generally applicable, 
except as noted.
The structure of the Philadelphia Rouse of Refuge as de­
scribed by its managers may be considered as reasonably typ­
ical of refuges and reform schools.
The main ediface is 92 feet in length. Its centre 
contains convenient apartments for a library, and 
for the use of the managers and the families of 
the officers of the institution. The wings, which 
are of consequence this entirely separate from 
each other, comprise the respective dormitories of 
the male and female pupils, and their several spa­
cious halls for schools. Each lodging room, of 
which there are eighty-six in either wing, is cal­
culated for entire solitude, being 7 feet in 
length, and 4 feet in breadth, furnished only with 
a small bedstead and shelf; but well lighted and 
ventilated, and exnosed at all times to absolute 
superintendence and inspection. Workshops are con­
structed in the extensive area, which is surround­
ed by a lofty wall- [quoted in Mennel, 1972:12)
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An official description of a typical day in the Hew York
House of Refuge provides some indication of the type of
"training" that took place in such institutions.
At sunrise, the children are warned, by the ring­
ing of a bell, to rise from their beds. Each child 
makes his own bed, and steps forth, on a signal, 
into the Hall. They then proceed, in perfect or­
der, to the Wash Boom. Thence they are marched to 
parade in the yard, and undergo an examination as 
to their dress and cleanliness; after which, they 
attend morning prayer- The morning school then 
commences, where they are occupied in summer, un­
til 7 o'clock. A short intermission is allowed, 
when the bell rings for breakfast; after which, 
they proceed to their respective workshops, where 
they labor until 12 o'clock, when they are called 
from work, and one hour allowed them for washing 
and eating their dinner. At one, they again com­
mence work, and continue at it until five in the
afternoon, when the labor of the day terminates.
Half an hour is allowed for washing and eating 
their supper, and at half-past five, they are con­
ducted to the school room where they continue 
their studies until 8 o'clock. Evening prayer is 
performed by the Superintendent; after which the 
children are conducted to their dormitories, which 
they enter, and are locked up for the night, when 
perfect silence reigns throughout the establish­
ment. The foregoing is the history of a single 
day, and will answer for every day in the year, 
except Sundays, with slight variations during
stormy weather, and the short days in winter.
(quoted in Kennel, 1972:18-19)
While later institutions may have placed a greater emphasis 
on education, and viewed the refuges as "quasi-prisons", the 
rules of the New York Juvenile Asylum in mid-century indi­
cate a similar outlook.
The work of the boys may consist of gardening, 
tailoring, shoemaking, the plaiting of straw and 
palm, the manufacture of brass nails...The girls 
shall be employed in cooking, washing, ironing, 
scouring, sewing, knitting....
Ho plav or conversation shall be allowed among 
the children, while engaged at their work, on pa­
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rade, at meals, or after they have retired to 
their sleeping rooms, (quoted in Mennel, 1972:45)
In the latter part of the century, J. C. Hite of the Ohio 
Boys' Industrial School, described his institution in simi­
lar terms as
a place of discipline, which means to educate, to 
instruct, to correct, and in some cases to chas­
tise....The principle that labor is honorable 
should be faithfully taught and upheld, but every 
wayward boy in a reformatory ought to be provided 
with such hinds of labor as will arouse in his 
mind most and get him thinking soonest.... Labor 
produces muscle, and muscle produces brain, (quot­
ed in Platt, 1959:72)
The basic objectives of these institutions in general can 
be summarized as follows in the context of major character­
istics of such institutions:
Isolation of juveniles from the contagious influence 
of adult criminals, paupers, deviants in general. 
These institutions provided alternatives to the in­
carceration of juveniles in jails, prisons, and alms­
houses. It was also an essential objective of most of 
these institutions to isolate their charges from the 
corrupting influences of city life, either through 
physical separation of the institutions from the sur­
rounding community by means of high walls, fences, 
etc. or by actually locating such institutions in ru­
ral areas. Finally, there was a recognition among 
many institution managers of the possible corrupting 
influences of experienced juvenile criminals on oth-
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ers in the institutions. This objective would be ac­
complished by means of classification systems in some 
cases and refusal to accept juveniles charged with 
serious crimes in others.
2. Regimentation as a form of discipline was character­
istically used to attain the objective of character 
development as well as to maintain order within the 
institutions. This took various forms in various in­
stitutions but nearly always involved rigorous sched­
uling of activities throughout the day. In some in­
stitutions, it was the regimen of the monastery, in 
others, that of the military or the factory. Idleness 
was not countenanced.
Authoritarianism characterized most of the institu­
tions and its stated objective was to train juveniles 
to respect authority. There were, however, exception­
al institutions in which managers subscribed to the 
view that genuine rehabilitation could only come 
about through the voluntary cooperation of the juve­
niles. The rule, nevertheless, seems to have been 
coerced respect.
4. Training juveniles for low level occupations was a
characteristic objective of the institutions. Skills 
taught were generally industrial, agricultural, or 
domestic. Most importantly, the institutions general­
ly felt obliged to train their charges to view menial 
work as having dignity.
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5- Salvation of not just criminal youth, but all youth 
who needed it, was the overriding objective of most 
of the institutions. The concern was not primarily 
with delinquent youth, but with those defined as pre­
delinquent, those living in conditions considered 
likely to lead to a life of crime. Thus, the institu­
tions housed a wide variety of juveniles —  the crim­
inal, the idle, the homeless, the incorrigible, the 
child lacking in proper morals, and so forth.
The Failure of Peform Schools and the Emergence of the Juve- 
nile Court
The eiergenge of special, separate courts for juveniles at 
the turn of the century marked the full institutional devel­
opment of the idea of socialized juvenile justice. This is 
not to say that the ideal of socialized justice was thereby 
realized, but simply that the institutional framework was 
largely in place, that the idea had attained legitimacy. 
While various types of "reform schools", probation, and 
"placing out" had provided the substantive response to de­
linquency and predelinquency, the juvenile court was the le­
gal legitimation of socialized justice.
From this point of view, the emergence of the juvenile 
court would seem to represent the completion of the work of 
reformers of the nineteenth century, certainly not a repudi­
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ation of their work. In this sense, the -juvenile court re­
formers are presumed to have been primarily concerned with 
procedural reform in the juvenile justice process, namely, 
the development of an alternative to the criminal justice 
process for addressing the problems of delinquent, depen­
dent, and neglected juveniles. This is, in fact, the view of 
the origin of the juvenile court expressed by Justice Fortas 
in the decision in Gault.
The early reformers were appalled by adult proce­
dures....The child...was to be made "to feel that 
he is the object of [the state*s] care and solici­
tude," not that he was under arrest or on trial.
The rules of criminal procedure were, therefore, 
altogether inapplicable. The apparent rigidities, 
technicalities, and harshness which they observed 
in...procedural criminal law were therefore to be 
discarded- (U.S. Supreme Court, 1968:1437)
Fox argues rather forcefully that "Whatever else the 1899 
legislation [Illinois Juvenile Court Act] reflected, it was 
not a movement to change procedures." Rather, he argues, it 
was a movement geared primarily to the improvement of insti­
tutional treatment of juveniles. (1970:1221) While Fox may 
overstate the case somewhat, the evidence he presents, as 
well as that presented by Mennel, Schlossman, Platt, and 
others, provides a clear indication that the roots of the 
juvenile court movement lie in the failure of the reforms of 
the previous century. Most of the major concerns of the ear­
lier reformers had not been met by the institutions which 
they helped to establish.
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In 1871, the Superintendent of the Chicago Reform School 
"echoed the concern expressed by reformers of fifty years 
earlier —  children ought not to be incarcerated with 
adults, and when set off by themselves they should be under 
a system of strict classification." (For, 1970:1222)
In 1898, Hastings Hart, a prominent Chicago reformer, ex­
pressed concern about "the keeping of children in poorhous- 
es" and called for legislation to forbid the practice, 
(quoted in Fox, 1970: 1223) Despite the efforts of the earli­
er reformers, hundreds of children continued to be placed in 
the Chicago -jails.
In the first six months of 1899, 312 boys under
the age of 16 were sent to the city jail, usually 
on charges of disorderly conduct which included 
everything from burglary to "flipping trains" and 
playing ball on the streets. (Platt, 1969:127)
The contagion issue which had so concerned the philanthro­
pists of the early 1800's continued to be the central issue 
for the "child savers" toward the end of the century. In 
1884, Adelaide Groves, a member of the Chicago Woman's Club, 
described the jails as "training schools for crime inhabited 
by children who would soon be men, ripe for the penitenti­
ary." (quoted in Platt, 1969:127) In 1898 the Warden of the 
Joliet State Penitentiary addressing the Illinois Conference 
on Charities argued.
You can not take a boy of tender years and lock 
him up with thieves, drunkards and half-crazy men 
of all classes and nationalities without teaching 
him lessons in crime, (quoted in Platt, 1969:132)
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Lemert (1970:37) writing of the same period in California, 
points out that despite the reformatories, children were ar­
rested and jailed along with criminals, prostitutes, and 
other disreputable characters, which “aroused the ire and 
fire of humanitarian organizations in San Francisco and Los 
Angeles at the turn of the century-"
Even where the creation of a juvenile court was specifi­
cally proposed, the issue of contagion appears to have been 
the central concern. Mrs. Perry Smith of the Chicago Wo­
man's Club, for example, proposed in 189 1 that a juvenile 
court be established so that children "might be saved from 
contamination of association with older criminals." (quoted 
in Platt, 1969:129) Another of the prominent Chicago re­
formers, Lucy Flower, said, "We are struggling very hard to 
get a juvenile reformatory in Chicago." (quoted in Fox, 
1970: 1223)
The Illinois "child savers" sought the aid of the Chicago
Bar Association in getting reform legislation through the
legislature. Their resolution at their 1898 meeting aqain
expresses concern not so much with procedural issues as with
institutional treatment.
WHEREAS, the State of Illinois and the City of 
Chicago, are lamentably deficient in proper care 
for delinquent children, accused or convicted of 
violation of law, lacking many of those reformato­
ry institutions which exist in other progressive 
states of the union; and WHEREAS, Children accused 
of crime are kept in common jails and police sta­
tions, and children convicted of misdemeanors are 
sentenced to the bridewell, where they are kept in 
immediate association with drunkards, vagabonds, 
and thieves; and WHEREAS, The judges having charge
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of the trial of children are in our courts so ov­
erburdened with other work as to make it difficult 
to give due attention to the cases of children, 
particularly those of the dependent and neglected 
classes; and WHEREAS, The State of Illinois makes 
no provision for the care of most of the children 
dependent upon the public for support, other than 
the public almshouses— unlike many neighboring 
states which have long ago passed laws prohibiting 
the keeping of children in the public almshouses: 
RESOLVED, That the president of this association 
appoint a committee of five of its members to in­
vestigate existing conditions relative to delin­
quent and dependent children, and to cooperate 
with committees of other organizations in formu­
lating and securing such legislation as may be 
necessary to cure existing evils and bring the 
State of Illinois and the City of Chicago up to 
the standard of the leading states and cities of 
the Onion. {quoted in Platt, 1969:131)
Indeed, as indicated in the above statements, and made clear
by Mennel {1972:126), Illinois was somewhat unique in the
sense that at the turn of the century it had no state reform
schools, owing in part to the great Chicago fire and the 0J[_-
Connell decision which struck down much of Illinois juvenile
procedure. Nevertheless, other aspects of the concern with
institutional improvement appear to have been common to many
of the states.
Considerable criticism struck at the very core of the
promises on which the institutions were based. They failed
to protect and they failed to rehabilitate. In Ryerson’s
{1978:19-20) words.
By the late nineteenth century, the artificial en­
vironments of the reformatories and even the in­
stitutions built on the cottage plan had earned 
reputations for both cruelty and ineffectiveness 
in rehabilitation. If they had ever been anything 
else, they had by then degenerated into custodial 
institutions which at best aided society by spar­
ing it the company of criminals for a brief period
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of time, but which also served as a breeding 
ground for the attitudes which perpetuated crime.
These institutions stood revealed not as agents of 
rehabilitation, but as devices of punishment, and 
punishment had come to seem futile as a means of 
controlling crime.
The ineffectiveness of these institutions is indicated in 
a number of ways. First, they did little to stem the appar­
ently rising tide of criminality. In 1902, the Juvenile Re­
cord noted.
From many sources comes the suggestion that crime, 
among children, is rapidly increasing. (guoted in 
Ryerson, 1978:16)
The general refusal of inmates to co-operate in their 
salvation is a further indication of the ineffectiveness of 
the institutions. Violent behavior of inmates and frequent 
attempts to escape seem to have characterized institutional 
life. In 1866, the main building at the Wisconsin State Re­
form School was burned to the ground by inmates. (Schloss- 
man, 1977:105) In 1859, the Massachusetts Reform School for 
Boys had been "partially destroyed by incendiarism and riot­
ing." (Mennel, 1972:55) The Massachusetts girls’ reform 
school was also burned by inmates. (Mennel, 1972:61-62) In 
1854, the cane shop at the New York Refuge was burned to the 
ground by an inmate. The foreman of the shop had been 
stabbed by an inmate in 1846. And again in 1872, a similar 
incident is reported to have occurred. (Mennel, 1972:28,61) 
A further indication of the refusal of inmates to cooperate 
in revealed in Kennel's (1972:29-30) examination of New York 
Refuge records for the years 1839-1841 wherein he discovered
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that approximately 40* of the inmates escaped or were re­
peatedly returned to the institution. These dramatic inci­
dents aside, the general non-cooperative attitude is re­
vealed in the journal of a matron of one such institution. 
She writes, "Disorder and indolence, defiance of rules and 
authority is the rule." (quoted in Mennel, 1972:108)
The refusal of many of these institutions to admit those 
juveniles who presumably most needed treatment also served 
to make them ineffective- As Fox (1970:1189) notes.
Only 'proper objects' were to be sent to the 
House, not every vagrant and criminal child. This 
limitation was conceived as a mandate to the 
courts that they commit to the House only those 
who could still be rescued.... The objects of House 
reform thus were seen as children who were not yet 
truly criminal.
The violence which characterized the institutions seems 
to have issued in large part from institutional management 
and staff. For all of the humanitarian rhetoric of the re­
formers, there was a growing realization that in practice 
the institutions engaged in a great deal of punishment, of­
ten brutal. An important rationale for the development of 
special institutions for juveniles in the first place was 
now turned against these very institutions early at the turn 
of the century. The refuges and reform schools had become 
the very types of institutions that they had established to 
replace. Several court decisions, beginning with O 'Connell 
in Illinois in 1870, State v. Ray in New Hampshire in 1886, 
and Ex parte Bicknell in California in 1897, acknowledged
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the essentially punitive nature of these reform institu­
tions- In the words of the decision in State v. Ray,
The school has always been regarded as a quasi pe­
nal institution, and the detention of its inmates 
or scholars as involuntary and constrained.
(quoted in Mennel, 1972: 125)
As previously noted, public statements by managers of
some institutions admitted to their equivocation on the
proper role of the institutions. As Schlossman (1977:30)
writes of them.
As often as they insisted that the Refuge was a 
school, they insisted that it was —  and was meant 
to be -- a prison.
Elijah Devoe, a former assistant superintendent at the New
York House of Refuge reported.
Corporal punishments are usually inflicted with 
the cat or a rattan. The latter punishment is ap­
plied is a great variety of places, such as the
palm or the back of the hands, top and bottom of
the feet, and lastly, but not rarely or sparingly, 
to the posteriors over the clothes, and also on 
the naked skin, (quoted in Schlossman, 1977:35)
Mennel (1972:107) describes the brutal treatment of a boy at 
the Illinois Reformatory in Pontiac who was hung by chains 
on a wall for nearly three days. He was then alternately 
beaten and given the 'water cure' until he died with his
back broken in three places. The Annual Report of the Soci­
ety for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents described 
the punishment inflicted on inmates who betrayed a trust.
The punishment consist in flagellation with a whip 
of strings, in solitary confinement to their 
cells, either with or without the accompaniment of 
a low diet, in forbidding anyone to hold communi­
cation with the offender without permission, and 
in extraordinary cases of flagitious conduct, in
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wearing an iron on one side, fastened to the waist 
at the one end and to the ankle at the other.
(quoted in Fox, 1970:1195)
Schlossman (1977:119-120) writes of the reign of terror at 
Wisconsin's reformatory under the management of William 
Sleep in the 1870's and 80*s- For example, a boy whose fa­
ther had unsuccessfully filed a habeas corpus petition was 
put in ball and chain, fed bread and water, and whipped reg­
ularly. He also tells of a sickly boy who was beaten until
he went into a fit, and in that condition was taken down to 
the pump room and had cold water pumped on him to bring him
out of the fit. There are also reports of Sleep personally
beating boys until he fell from exhaustion. Such brutality 
was, apparently, not uncommon in these institutions.
The daily routine of such institutions as described pre­
viously must also be considered to have exceeded the bounds 
of discipline to the point of being punitive. An additional 
common, though not universal, practice that must be men­
tioned briefly is that of exploitation of the inmates in 
various labor contract schemes, usually under the guise of 
educational programs. Platt (1969:105) briefly describes 
one such scheme.
After land and money had been appropriated, the 
State Reform School was finally opened in 1871 at 
Pontiac, about a hundred miles from Chicago. Dr- 
J. D. Scoullee, who was formerly a physician and 
Assistant Superintendent at the St. Louis Reform 
School, was appointed Superintendent and immedi­
ately contracted with private industry for the 
cheap labor of inmates. Although the trustees of 
the reformatory were prevented by law from leasing 
the labor of inmates for more than six hours a 
day, a contract was made with a Chicago shoe firm
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for the labor of fifty boys who were to be em­
ployed seven hours a day. A similar contract was 
made with Clark and Hill and Company for the manu­
facture of brushes. After these contracts were 
dissolved due to legal difficulties, many of the 
inmates were employed in cane-seating chairs for 
the Bloomington Manufacturing Company under the 
direction of officers of the School. Such was the 
main "educational" program in the new reformatory.
Mennel (1972:60-61) documents the violence and exploitation 
characteristic of reform school workshops. He cites one ex­
ample of inmates being whipped for not completing their 
tasks, "so that blood ran down into their boots."
While there were numerous other problems which character­
ized the reform schools —  financial difficulties, unsani­
tary conditions, staffing problems, political attacks, and 
the like —  the failure of such institutions appears to have 
been most fundamentally rooted in their ineffectiveness and 
their brutality.
While institutional reform may indeed have been the top 
priority of many reformers in the juvenile court movement, 
the establishment of the juvenile court was not merely a by­
product of their concerns or the result of the efforts of 
others. The idea appears to have been an essential part of 
the solutions they proposed. Lucy Flower's "Everyday Club" 
and other "child saving" organizations specifically explored 
the juvenile court idea. The Illinois Conference of Chari­
ties' 1898 meeting gave impetus to its development. In his 
closing speech to the Conference, Frederick Wines articulat­
ed the point of view of participants in calling for juvenile 
court legislation.
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We make criminals out of children who are not 
criminals by treating them as if they were crimi­
nals. That ought to be stopped. What we should 
have, in our system of criminal jurisprudence, is 
an entirely separate system of courts for chil­
dren, in large cities, who commit offenses which 
would be criminal in adults. We ought to have a 
"children's court" in Chicago, and we ought to 
have a "children's judge," who should attend to no 
other business. We want some place of detention 
for those children other than a prison....No child 
ought to be tried unless he has a friend in court 
to look after his real interests. There should be 
someone there who has the confidence of the judge, 
and who can say to the court, "Will you allow me 
to make an investigation of this case? Will you 
allow me to make a suggestion to the court?"
(quoted in Platt, 1969:132)
The first juvenile court was established in Illinois in 
1899 by "an act to regulate the treatment and control of de­
pendent, neglected, and delinquent children." (Platt, 
1969:133-134) The idea spread rapidly throughout the nnited 
States and throughout the world. By 1925, all states but 
Maine and Wyoming had established some type of special juve­
nile court, most modeled on the Illinois court. (Mennel, 
1972:132) Maine set up a Juvenile Court in 1931 and Wyoming 
in 1945. (Mennel, 1972:132) In most respects, the Illinois 
Juvenile Court and those of other states incorporated most 
of the elements that would characterize the socialized juve­
nile court into the 1960's.5 Faust and Brantingham (1979:14)
5 There is disagreement over whether Illinois had the first 
juvenile court. Massachusetts and New York laws of 1874 
and 1892 respectively provided for separate proceedings 
for children, while Judge Lindsey claimed that Colorado's 
1899 education law established the first juvenile court in 
the nation. (Platt, 1969:9) This illustrates that the ju­
venile court movement was not local, but national, in 
scope. It should also be noted that the Illinois Ret as 
initially enacted did not fully implement the juvenile
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summarize these characteristics (based on the Illinois law): 
Jurisdiction —  The juvenile court has jurisdiction 
not only over those accused of law or ordinance vio­
lations, but also over any juvenile (in Illinois, un­
der 16 years of age) who is thought to be dependent, 
neglected, immoral, incorrigible, etc.
2. Separation —  Separate judges are appointed to serve 
as juvenile court judges. Separate facilities, away 
from the adult court, are to be used for hearings in­
volving juveniles.
3. Noncriminal procedures —  Arrest warrants, indict­
ments, pleas, rules of evidence, etc. are discarded 
in favor of civil summonses, petitions, and informal 
procedures.
9. Probation —  The juvenile court has the authority to 
appoint probation officers to conduct investigations, 
make recommendations to the court, and supervise ju- 
ven iles.
5. Parens patriae —  The juvenile court should act as a 
parent rather than as a judge of guilt or innocence. 
(In the Illinois law: "This act shall be liberally
construed, to the end that its purposes may be car-
court idea. It contained elements of criminal procedure, 
provisions for notice of charges, jury trial of disputed 
facts, and jurisdiction only in cases of law violation. 
The Act was amended in 1901 and 1907 to bring it more in 
line with socialized justice, including provisions extend­
ing the court's jurisdiction to incorrigible, immoral, 
neglected, and other non-criminal juveniles. (Faust and 
Brantingham, 1979: 19-15; Mennel, 1972: 198)
5?
ried out, to wit: that the care, trust, custody and
discipline of a child shall approximate as nearly as 
may be that which should be given by its parents.'1)
With the almost universal adoption of the juvenile court 
idea by the 1920*s, the idea of socialized justice for juve­
niles was firmly in place. The components of systems, while 
not identical in all jurisdictions, generally include the 
following:
1. Entry into the system continued to be, for the most 
part, via contact with police. Ideally, however, 
there are specialized juvenile officers. In addi­
tion, considering that law violation is not the only 
basis for intervention, referrals from welfare agen­
cies, schools, parents, etc. are appropriate.
2. Juvenile detention facilities rather than jails and 
police lock-ups serve as appropriate holding facili­
ties for juveniles awaiting further processing. Under 
no circumstances are juveniles to be allowed contact 
with adult criminals by being held in adult facili­
ties. Furthermore, detention is to be non-punitive 
(as it is in theory for adults also).
3. Probation officers are appointed to serve as intake 
agents screening juveniles for court processing or 
informal disposition, conduct social investigations 
for the court, make recommendations to the court, and
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supervise juveniles placed on fornal or informal pro­
bation.
4. The central component is the juvenile court itself 
with its separate facilities and personnel. Since its 
purpose is parental care and treatment rather than 
determination of guilt and appropriate punishment, it 
shall be constituted not as a trial court but as an 
investigative agency# determining appropriate reha­
bilitative programs and arranging for their provi­
sion. 6
5. The juvenile correctional institutions developed in 
the nineteenth century continued to serve, along with 
probation, as the major dispositional options avail­
able to the court. Through such dispositions (and, 
ideally, a wide range of other alternatives) the ju­
venile was not to be punished, but provided with a 
treatment program tailored to his/her individual 
needs —  educational, social, moral, psychological, 
etc. All such dispositions are to be determined with­
in the principle that the family, preferably one’s 
own if it is adeguate, is the preferred treatment
6 Ideally, the court was to operate with a two-step hearing 
procedure. The first, the adjudicatory hearing, based on 
relevant and reliable evidence "to determine whether the 
youth...had done something or suffered under such condi­
tions as to warrant some state intervention..." In the 
second step, the dispositional hearing, the court would 
act as a social agency examining anything which might be 




The general attitudinal orientation of the juvenile jus­
tice system was to be one of benevolent, solicitous care. 
In his history of "progressive" juvenile justice, Schlossman 
(1977) uses the term Mlove" to characterize this orienta­
tion. Several juvenile court judges similarly characterize 
their orientation in terms of the love of a father for his 
son. Chicago's Judge Tuthill observed in 1902,
I have always felt, and endeavored to act in 
each case, as I would were it my own son who was 
before me in the library at home, charged with 
some misconduct, (quoted in Platt, 1969:144)
The editors of Survey similarly wrote in 1910, that the 
judge might occasionally "put his arm around [the child's] 
shoulder and draw the lad to him." (quoted in Platt, 
1969:144) Judge Harvey Baker of the Boston Juvenile Court, 
in the same issue of Survey described the judge's role as 
analogous to that of a doctor treating his patient. "The of­
ficials of the court believe it is helpful to think of them­
selves as physicians in a dispensary." (Baker, 1979:147) 
Whether the socialized juvenile justice system is viewed as 
a loving parent or a caring physician, it is to act always, 
in the phrase used frequently throughout its history, "in 
the best interests of the child."
The Failure of Socialized Juvenile Justice
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In much the same way as the perceived iailures of juvenile 
justice reform of the nineteenth century paved the way for 
the juvenile court movement, so did the perceived failure of 
fully socialized juvenile justice pave the way for major re­
forms in the post-Gault era. Whatever other factors may 
have been involved in each reform in the history of American 
juvenile justice, each reform had its roots in the failure 
of previous reforms.
Socialized juvenile justice as fully defined with the 
emergence of the juvenile court was widely acclaimed 
throughout the country when it first appeared. The idea was 
embraced by state legislatures, legal scholars, appellate 
courts, social workers, and judges such as Tuthill, Hack, 
Lindsey, and Baker, as a humane, just, and effective ap­
proach to the problem of juvenile crime and misbehavior. The 
Illinois Juvenile Court Act was proclaimed as "the chief 
event of the year.” One proponent claimed that it would 
"prove the dawn of a new era in our criminal history." 
(Platt, 1969:146) One New York Juvenile Court official con­
cluded that.
Considering the slowness which changes in judicial 
procedures are brought about, the rapid extension 
of the children's court is extraordinary and bears 
witness to its social need and constructive worth.
There was in fact a general view that the idea held such
promise as to be unopposable. "Only ignorance of what it re­
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ally is could make anyone oppose the juvenile court." ( q u o t ­
ed in Rothman, 1979:37) Prederick Howe predicted that as a 
result of the socialized juvenile court, "the budding crop 
of crime of the next decade will be largely diminished." 
(quoted in Mennel, 1972:133)
However, as Ryerson (1978:78) writes, "the ease with 
which the reformers secured acceptance of their promise gave 
no hint of the difficulty they would encounter in keeping 
it." She goes on to note.
The honeymoon of the juvenile court with the pub­
lic was remarkably brief. With no more than a dec­
ade's experience behind it, the juvenile court, be­
came the subject of public investigation and 
newspaper campaigns-
Faust and Brantingham (1979:19) write that the court was 
subjected to a "thin stream of criticism from its very be­
ginnings. "
At the same time, it must be noted that the juvenile 
court and socialized juvenile justice had friends in high 
places, most notably, in appellate courts. The view ex­
pressed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth 
v. Fisher, (in Faust and Brantingham, 1979:156-162) the 
first major constitutional challenge to the juvenile court, 
affirming the constitutionality (and the wisdom) Pennsylva­
nia's Juvenile Court Act, remained without serious challenge 
until the U.S. Supreme Court's 1966 decision in Kent v. the 
United States. (U.S. Supreme Court, 1967) Furthermore, 
critics won few battles against the juvenile court prior to
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the revision of California juvenile law in 1961 and similar 
revisions in New York in 1962- {Brantingham, 1979:259-269)
To what extent did the reforms of the juvenile court era 
represent genuine progress in the handling of deviant and 
victimized juveniles? fcs Empey {1979:293) points out, this 
requires that we ask both whether the reforms represented 
improvements over existing conditions and whether they were 
superior to other possible alternatives. We begin by reiter­
ating the similarity of the concerns of the "child savers" 
at the turn of the century to their predecessors and use 
their criteria for judging the success of earlier efforts to 
judge the effectiveness of the system they helped to devel­
op. Did the socialized justice that emerged with the juve­
nile court stem the apparently rising crime wave, end the 
practice of confining juveniles in jails, replace punishment 
and brutality with treatment, and address the problems of 
"predelinquent" and other troubled juveniles? The evidence, 
unfortunately, is fairly convincing that the early twentieth 
century reformers had at least as dismal a record as their 
predecessors.
While it is difficult to find reliable statistical data 
on juvenile crime rates, FBI and juvenile court statistics 
indicate a steadily rising level of juvenile crime despite 
the efforts of socialized juvenile justice. From the 1940's 
through the 1960's, official statistics indicate annual in­
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creases every year with the exception of those years immedi­
ately following World War II to 1949. From 1957 to 1965, 
according to Children's Bureau statistics, the juvenile 
crime rate rose 58%. (Ryerson, 1978:146) Whatever the actual 
rates, there is no evidence to suggest that socialized juve­
nile justice did anything to curtail juvenile crime.
The practice of confinina juveniles in adult facilities 
was a major concern of the juvenile court reformers as it 
was of their predecessors. The extent to which they suc­
ceeded ending that practice would then be one measure of 
their success. In her 1918 survey of juvenile courts for 
the U.S. Children's Bureau, Evelina Belden noted that few 
juvenile courts "had solved one of the problems that had 
most bothered juvenile court reformers —  the pretrial de­
tention of children in jails where they mixed with adult of­
fenders." [quoted in Ryerson, 1978:82) Similarly, leraert 
(1970:92-94) in discussing the issues of most concern to 
California governor's conferences on delinquency in the 
1940's and 50's, notes that the use of jails for detaining 
juveniles was routine, despite the fact that it was explic­
itly prohibited by law. According to Platt (1969: 146), the 
situation in Illinois was the same —  that despite its pro­
hibition, children continued to be placed in adult jails.
The continuation of punitive, and often brutal, "treat­
ment" for juveniles, perhaps more than any other factor, is 
indicative of the failure of socialized juvenile justice.
60
Platt's (1969:146) statement with respect to Illinois seems
applicable to most states.
The act...did little to change the guality of in­
stitutional life for delinquents, though it facil­
itated the means by which juvenile offenders could 
be "reached" and committed.
He goes on to describe some of the more brutal practices at 
the State Home for Delinquent Boys (the St. Charles School). 
They included whipping with a leather strap, use of mana­
cles, boys being confined to the "hole" for up to 32 days, 
handcuffed to an iron pipe, without shoes, and with only 
boards on the floor to sleep on. (Platt, 1969:148-149) Fox 
(1970:1232-1233) writes that reform schools remained largely 
unchanged. He quotes Albert Deutsch to the effect that only 
the terminology had changed.
The disciplinary or punishment barracks —  some­
times these veritable cell blocks were more for­
bidding than adult prisons —  were known official­
ly as "adjustment cottages," or "lost privileges 
cottages." Guards were "supervisors." Employees 
who were often little more than caretakers and 
custodians were called "cottage parents." Whips, 
paddles, blackjacks and straps were "tools of con­
trol." Isolation cells were "meditation 
rooms."...Catch-words of the trade —  "individual­
ization of treatment," "rehabilitating the malad­
justed" —  rolled easily off the tongues of many 
institutional officials who not only didn’t put 
these principles into practice but didn't even un­
derstand their meaning.
As Rothman (1979:66) writes, "State training schools never 
did become places of education as opposed to places of pun­
ishment." The net result of juvenile court legislation, he 
claims, was to "supplement incarceration, not to substitute 
for it."
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The failure of the institutions to "rehabilitate" and 
"educate" suggests that socialized juvenile justice failed 
in its efforts to prevent delinquency by intervention into 
the lives of "pre-delinquents." Juvenile court legislation 
had given juvenile courts extremely broad jurisdiction over 
delinquent, dependent, and neglected children. That the in­
stitutions to which such children were frequently committed 
were "heavily punitive and functioned much like adult pris­
ons" {Fox, 1970: 1239) without due process of law, that such 
institutions were widely viewed as schools of crime, that 
contact with the juvenile justice system stigmatized youth, 
and that the wide range of social services associated with 
socialized justice was largely nonexistent, suggest that the 
socialized juvenile justice system could only fail as a de­
linquency prevention agency.
There were numerous other aspects of socialized juvenile 
justice which were subjected to significant criticism which 
paved the way for Gault and post-Gault reform. Most of 
these are subsumed under one or more of the major lines of 
argument against socialized juvenile justice. Faust and 
Brantingham refer to them as {1)the Retributionists, {2) the 
Pract.ica lists, and (3) the Constitutionalists. 7
7 In the discussion of these positions, we rely heavily on 
Faust and Brantingham, Juvenile Justice Philosophy {1979:19-25 and 139-196). - - -
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(1) Retribution —  The retributionist argument (or, as 
Platt calls it, the "legal moralist" argument) was articu­
lated by John Wigmore in 1926 and is similar to the "get 
tough on young criminals" arguments that have been popular 
in recent years- (Platt, 1973:152; Wigmore,1979:170) While 
Wigmore claimed support for the juvenile court stating that 
he was "proud that Illinois invented it," he was clearly 
critical of the socialization of the court. According to his 
argument, socialized justice undermines the functions of 
criminal law which he defines as
1. Pronouncing and reaffirming moral law,
2- Threatening and thus deterring other possible offend­
ers, and
3. Handling the individual offender so as to prevent 
repetition of his offense.
In failing to condemn juvenile crime, the socialized court 
undermines criminal law and, thus, the moral fabric of soci­
ety. As Wigmore wrote.
The courtroom is the only place in the community 
where the moral law is laid down to the people 
with the voice of authority. (1979:170)
While the retributionist argument did have some impact on 
subsequent reform, the practicalists and the constitutional­
ists had, by far, the greatest impact.
(2) Practicality —  The disjunction between the theory 
and practice of socialized juvenile justice has long been a 
major concern of critics. Judges Julian Hack and Edward
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Waite, while supporters of socialized juvenile justice, ear­
ly warned of the potential for despotism inherent in the ju­
venile court. Mack (1979:106) warned against the possibili­
ty of the state failing to provide the services that justi­
fied its unfettered powers of intervention.
If a child must be taken away from its home, if 
for the natural parental care that of the state is 
substituted, a real school, not a prison in dis­
guise, must be provided.
Implicit is the notion of a quid pro quo whereby the state 
promises care, education, etc. in exchange for procedural 
protections, due process. If these are empty promises, ju­
venile justice is nothing but despotism.
It appears that the promises of socialized justice were 
largely empty. A number of points have been raised. The pu­
nitive nature of the institutions has been discussed previ­
ously. Two additional components of the system require dis­
cussion —  probation departments and the courts themselves.
As previously noted, socialized juvenile justice ideally 
provides for a wide range of treatment alternatives tailored 
to individual needs. In fact, the only commonly available 
alternative to incarceration has been probation. The evi­
dence suggests that not only have probation departments been 
unable to provide the wide range of alternatives and, per­
haps should not be expected to, they have experienced diffi­
culty even meeting minimal socialized justice functions of 
screening, social investigation, and supervision of proba­
tioners. Two points in particular stand out as most proble­
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matic. First, staffing seems always to have been a problem 
with probation officers "undertrained and overworked." 
(Rothman, 1979:66) In addition to their other responsibili­
ties to the court, it is not apparently uncommon for proba­
tion officers to carry ongoing caseloads in excess of 100. 
Under such circumstances, it seems unlikely that the super­
vision and treatment offered and the investigations conduct­
ed can be much more than formalities. Secondly, the orien­
tation of probation officers to their work has frequently 
been punitive and coercive rather than caring, helping, and 
so forth. Hennel (1972:143) guotes probation advocate Homer 
Folks who wrote, "Probation is a new kind of reformatory, 
without walls and without much coercion." However, as Hennel 
says.
Coercion...lurked close to the surface. Probation 
officers emphasized the friendly aspect of visita­
tion, but simultaneously they felt compelled to 
threaten the delinquent and his family. "When 
sterner treatment was demanded," said one officer,
"the friendly adviser became the official repre­
sentative of the court with the demand that cer­
tain conditions be observed or that the probation­
er be returned to the court."
The essence of probationary treatment is indicated as Hennel
quotes Henry Thurston.
All right-minded people are willing to have boys 
and girls have chances to do the right thing, but 
after they persistently throw chances away the 
same people have a right to insist that these 
young people be really controlled, even if it 
takes a criminal court process to do it.
There are also indications that the ideals of socialized
justice were also somewhat foreign to the courtroom. The
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Lundberg and Lenroot survey of 1925, for example, "found 
that the atmosphere in the courtroom varied widely from the 
spirit reformers associated with that procedure; in almost 
half of these ten urban courts, they found that the conduct 
of hearings was 'quasi-criminal.'" A 1929 article claimed 
that the notion of juvenile courts as "separate and distinct 
from the spirit and practice of the criminal courts...with 
certain exceptions...[was ] an observation at absolute vari­
ance with the facts." {quoted in Ryerson, 1978:94) Platt 
(1969: 159) writes.
Informal procedures and confidentiality in juve­
nile court do not necessarily guard juveniles 
against "degradation ceremonies." The juvenile 
court, despite any intentions to sympathize with 
juvenile problems, is structurally organized to 
make judgements about positive and negative social 
behavior.
Judge Lindsey observed in 1914, "There is often a very real 
deprivation of liberty, nor is that fact changed by refusing 
to call it punishment or the good of the child is stated to 
be the object." The President's Commission on Law Enforce­
ment and the Administration of Justice noting findings of 
the 1920 Children's Bureau survey which found juvenile 
courts falling far short of the ideals of socialized justice 
reported,
A similar survey conducted by the Children's Bu­
reau and this Commission in 1966 revealed signifi­
cant gaps still existing between the ideal and ac­
tual court structures, practices, and personnel.
(quoted in Faust and Brantingham, 1979:141)
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(3) Constitutionality —  The constitutionalist argument 
had by far the greatest impact on socialized juvenile jus­
tice. It should, however, be noted that their arguments 
were premised on the disjunction between theory and practice 
discussed above. Rad the socialized juvenile justice system 
been genuinely non-punitive, non-coercive, and actually a 
provider of services for troubled youth, it is difficult to 
envision constitutionalist objections to it. The core of 
the constitutionalist criticism was that, despite the benev­
olent rhetoric, the juvenile justice process was indeed a 
coercive, punitive, stigmatizing process. Its functions are 
not very different from those of the criminal court. Juve­
nile courts, they argued, are in fact bona fide courts of 
law, "invested with the authority and coercive power of the 
state." (Faust and Brantingham, 1979:139) From the begin­
ning, constitutionalists argued that the socialized juvenile 
court
stigmatized adolescents as *delinguents* and in­
carcerated them in institutions that could not be 
distinguished in practice from adult prisons. In 
so doing, the juvenile court performed as a crimi­
nal court, but did so without giving juveniles any 
measure of procedural protection —  the protection 
of ’due process of law* guaranteed by the nnited 
States Constitution. (Faust and Brantinaham,
1979:20)
For many years, the appellate courts accepted the myth of 
socialized juvenile justice. One of the earliest constitu­
tional challenges to the juvenile court was the case of Com­
monwealth v. Fisher (in Faust and Brantingham, 1979: 156-162)
67
The appellant argued that, among other things, the Pennsyl­
vania Juvenile Court Ret was unconstitutional in that it 
provided unequal treatment, different punishments for the 
same offense on the basis of age, that it denied due process 
of law, that it denied his constitutional right to a "jury 
trial, and so forth. In rejecting these arguments, the Su­
preme Court of Pennsylvania endorsed the juvenile court idea 
while noting that the appellant falsely assumed "that the 
proceedings of the act of 1903 are of a criminal nature for 
the punishment of offenders for crimes committed, and that 
the appellant was so punished." (in Faust and Brantingham, 
1979:159) The Court argued that the juvenile court was, in 
fact, "not for the punishment of offenders but for the sal­
vation of children..." (in Faust and Brantingham, 1979: 157) 
In 1946, Paul Tappan led the constitutionalists in argu­
ing that the Constitution required certain procedures to be 
followed in juvenile court, among them, notice of specific 
charges, adjudication on the basis of evidence, the right to 
counsel, the right to cross-examination, and the right to 
appeal. (1979) By the 1960*s, the constitutionalists argu­
ments began to have an impact of the system beginning with 
revisions of California and New York juvenile codes in the 
early 60*s. (Brantingham, 1979) In 1967, the President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Jus­
tice called for an end to the socialized juvenile justice 
system which it considered a failure. The Commission recora-
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mended that it be replaced with a social service referral 
system to handle minor cases and a junior criminal court to 
handle serious ones. (Faust and Brantingham, 1979:146) The 
Commission agreed essentially with the constitutionalists 
that "the juvenile justice system was motivated by the same 
purposes that characterized the adult criminal justice sys­
tem —  retribution, condemnation, deterrence, and incapaci­
tation." (Faust and Brantingham, 1979:21)
At about the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court entered 
the fray, largely on the side of the constitutionalists. In 
1967, the Court issued its historic decision in the case of 
In Re Gault (1968) in which they recognized that the juve­
nile justice system, despite the benevolent rhetoric of so­
cialized justice, was essentially a criminal justice system 
for juveniles and, as such, must operate within the consti­
tutional requirements of due process of law. Justice Fortas 
wrote for the majority.
I proceeding where the issue is whether the child 
will be found to be "delinquent" and subjected to 
the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in 
seriousness to a felony prosecution. (1968:1448)
In agreement with the constitutionalists, Fortas wrote.
The fact of the matter is that, however euphemis­
tic the title, a "receiving home" or an "industri­
al school" for juveniles is an institution of 
confinement in which the child is incarcerated for 
a greater or lesser time. His world becomes "a 
building with whitewashed walls, regimented rou­
tine and institutional hours...." Instead of 
mothers and fathers and sisters and brothers and 
friends and classmates, his world is peopled by 
guards, custodians, state employees, and "delin­
quents" confined with him for anything from way­
wardness to rape and homicide.
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Tn vie* of this, it would be extraordinary if our 
Constitution did not require the procedural regu­
larity and the exercise of care inplied in the
phrase "due process." Tinder our Constitution, the
condition of being a boy does not justify a kanga­
roo court." (1968: 1443-4)
The Court specifically required that the following constitu­
tional rights be protected and procedures followed:
1. Notice of charges be given.
2. Bight to cross-examination.
3. Privilege against self-incrimination.
4. Bight to counsel when liberty is at stake.
5. Bight to a transcript of the proceedings.
6. Bight to appeal.
In 1970, the Court "fully recognized the criminal court 
qualities of juvenile justice" when it found in In Re Win- 
ship "that, where a 12-year-old boy is charged with an act 
of stealing which renders him liable to confinement for as
long as six years, then, as a matter of due process,... the
case against him must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 
(1971:1075)
It was, presumably, the beginning of the end for social­
ized juvenile justice as the states began to revise their 
juvenile codes to bring them in line with the Constitutional 
requirements mandated by the Supreme Court. The failure of 
previous "radical" reforms, however, inevitably leads to 
skepticism with respect to the kind of "juvenile justice" 
that is emerging in the post-Gault era. Rs Fox (1970: 
1235) writes, "Procedural revolution in the juvenile courts
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may well be the most recent myth of juvenile justice re­
form. "
Historical Failure and the Emergence of Post-Gault Reform 
The Idea Is of Post-Gault Reform
Along with the procedural reforms in the juvenile court pro­
cess mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court, a number of other 
concerns, all rooted in specific failures of socialized ju­
venile justice, emerged as central issues of post-Gault re­
form of juvenile codes. These are perhaps best summarized 
by Empey (1979:292) as "the four D's:"
1- Pue Process: The application of constitutionally
guaranteed procedural safeguards in the judicial pro­
cessing of juveniles, most especially the provision 
for legal representation in all cases.
2. Decriminalization: The juvenile justice process
should be concerned with juveniles who violate crimi­
nal law. Offenses should be specific. Juveniles 
should not be punished more severely than adults and 
should not be punished for offenses which are not 
criminal for adults. Status offenses and neglect 
should be handled nonjudicially.
3. Diversion: Recognizing the negative effects of juve­
nile justice processing, particularly the stigma at­
tached to it, juveniles should be diverted away from 
the juvenile justice system whenever possible, par­
ticularly in the cases of first offenders and/or 
those charged with relatively minor offenses.
4. Deinstitutionalization: Juvenile offenders must al­
ways receive the least restrictive alternative possi­
ble in a particular case. Recognizing the apparent 
inability of institutions to reform and the unnatural 
environment of institutions, juveniles should be 
treated whenever possible in the community, prefera­
bly while residing at home. Consideration should be 
given to the complete elimination of reform school 
type institutions. Furthermore, there should be a 
strict prohibition of the practice of confining juve­
niles in jails or other adult facilities. Where de­
tention is necessary for the protection of the juve­
nile or the community, it should be in a special 
juvenile detention facility.
Post-Gault reformers by and large have envisioned a juve­
nile justice system that offers the procedural protections 
of the criminal justice system as well the solicitous care 
of socialized justice, the "best of both worlds," rather 
than what Justice Fortas called the "worst of both worlds." 
(U.S. Supreme Court, 1967: 1054) Whether such a system has
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emerged and whether it is just and effective seen to depend 
in part on the extent to which post-Gault reformers managed 
to avoid the pitfalls of their predecessors.
Chapter III 
THE EHEBGBNCE OF POST-G&DLT BEFORE IE H&IIE
In order to understand and assess juvenile justice reform in 
Maine in the 1970's, it is necessary to understand the evo­
lution of juvenile justice in the state, the post-Gault re­
form process in Maine, and the principles, goals, and ideals 
which the reformers hoped to incorporate into Maine's juve­
nile justice system. To these ends, this chapter presents 
an overview of pre-reform juvenile justice in Maine, includ­
ing an historical sketch of juvenile law up to the time of 
enactment of the new Juvenile Code. The history of the re­
form process itself is also outlined. This will provide 
some basis for understanding the nature of the reform. More 
importantly, through an of examination the documents which 
comprise this history, it will be possible to ascertain the 
ideals which informed the reform process and which consti­
tute an important basis on which its success can be judged.
Historical Overview
The history of juvenile justice in the State of Maine does 
not differ substantially from the general history of juve­
nile justice in hmerica as described in the previous chap-
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ter. Maine was, however, one of the last states to estab­
lish a juvenile court, not doing so until the enactaent of 
"An Act to Extend the Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts in 
Certain Cases" in 1931. (Maine Legislature, 1931: 273-27*4) 
Prior to 1931, the law did not distinguish between juveniles 
over seven years of age and adults. The decision of the Law
Court in Wade y. Warden of State Prison (Maine Supreme
Court, 1950:128) summarizes pre-juvenile court law as it re­
lates to juveniles.
At the common law, the same court had jurisdiction 
over juvenile offenders that had jurisdiction over 
those of mature years. Children under seven years 
of age were conclusively presumed to lack mental 
capacity to commit a crime. In the case of felo­
nies, if the child was over seven years, he could
be proceeded against by complaint and warrant be­
fore a magistrate, and if the magistrate found 
that a crime had been committed, and that there 
was probable cause that the infant was guilty, he 
could be held for the grand jury; or a prosecution 
could be instituted before the grand jury without 
going before the magistrate in the first, instance.
Such was the law in Maine until the year 1931.
While juveniles in Maine prior to 1931 were subject to the 
same criminal justice system as were adults, it should be 
noted that in practice juveniles did not always receive such 
treatment. As with most other states, Maine has had special 
reformatories for juveniles since the mid-nineteenth centu­
ry. So it must be assumed that juveniles were frequently 
sentenced to these institutions rather than to adult facili­
ties. Furthermore, it can be assumed that juveniles were 
sometimes dealt with more leniently by the criminal justice 
system than their adult counterparts. This has been charac­
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teristic of juvenile justice generally prior to the estab­
lishment of special juvenile justice systens.
The Act of 1931, brief as it is, includes several of the 
key elements of the "socialized juvenile court". First, 
though not specifically referred to as such, in granting 
"exclusive original jurisdiction" to the municipal court 
"over all offenses committed by children under the age of 
fifteen years," a juvenile court is established, although in 
Maine it was the municipal court functioning as such. Fur­
ther, the Act specified that adjudication or judgement under 
such proceedings does not constitute a criminal conviction. 
The secrecy provisions common to most juvenile court lavs 
are similarly present in the Act of 1931, in that the gener­
al public is excluded from all proceedings, only persons 
having a "direct interest in the case" being admitted and 
all records of the municipal court in such cases are closed 
to the public except by permission of the court. That the 
primary function of the municipal court in juvenile cases is 
rehabilitative is implicit both in the provision that de­
scribes proceedings as non-criminal and in the provisions 
regarding dispositions available to the court. The judge is 
authorized by the law to appoint special probation officers 
in juvenile cases to "promote the interests of all con­
cerned."8 The court is authorized to place juveniles "under
8 It should also be noted that consistent with the general 
history of juvenile justice in the United States, little 
provision was made for resources to carry out the func­
tions of probation. The law requires the reimbursement of
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the supervision, care and control" of probation officers, 
agents of the state board of children's guardians, to place 
the juvenile in a "suitable family home" subject to supervi­
sion by probation or the state board, may commit the juve­
nile directly to the state board, may make any other dispo­
sition that seems "best for the interests of the child and 
for the protection of the community including commitment of 
such child to the state school for boys or state school for 
girls." This rehabilitative ideal is further implicit in a 
provision governing exceptions to the provision that munici­
pal court judgements shall not be deemed criminal convic­
tions. This provision "shall not apply to sentences under 
paragraph two of section four hereof." The paragraph in 
question appears to allow for the treatment of juveniles as 
"criminals" in certain cases.
Unless the offense is aggravated or the child is 
of a vicious or unruly disposition no court shall 
sentence or commit a child to jail, reformatory, 
or prison, or hold such child for the grand jury.
There are, of course, a number of major differences between 
Maine's first juvenile court law and early juvenile court 
legislation in other jurisdictions, the Illinois Juvenile 
Court Law, for example. Most noteworthy is the failure of 
the Law of 1931 to specify what constitutes a juvenile of­
fense which falls within the jurisdiction of the court. One 
must assume that such offenses were acts in violation of the
such officers for "actual expenses incurred in the per­
formance of their duties." Implied is that these probation 
officers are volunteers.
State's criminal statutes. Thus, it appears that under 
Maine's earliest juvenile court statute, definitions of ju­
venile only offenses were not part of the lav.
From the time of the 19 31 legislation to the enactment of 
the new Juvenile Code in 1977, numerous changes were made in 
juvenile justice in the State. By 1993, for example, the 
upper age limit for juvenile jurisdiction of the municipal 
courts had been raised to 17 years. The 1993 "Act Relating 
to Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts in Criminal and Juvenile 
Cases" renames the Municipal Court, in juvenile cases the 
"juvenile court." {Maine Legislature, 1993:397) It further 
refines the wording of the original legislation such that 
adjudication or judgements in juvenile cases "shall be that 
the child was guilty of juvenile delinquency and no such ad­
judication or judgement shall be deemed to constitute a con­
viction for crime." Perhaps, the most significant change is 
with regard to the limitations on "original and exclusive 
jurisdiction" of the juvenile courts in such cases. Whereas 
the 1931 legislation had relatively loose language allowing 
for criminal processing of juveniles whose offense was "agg­
ravated" or who were "of a vicious or unruly disposition," 
the 1993 changes allow such proceedings against a juvenile 
only if the offense is "a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime." {Maine Legislature, 1931:273-9) The 1999 Revised 
Statutes of the State of Maine reflect these changes. {Maine 
Legislature, 1999:1912-19) In 1997, the Legislature further
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expanded the jurisdiction of the municpal court in initiat­
ing criminal proceedings against juveniles changing the 
wording from "capital or otherwise infamous crime" to crime 
the punishment for which may be imprisonment for life or any 
term of years." {Maine Legislure, 1947:420-21) According 
to the decision in Wade v. Warden of State Prison (Maine Su­
preme Court, 1950: 120-169), the effect of the law up until 
this time was to prevent any juvenile being accused of a 
felony from being processed by the juvenile court. The 1931 
legislation, while generally more vague than subsequent law, 
appears to have allowed criminal proceedings against juve­
niles in certain cases; the 1943 legislation required it in 
all felonies due to the interpretation of "infamous". The 
1947 law more or less restored the broad jurisdiction origi­
nally enjoyed by the juvenile court in the 1931 legislation.
The decision in Wade further illuminates the nature of 
juvenile law in Maine up to that time in stressing the reha­
bilitative functions of the juvenile court. The following 
paragraph from the decision expresses the socialized juve­
nile justice philosophy in a nutshell.
The purpose of juvenile courts, and laws relating 
to juvenile delinquency, is to carry out a modern 
method of dealing with youthful offenders, so that 
there may be no criminal record against immature 
youth to cause detrimental local gossip and future 
handicaps because of childhood errors and indis­
cretions, and also that the child who is not in­
clined to follow legal and moral patterns, may be 
guided or reformed to become, in his mature years, 
a useful citizen.
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The above calls into question the extent to which vaguely 
worded status offenses were in fact matters of juvenile 
court jurisdiction- The laws do not specify what "offenses'* 
are involved. In the 1944 Statutes, the jurisdiction of the 
municipal court is said to be over "all crimes and offenses 
including violations of any statute, or by-law of a town, 
village corporation, or local health officer, or breaches of 
the peace...." (Maine Legislature, 1944:1912) Presumably, 
these are the offenses to which the following paragraph of 
Chapter 133 on juvenile courts refers. Presumably, the ref­
erence to "moral patterns" in Wade implies that immorality 
and related states and behaviors were among the offenses in­
cluded in the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
In 1959, the Legislature passed "An Act Relating to Juve­
nile Offenders." The passage of this statute represented 
major refinement of juvenile justice in Maine and remained 
largely unchanged until the enactment of the Maine Juvenile 
Code in 1977.9 Most significant among the refinements were 
the greater specificity and comprehensiveness of the juve­
nile law. Where the pre-1950's versions of the law were 
generally two or three pages in length, by the time of the 
1977 reform, juvenile law had grown to about twenty-five 
pages. There were specific sections including provisions on
9 A significant change in the Juvenile Law was enacted in 
1973, prohibiting the commitment of a juvenile to a cor­
rectional institution for an act which was not an offense 
under criminal statutes, thereby areatly curtailing the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court over status offenses.
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purpose of the law, definitions, mentally ill juveniles, ju­
risdiction, offenses, bind-over proceedings, custody, ap­
peals, disposition, to name but a few. Clearly, the devel­
opment was in a direction which removed a great deal of the 
vagueness that had characterized the juvenile justice system 
in Maine previously. This is not to say that it approximat­
ed a criminal code more closely than it did a "socialized" 
juvenile code. It was in the final analysis a clearer and 
more consistent and more concise statement of the socialized 
philosophy. While far more detailed than what had preceeded 
it, the details themselves outlined the essential components 
of this philosophy.
The Juvenile Of fenders Act
Juvenile justice in Maine at the time of the reform was 
based largely on the Juvenile Offenders Act. (Maine Legisla­
ture, 1965) This Act, consequently, was a central object of 
reform and is a baseline against which the extent of statu­
tory change can be measured.>°
The purposes of Maine's "Juvenile Offenders" statutes 
prior to the new Code are summarized as follows:
This discussion is based partly on original analysis of 
the Juvenile Offenders Act and partly on the analysis of 
the Act provided by Arthur Bolton Associates, consultants 
to the Commission to Revise the Statutes Relating to Ju­
veniles, in their Report on Task 3: Statutes of Maine* s
Juvenile Justice System. (1976c)
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The care, custody and discipline of said juveniles 
shall approximate as nearly as possible that which 
they should receive from their parents or custodi­
ans; and
That as far as practicable, they shall be treated, 
not as criminals, but as young persons in need of 
aid, encouragement and guidance.
That no juvenile shall be placed or detained in
any prison or jail or detained or transported in
association with any criminal, vicious or disso­
lute person, unless and until such juvenile be­
comes subject...to proceedings which are criminal 
in nature....
The major elements of the prevailing juvenile justice phi­
losophy are contained in this statement of purposes. The 
parens patriae role of the juvenile court is emphatically 
stated. The notion that these are not criminal proceedings 
and, thus, the implication that due process and formality 
are not reguired, is equally clear. The insistence on sepa­
rate treatment of juveniles, keeping them from the contami­
nating influence of adult criminals and other "dissolute* 
persons is similarly emphasized. Maine*s juvenile law obvi­
ously is viewed as a mechanism for the rehabilitation of un­
fortunates rather than for the punishment of criminals.
The provisions of the law which immediately follow, how­
ever, represent something less than a pure application of 
the socialized philosophy. Rather, they represent an appli­
cation of that philosophy as gradually eroded by concerns 
such as those of the "reformers". The fact that there was 
some degree of procedural consideration should not, however, 
be taken as a negation of the socialized philosophy. As
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seen in previous chapters, no juvenile justice system was 
completely without procedure, but rather aprocedural rela­
tive to criminal justice systems.
With respect to jurisdiction, the District Court as Juve­
nile Court had "exclusive, original jurisdiction" over all 
offenses of juveniles [with the exception of traffic and or­
dinance violations which are misdemeanors) and over a range 
of behaviors generally considered "status offenses". These 
included:
1. Habitual truancy;
2. behaving in an incorrigible or indecent and lascivi­
ous manner;
3. knowingly and willfully associating with vicious, 
criminal or grossly immoral people;
4. repeatedly deserting one's home without just cause;
5. living in circumstances of manifest danger of falling 
into habits of vice or immorality. (1965:522)
The Post-Gault Reform Process
The process which culminated in the new Juvenile Code of 
1977 was an extensive one which encompassed the entire dec­
ade of the 1970's. The reform process itself can be viewed 
in terms of four major phases.
In the first half of the decade, there was a series of 
studies which made major reform recommendations directly or
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indirectly related to Maine’s system of juvenile justice. 
These include the Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency S t.ud y 
conducted by the University of Maine Cooperative Extension 
Service (1971) under the auspices of the Maine Law Enforce­
ment Planning and Assistance Agency; a study of Maine's cor­
rectional system conducted by the Iowa consulting firm. Bat­
ten, Batten, Hudson, and Swab (1972), commissioned by the 
Maine Bureau of Corrections; the work of the Governor's Task 
Force on Corrections and its report. In the Public Interest 
(1974); and the work of the Governor's Commission on Chil­
dren and Youth and its report. Children and Youth Caught jLn 
the Crunch (c1973).
The second phase is marked by the work of the Commission 
to Revise the Statutes Relating to Juveniles. (Maine Legis­
lature, 1975) At about the same time, the Children's and 
Youth Services Planning Project was studying aspects of ju­
venile justice in Maine. (1977)
The third phase is the Legislative process in which the 
recommendations of the Commission were examined by the Leg­
islature, debated, amended, and a new Juvenile Code enacted.
The fourth phase of the process is represented by various 
efforts at evaluation of the new Code, particularly the ef­
forts of the legislatively appointed Committee to Monitor 
the Implementation of the New Juvenile Code which continued 
its work well into 1982.
Studies
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The Comprehensive Delinquency Studv. The first major ef­
fort at examining Maine’s juvenile justice system was a 
study commissioned by the Maine Law Enforcement Planning and 
Assistance Agency (Maine* L.E.A.A. conduit) in 1970. The 
study was conducted by the Cooperative Extension Service of 
the University of Maine at Orbno. Federal funding of 
projects under the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Con­
trol Act of 1968 was contingent on such a study. The Com­
prehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study was designed to review 
Maine's juvenile justice system with a view toward making 
recommendations with respect to the prevention and control 
of delinquency in Maine. According to its Final Report, it 
attempted to provide an overview of delinquency in Maine, a 
"philosophical construct" for prevention and control, an 
evaluation of available resources, and recommendations for 
prevention and control of delinquency.
If a single theme can be said to dominate the study, it 
is that delinquency has its origins not exclusively within 
the individual, but in the relations among the individual, 
the community, and social institutions. Thus, attempts to 
prevent and control delinquency must be directed beyond the 
individual to the community and its institutions. Individu­
al treatment alone is not the answer. The Final Report goes
A
85
so far as to suggest that the community is "neurotic" in its 
reactions to juveniles and requires therapy.
The Final Report contains more than a hundred recommenda­
tions, most rather specific proposals for increasing the ef­
fectiveness of particular components of the existing juve­
nile justice system. Many of these involve recommendations 
for increased personnel and increased training in lav en­
forcement, probation, education, recreation, and so forth. 
Others involve the expansion of existing services, such as 
greater access of juveniles to community mental health ser­
vices, vocational training, recreational programs, educa­
tional counselling, and psychiatric treatment at the State’s 
juvenile correctional institutions (Stevens School and Boy’s 
Training Center).> > Other recommendations, however, imply 
some fundamental reform of the system. Among these are rec­
ommendations which emphasize the role of the community in 
the generation of delinquency and, consequently, in its pre­
vention and control. A number of recommendations suggest 
non-punitive treatment by appropriate experts of problems 
that are primarily medical or psychological rather than 
criminal. Drug and alcohol treatment, for example, might 
better be left to medical professionals. Truancy, likewise, 
should be dealt with by the schools rather than law enforce­
ment. Several proposals aim at what might be called greater
11 The Stevens School is now closed and the Boy's Training 
Center is a coeducational institution now referred to as 
the Baine Youth Center.
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rationalization of the juvenile justice system through meas­
ures which would provide greater coordination of existing 
and future resources such as a Department of Youth Affairs 
and a Governor*s Juvenile Delinquency Advisory Committee. 
Also in this category are those recommendations which call 
for greater evaluation and planning capacities and uniform, 
comprehensive record keeping. These are themes which appear 
repeatedly in subsequent reports of juvenile justice in 
Maine during the 1970*s.
Comprehensive Correctional Study. In 1971, with funding 
from the Maine Criminal Justice Planning and Assistance 
Agency, the Bureau of Corrections contracted with the Iowa 
consulting firm of Batten, Batten, Hudson, and Swab, for a 
comprehensive study of corrections in the state, including 
juvenile corrections, and the development of a proposal for 
an improved system. For the most part, the Comprehensive 
Correctional Study. like the Comprehensive Juvenile Delin­
quency Study which preceded it, submitted recommendations 
which called for improvements in the existing system of ju­
venile corrections rather than a fundamental change of the 
system. Batten in its recommendations on juvenile correc­
tions seems to have relied heavily on the work done in the 
previous study.
There are, nevertheless, a number of themes in the Com- 
prehensive Correctional Study which could imply significant
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change in juvenile justice if fully implemented. First, the 
study recommends a move toward community-based corrections. 
Juvenile corrections and juvenile justice should be redi­
rected to local communities by giving town and county gov­
ernment greater responsibility and authority and by provid­
ing the support necessary to the development of appropriate 
community programs. Similarly, correctional facilities 
would be brought closer to the local community by locating 
such centers (and sub-centers) throughout the state and by 
malting juvenile correctional institutions more similar to 
the community through such "normalizing" measures as making 
then "coeducational." Secondly, a move toward deinstitu­
tionalization is suggested in the recommendation that the 
number of youths for whon institutionalization is necessary 
be decreased by expanding half-way house and group home fa­
cilities, foster care, and emergency foster care, and 
through the establishment of a volunteer counselor program. 
Finally, the Study focuses on the problem of juvenile jus­
tice system's lack of information. Improved and uniform re­
porting and better collection and use of data are discussed 
in some detail-
Tery few statutory changes were deemed necessary. Among 
them was a suggestion that the Juvenile Offenders Act be 
made clearer in distinguishing between delinquents and way­
ward or unruly juveniles. It is further suggested that the 
Act be amended to allow greater flexibility in rehabilitat­
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ing juveniles by committing then to the Bureau of Correc­
tions rather than to a specific institution. Pinally, it is 
suggested that the pre-sentence investigations be nade man­
datory. So few recommendations for statutory change indi­
cate that radical change in Maine's juvenile justice system 
vas clearly not contemplated by the authors of the Compre­
hensive Correctional Study.
The Governor * s Task Force on Corrections. By far the 
most competent and comprehensive of the early studies of ju­
venile justice in Maine vas conducted by the Governor's Task 
Force on Corrections in 1973. Its analysis and recommenda­
tions are set forth in its final report. In the Public In­
terest. The report is noteworthy for its attempt to come to 
grips with the major issues in post-Gault juvenile justice 
reform and its familiarity with these issues as discussed 
nationally. It does not rely on the thinking of partici­
pants in the Maine juvenile justice system to as great an 
extent as do the previous studies and thus must be consid­
ered more objective. The system of juvenile justice in 
Maine envisioned by the Task Force is in many respects a 
radical departure from the existing system. There is little 
in subsequent studies and proposals that is not found in 
some form in In the Public Interest.
The Task Force argues essentially that the present system 
of juvenile justice (and, also, criminal justice) has failed
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to accomplish its stated purposes in nearly every important 
respect. At best, it represents an imprudent and ineffi­
cient use of taxpayers' money. Although like previous re­
ports, the Task Force recommendations are for the most part 
rather specific proposals for changing particular aspects of 
the juvenile justice system, they clearly embody the post- 
Gault reform philosophy. That philosophy is made explicit 
in the introduction to the report. It is consistent with 
the four reform principles outlined by Empey (1979:292): 
due process, decriminalization, deinstitutionalization, and 
diversion. The system must be fair, must be perceived as 
fair, and must be rehabilitative rather than punitive in 
practice as well as in theory. The Task Force report also
clearly indicates its belief in the inherent limits of the 
juvenile justice system as a means of preventing and con­
trolling delinquency and misbehavior. These problems, the 
Task Force suggests, originate in the organization of socie­
ty rather than within the individual, or even the family. 
Thus, while juvenile justice reform is essential, it cannot 
be expected to solve the problems. Only a reorganization of 
society can accomplish that.
The proposals of the Task Force are geared toward the 
elimination of those aspects of the juvenile justice system 
which generate delinquency and toward measures which promise 
to mitigate some of the criminogenic consequences of socioe­
conomic inequality. Its detailed proposal for the estab­
lishment of Youth Services Bureaus, for example, serves 
both objectives. Such agencies, by providing necessary ser­
vices to juveniles needing them would alleviate problems 
which might otherwise result in delinquency or continued de­
linquency. By insisting that such agencies be outside of 
the official juvenile justice system and by insisting that 
their services be accessible to all needing them (not just 
delinquent youth), the stigma of juvenile justice processing 
and the "delinquent" label which often exacerbate delinquent 
tendencies would thereby be avoided.
The Governor1s Committee on Children and Youth. Working 
simultaneously with the Governor's Task Force, the Gover­
nor's Committee on Children and Youth, appointed in January 
of 1973, conducted a more general review of programs for 
children and youth and was asked to indentify unmet needs 
and suggest methods to meet such needs. The central theme 
of its report. Children and Youth Caught in the Crunch. is 
one which is echoed in the studies which deal more specifi­
cally with juvenile justice, that resources to meet the 
needs of juveniles are woefully inadequate. In submitting 
its report to the Governor, the Committee wrote.
If we do not begin investing our money in preven­
tive programs early in our children's lives, we 
surely will be spending increasing amounts to try 
to correct the problems which have been caused as 
a result of our neglect. (1973:i)
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The Committee did no independent research, but relied on in­
formation provided by departments and agencies involved in 
serving children and youth. They also note that numerous 
studies have been conducted previously and that these were 
used in formulating their own recommendations. Their con­
clusions and recommendations relevant to juvenile justice 
reform include the following:
1. That youth services are fragmented, uncoordinated, 
inadequate, and inequitably distributed.
2. That the family and the community are more appropri­
ate environments for the provision of services; in­
stitutional facilities are not the answer.
3. Youth should have a voice in policies that effect 
t hem.
4. The coercion of the juvenile justice system is an in­
appropriate and ineffective response to many of the 
problems that presently fall within its jurisdiction. 
Truancy, for example, is an educational problem and 
ought to be dealt with by the educational system.
5. Due process of law ought to be guaranteed to juve­
niles when they come under the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court.
6. Prevention must replace crisis intervention as the 
dominant orientation of the system of youth services 
{and juvenile justice).
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These studies conducted in the early 1970’s set the agen­
da for post-Gault reform in Maine. While few of the recom­
mendations made in the various reports required statutory 
change for their implementation, taken together, they set in 
motion a major revamping of the juvenile justice system. 
The criticisms of juvenile justice implied in these reports 
suggested that juvenile law, its general philosophy as well 
as its specific provisions, required serious reexamination. 
In 1975, the Legislature passed "An Act to Create a Commis­
sion to Revise the Statutes Relating to Juveniles," and the 
reform process began in earnest. (Maine Legislature, 1975)
Commissi on to Revise the Statutes
Maine’s Legislature, in establishing the Commission to Re­
vise the Statutes Relating to Juveniles, clearly intended 
the work of such Commission to focus on juvenile crime and 
misbehavior. On the other hand, its mandate to the Commis­
sion was a broad one involving a review of all relevant 
statutes, not strictly those governing the juvenile justice 
system and constituting the Juvenile Offenders Act. The 
Legislature directed that:
The Commission shall give particular weight to the 
needs and resources of the State of Maine and its 
various agencies and institutions dealing with ju­
veniles through the areas of education, community 
based corrections, institutional corrections, po­
licing agencies, and the court system.
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The Commission was also given a mandate to incorporate into 
its proposed Juvenile Code whatever it deemed appropriate. 
It was not limited to a redefinition of juvenile court pro­
cedure.
The proposed code may, without limitation, incor­
porate all necessary repealers, amendments, and 
modifications of existing laws as, in the judge­
ment of the Commission, are necessary and appro­
priate to accomplish the Commissi on*s purposes.
The Commission was composed largely of individuals in­
volved in some aspect of juvenile justice in the state in­
cluding a judge, an attorney, a district attorney, legisla­
tors, counselors, law enforcement officials, educators, a 
child psychiatrist, and the superintendent of the Maine 
Youth Center. In addition, the Commission worked closely 
with officials involved in juvenile justice. They met with 
juvenile court judges and maintained frequent contact with 
the Commissioners of the Departments of Mental Health and 
Corrections, Human Services, and Educational and Cultural 
Services- They also consulted members of other task forces, 
committees, and projects in related areas.12 The Commission 
staff conducted reviews of the goals, statutes, and regula­
tions of Maine's juvenile justice system. The Commission
12 The extent of activity related to reform in criminal and 
juvenile justice and related areas is indicated by the 
number of independent task forces, committees, and 
projects mentioned by the Commission. Included are: the 
Children and Youth Services Planning Project, the Crimi­
nal Law Advisory Committee Project on Standards and Goals 
of Maine's Criminal Justice System, the Correctional Eco­
nomics Project, the Child Abuse and Neglect Task Force of 
the Maine Human Services Council, the United Way Substi­
tute Care Task Force, and the Community Justice Project.
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held public hearings, formulated proposed goals for the ju­
venile justice system, and drafted a new Juvenile Code for 
submission to the Legislature. (1977a)
The Commission's philosophy is summarized in their Final 
Report:
The Commission's recommendations are intended to 
implement its basic philosophy that —
1. youth who are accused of criminal behavior 
should be treated by the justice system in 
a manner that clearly acknowledges the 
gravity of their crime and that adeguately 
protects the public and the accused; and
2. children who do not commit criminal offen­
ses but who are "incorrigible," truant from 
school or run away from home should not be 
referred to juvenile courts but rather 
should be served by the social and educa­
tional agencies better eguipped to deal 
with their behavior than are courts of law. 
(Commission, 1977a:9)
The Commission's proposed code would require that juve­
niles who commit acts which would be felonies for adults be 
treated as in almost all respects as if they were adults. 
Juveniles who commit acts which would be misdemeanors for 
adults or acts which are "juvenile crimes" (e.g. prostitu­
tion, or marijuana or alcohol possession) would be handled 
in some respects as if they were adults. For example, a 
hearing on a petition alleging a felony would be open to the 
public, but would not be heard by a jury. A hearing on a 
misdemeanor offense or a "juvenile crime", on the other 
hand, would not be open to the public. Furthermore, a wider 
range of dispositions would be available to the court in ju­
venile misdemeanor cases than in similar adult cases. In 
both felony and misdemeanor cases, however, juveniles vould 
be accorded most of the due process rights traditionally ac­
corded to adults in criminal proceedings. The proposed code 
would also decriminalise most of the "status offenses" that 
had previously been grounds for juvenile court jurisdiction. 
Instead, such behavior would be grounds for the provision of 
services from appropriate agencies. Finally, the proposed 
code would allow juvenile courts greater discretion in waiv­
ing its jurisdiction so that in appropriate cases, juveniles 
may be tried in adult criminal courts.
Leqislat ion
Although the significance of the various studies, reports, 
and recommendations which preceded the introduction of L.D. 
1581 into the 108th Legislature is considerable, the ulti­
mate responsibility for reform of juvenile justice in the 
State of Maine clearly rested with the legislative and exe­
cutive branches of state government. The Legislature alone 
[with the consent of the Governor) had the authority to en­
act the proposed code, to amend it, to repeal existing stat­
utes, and to authorize the expenditure of resources neces­
sary to carry out its purposes.
The Code which finally emerged from the Legislature was 
in many respects similar to that proposed by the Commission
to Revise the Statutes. There are, however, a number of 
significant differences which must be noted. First, the 
Legislature eliminated some of the specific provisions re­
quiring due process outside of the juvenile court hearing. 
Secondly, although the Legislature accepted Commission rec­
ommendations that "status offenses" be decriminalized, they 
eliminated sections which outline state responsibility for 
addressing problems implied by such behavior. Thirdly, 
where the Commission mandated the provision of various ser­
vices, the Legislature made such services contingent on 
available resources. In general, however, much of the Code 
proposed by the Commission was enacted by the Legislature 
without change.
Recognizing the possibility of unanticipated consequenc­
es and bureaucratic resistence, the Legislature also enacted 
legislation establishing the Committee to Monitor the Imple­
mentation of the Juvenile Code. The work of this Committee 
and of unofficial monitoring efforts constitutes the final 
phase in the evolution of post-Gault juvenile justice reform 
in Maine.
Monitoring the New Code
There were two major efforts at monitoring and evaluating 
the new Juvenile Code. The first was the work of the United 
Way Juvenile Code Committee which issued an in depth evalua­
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tion of the new Code, The New Juvenile Code; Its First Three 
Months in Cumberland County, in November, 1978. The second 
was the work of the Committee to Monitor the Implementation 
of the New Juvenile Code which spent several years reviewing 
the implementation of the Code and making recommendations 
for revisions to the Legislature. The Committee went out of 
existence in 1982 without issuing a final report.*3
Thus, the process of reforming Maine's juvenile justice 
system in the post-Gault era was a long and complex one. 
What remains to be done is to assess the results of that 
process. Do the results represent genuine reform? Did the 
process result in a just and effective system of juvenile 
justice? To answer these questions, it is first necessary to 
ascertain the ideals thought to constitute genuine juvenile 
justice in the post-Gault era.
13 Efforts to monitor/evaluate the new Juvenile Code will be 
discussed in some detail in the final two chapters.
Chapter IT
THE FAIRNESS IDEAL AND THE NEW CODE
The constitutionalist revision of juvenile justice repre­
sented by Gault and related decisions of the O.S. Supreme 
Court was motivated in large part by the criticism that ju­
veniles were not treated fairly by the State in juvenile 
justice proceedings. Fairness in constitutional terms is 
equated with "due process of law." Although the Supreme 
Court decisions focused on the standard of fairness appro­
priate to formal juvenile court processing, fairness in ju­
venile justice encompasses a great deal more. There is in 
the various studies of Maine’s juvenile justice system some 
recognition that the ideal of fairness must go beyond mere 
adherence to specifically mandated constitutional require­
ments in adjudication proceedings.
Fairness in Pre-reform Juvenile Law
Juvenile justice in Maine prior to post-Gault reform varied 
from tine to time with respect to the ideal of fairness. As 
indicated in the previous chapter, prior to 1911, juveniles 
in Maine were subject to the same criminal justice process 
as were adults and, presumably, were entitled to the same
- 98 -
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constitutional protections against arbitrariness. Hith the 
establishment of a rehabilitative juvenile court, these pro­
tections were severely curtailed on the grounds that juve­
nile proceedings were not adversary criminal proceedings and 
that the aim of the juvenile court was not the punishment of 
wrongdoers, but the salvation of children. Despite the nu­
merous changes in Maine juvenile law over the years, there 
was no provision for procedural safeguards until the enact­
ment of the Juvenile Offenders Act of 1959.
The Juvenile Offenders Act as amended was the law in ef­
fect during the 1970's when the various reform recommenda­
tions were issued. As noted by the Commission to Revise the 
Statutes Relating to Juveniles, the Juvenile Offenders Act 
provided for some, but not all, of the due process require­
ments mandated by the O.S. Supreme Court. (1976a:9) There 
are a number of the provisions of the Juvenile Offenders Act 
that are relevant to the specific Supreme Court requirements 
and the ideal of fairness more generally. The Act repre­
sents considerable improvement in procedural regularity over 
previous juvenile law in that there is greater precision and 
specificity in definition of terms, some degree of defini­
tion of minimal procedures to be followed in juvenile jus­
tice processing, and the provision of some specific rights 
to be accorded to juveniles in such proceedings. There is, 
in short, considerably greater protection against arbitrary 
treatment in that far more of the law is spelled out in de­
tail.
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Specifically, the Juvenile Offenders Ret provides for the 
following. First, the form and contents of petitions and 
citations against juveniles are specified. Petitions must be 
verified on the basis of "information and belief" and must 
contain a "plain statement of the facts" and the name, ad­
dress, etc. of the juvenile charged. Citations must contain 
the substance of the petition and must be delivered to the 
parents of the juvenile not less than 24 hours prior to a 
hearing. Secondly, the parents of a juvenile must be noti­
fied when a warrant is issued for the arrest of a juvenile. 
Thirdly, the Court may allow parents and other interested 
parties to view otherwise secret court records. Fourth, the 
Juvenile Offenders Act provides for judicial review of deci­
sions to detain a juvenile in custody. Fifth, juveniles are 
accorded the right to representation by counsel or by any 
interested person at hearings and the right to be informed 
of the nature of the complaint against them. Finally, juve­
niles have the right to appeal to the Superior Court for de 
novo hearings or to the State Supreme Court on matters of 
law only. Bind-over decisions, adjudications, and disposi­
tions may be appealed. The juvenile is entitled to bail un­
less the court finds that he represents a danger to himself 
or to the community. The denial of bail is also appealable. 
(Maine Legislature, 1965:525-29)
There are, obviously, a number due process elements ab­
sent from the Act as well as a number of provisions which
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seem to represent a denial of due process. There is, for 
example, no mention in the Juvenile Offenders Act of the 
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to cross-ex­
amine and confront witnesses, the right to a transcript of 
the proceedings, or the requirement that facts be proved 
"beyond a reasonable doubt." These are all requirements of 
In He Gault and In Re Winship. The additional requirement 
of Gault that the juvenile be given notice of the charges 
against him would not appear to be satisfied by the require­
ments in the Juvenile Offenders Act that the judge inform 
the juvenile at a detention hearing of the nature of the 
complaint and that the citation issued to the juveniles* pa­
rents contain the substance of the petition and be delivered 
not less than 24 hours prior to the hearing. Gault requires 
notice of the charges be given to the juvenile and his pa­
rents and insists on "timely notice, in advance of the hear­
ing, of the specific issues that must be met." (1968:1447) 
There is no provision in the Act for a public trial or for 
trial by jury.
Several provisions in the Juvenile Offenders Act allow 
for the "rules of the game" to be changed at the discretion 
of the court. The Court may, for example, adjourn the pro­
ceedings from time to time for further investigations. It 
may also amend the petition at any stage of the proceedings. 
Dispositions may also be changed by the Court at the request 
of Corrections officials. (Maine Legislature, 1965:525-30)
There are no criteria governing decision making at many 
important stages of juvenile justice proceedings. There 
are, for example, no criteria specified for detention deci­
sions, dispositions or amendments of dispositional orders. 
Finally, no procedures are specified for juvenile arrests, 
detention hearings, or disposition hearings.
Reform Recommendations and the Fairness Ideal
Of the two major ideals of juvenile justice reform in Maine, 
the fairness ideal received relatively less attention than 
the ideal of rehabilitative services. This is, on the face
of it, somewhat surprising since the major thrust of post- 
Gault reform generally has been on constitutionalist con­
cerns expressed in terms of "due process of law." On the 
other hand, there is evidence in the various reports that 
comprised the history of post-Gault reform in Maine that the 
"fairness" issue, at least in terms of due process in juve­
nile justice proceedings, was largely settled by rulings of 
the United States Supreme Court and the application of these 
decisions in state courts. Thus, by the time most of these 
studies were undertaken, juveniles were already guaranteed 
[legally) considerably greater fairness than in the pre-1970 
period. What remained to be done in terms of ensuring the 
fairness of juvenile justice was largely a technical matter 
of incorporating these due process requirements into Maine's
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statutes- At the sane time, as many commentators subse­
quently pointed out, the rulings of the Supreme Court in 
Kent. Gault, HcKeiver. Winship. and Breed v. Jones. while 
clearly rejecting a central corollary of "socialized" jus­
tice, namely that acting parens patriae. the State was not 
adjudicating a crime, the implications were not as clear-cut 
as may have been apparent at first glance. In each of the 
decisions in question, the Court ruled on relatively narrow 
grounds, specifying what rights were minimally required in 
the narrow context of juvenile court adjudicatory hearings. 
Many areas of juvenile justice remained unexamined by the 
Court. The Court also left decisions on other due process 
issues beyond the minimum to the states- Further, the Court 
did not rule on issues of "general fairness," but only on 
specific due process issues- Clearly, a great deal more re­
mained to be said on the fairness issue- While it is true 
that the studies in question had relatively little to say on 
this issue in terms of amount of space devoted to discus­
sions of it and number of recommendations addressing it, 
fairness in general and due process in particular emerge as 
important considerations. There is no question that fair­
ness is a major ideal of post-Gault reform in Maine.
The extent to which the fairness ideal is a priority and 
the amount of discussion devoted to it vary from study to 
study- This is partly a function of the purpose and scope 
of the particular study and partly a function of the degree 
of importance attached to the fairness ideal.
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The Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study is the one 
study conducted during the reform process that exhibits a 
near insensitivity to due process considerations. Clearly, 
due process is within the purview of the study's objectives 
in formulating recommendations relative to the prevention 
and control of delinquency and the rehabilitation of delin­
quents and "pre-delinquents." The Final Report indeed gives 
little evidence of awareness of the due process rights man­
dated by the Supreme Court. Its point of view, in contrast 
to all of the other studies, is clearly at one with the tra­
ditional juvenile justice philosophy of rehabilitation un­
tempered by constitutional impediments.
On the other hand, there are a number of recommendations 
of relevance to the fairness ideal which indicate a general 
concern for fair treatment for juveniles at the hands of 
state. Two of these are specific due process recommenda­
tions: (1)Judges should always inform juveniles of their ap­
peal rights and (2)Juveniles must be represented by counsel, 
family-retained or a court-appointed full-time juvenile de­
fense attorney. (1971:77-78) At the same time, the appeals 
process recommended in the Final Report raises serious due 
process concerns in that a three-judge appeals court would 
examine all areas of a juvenile's life in arriving at a 
judgement. This procedure, on the face of it, appears an
open invitation to arbitrary decisions based not on points 
of law or evidence relevant to the allegation, but on family
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structure, income, school performance, or whom the juvenile 
"hangs around with." Further insensitivity to due process is 
apparent in the recommendations with respect to law enforce­
ment. Of all the due process issues involved in arrest, de­
tention, and interrogation, the study concentrates on the 
importance of good police public relations, personality of 
juvenile officers, and manpower and training considerations. 
[1971:73-74) Again, with respect to dispositions from the 
juvenile court, indeterminate dispositions are recommended. 
The wide discretion left to corrections officials in such a 
procedure again invites arbitrariness into the juvenile jus­
tice process. (1971:65-66)
With respect to the ideal of fairness in juvenile justice 
more generally, the Final Report mak.es a number of recommen­
dations which imply a far broader conception of the fairness 
ideal than contained in the decisions of the Supreme Court 
and the discussions of the constitutionalist critics of so­
cialized juvenile justice. The study cites arbitrariness on
the part of the State in a variety of its dealings with ju­
veniles, each of them deemed at least indirectly relevant to 
juvenile delinquency and juvenile justice. Its comments and 
recommendations in the area of education exemplify this con­
cern. Juveniles in general lack any input into educational 
decisions which so greatly affect their lives. Student par­
ticipation is strongly recommended, including direct repre­
sentation on school boards. Juveniles are often denied par­
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ticipation in extracurricular activities and are denied 
special educational services without due process. The study 
recommends that the State adopt an appeals process for pa­
rents and children denied such opportunities. (197 1:78-82) 
Furthermore, the study recommends that juveniles committed 
to institutions be afforded the right to privacy, including 
the right to receive uncensored mail. (1971:65-68) Thus, 
while there is little sensitivity to constitutional due pro­
cess in juvenile justice proceedings, the Comprehensive Ju­
venile Delinquency Study does exhibit a general concern that 
juveniles be treated fairly by the State. What the study 
fails to perceive is the central place of regular, formal 
procedures in ensuring that this ideal of fairness become 
the reality of fairness.
Two additional studies paid relatively little attention 
to due process/fairness issues, largely, it seems, because 
they were primarily concerned with the assessment of youth 
services in Maine rather than with juvenile justice specifi­
cally. Both, however, discuss the juvenile justice system 
at some length, make recommendations concerning it, and 
place a high priority on fairness.
The first of these is the report of the Governor*s Com­
mittee on Children and Youth, Children and Youth Caught in 
the Crunch. (c197l) This Committee was asked by the Gover­
nor to "review existing programs for children and youth, 
discover needs not met by such programs, and suggest methods
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to satisfy such needs." Clearly, the focus is not on juve­
nile justice procedures and their recommendations reflect 
this. Nevertheless, the report briefly, but unequivocally, 
calls for due process in juvenile justice proceedings.
Juveniles ought to receive "due process." Juve­
niles ought to have right to an attorney at all 
times, even without, parental consent. (c1973:29)
Secondly, the Committee raises an additional concern with 
fairness in juvenile justice proceedings in citing the prob­
lems of overloaded District Courts and judges untrained in 
juvenile justice. Assembly-line justice is clearly at odds 
with due process and fairness. The Committee recommends a 
separate juvenile court with specially trained juvenile 
court judges.
Finally, the broader conception of the fairness ideal al­
luded to in relation to the recommendations of the Compre­
hensive Juvenile Delinquency Study, is further developed in 
the recommendations of the Governor's Committee on Children 
and Youth. Several of their comments and recommendations 
indicate unequal treatment for juvenile justice clients in 
terms of a variety of social services. A number of reasons 
are indicated including the use of eligibility requirements 
to discriminate against such juveniles.**
** The general issue of rehabilitative services will, of 
course, be dealt with in detail in the following chapter. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of points at which the 
two ideals merge. The unavailability of services is it­
self a due process issue if such services are part of the 
juvenile justice process and are denied arbitrarily. Sec­
ondly, recent court decisions have indicated a right to 
treatment in the juvenile justice system. The right to
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The Children and Youth Services Planning Project [1977) 
similarly focused on the issue of services for juveniles. In 
their report, Comprehensive Blueprint, the authors note that 
members of the Project worked closely with the Commission to 
Revise the Statutes Relatinq to Juveniles, the chairman of 
the Project being in fact a member of the Commission. They 
further note that most issues relating directly to juvenile 
justice proceedings, including due process, were being ad­
dressed by the Commission and it was, consequently, unneces­
sary for the Project to devote much attention to these is­
sues. Nevertheless, the Project report expressed clear 
support for due process and fairness. They specifically ad­
dress the issue of due process in their criticisms of the 
"unwarranted" detentions of juveniles in the juvenile jus­
tice system. In their recommendations, a number of signifi­
cant fairness issues are raised.
First, the issue of "unequal justice" is raised in this 
report. The wide disparity between the processing by the 
juvenile justice system of juveniles from "broken" families 
and those from "normal" families is noted as is the similar
services is also clearly implied in Maine juvenile law. 
If such treatment is not provided, the juvenile is enti­
tled to be released. Thirdly, the underlying assumption 
in all of these studies is that social services have the 
potential to prevent conduct which places juveniles at. 
risk of juvenile justice processing and contributes to 
rehabilitation of adjudicated juveniles thus preventing 
subsequent contact with the juvenile justice system. If 
such services are not available, it can be argued that 
the juvenile is unfairly denied his constitutional rights 
by being placed at risk by the inaction of the State.
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disparity between the processing of juveniles from high and 
low income families. The only available data consists of 
the composition of the populations of the Boys Training Cen­
ter and the Stevens School with respect to these variables. 
The disparity is sharp. Only U1% of the population of the 
training centers is from "normal" families. Nearly half of 
the centers* populations are from families with incomes be­
low $5,000 per year. Only 30X of Maine’s families fall into 
this group. On the other hand, only 10% of Maine's families 
have incomes in excess of $ 15,000 per years while only 5% of 
the training centers' populations came from such families. 
As the study indicates, it cannot not be concluded that 
children from low-income and/or single-parent families com­
mit more crime, but only that they "have a much greater 
chance of running the full gamut of the system, i.e. being 
committed." (1977:188) There is the further suggestion of 
inequality in juvenile justice processing on the basis of 
the juvenile's sex. Boys are arrested, "held for court" in 
institutions, committed, and placed on probation at a great­
er rate than are girls. Girls, on the other hand, are more 
likely than boys to be detained in county jails.
(1977:176-77)
Secondly, the issue of equality of social services is 
also raised and discussed at length by the Children and 
Youth Services Planning Project report. A major area of 
concern in this regard was the preadjudicatory incarceration
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of juveniles in traininq centers for the performance of di­
agnostic evaluations for the Court, evaluations which could 
have and should have been performed at Community Mental 
Health Centers. Two issues of fairness are involved:
(1) Juveniles did not receive services of community mental 
health centers to which they should have been entitled and
(2)The use of training centers for this purpose is tanta­
mount to incarceration (punishment) without trial, a clear 
violation of due process by any standard. As noted by the 
Project, incarcerations for evaluation purposes were not in­
significant. The average stay at the Boy's Traininq Center 
for this purpose was 17.5 days and at the Stevens School, 
26.8 days in 197U-75. (1977: 150-57)
The Comprehensive Blueprint at several points expresses 
concern that juvenile justice clients are discriminated 
against in the provision of scarce service resources. Re­
lated to this is a further concern with the fairness of ser­
vice distribution, namely the formulation of rules governing 
the provision of such services, rules which have historical­
ly functioned as a bar to services for correctional (includ­
ing juvenile) clients. State agencies, the study notes, 
frequently promulgate rules and policies which have the 
force of law, but which are not subject to the safeguards 
which normally inhere in the legislative process. The im­
portance of procedure in ensuring fairness is recognized in 
the recommendation that the legislature adopt a uniform ad­
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ministrative procedure governing rule making by public agen­
cies, require advance public notice and a period for re­
sponse by the public and affected parties. Such rules 
should also be subject to legislative review. (1977:202) 
The relation between administrative rule making and due pro­
cess in juvenile justice is closer than may be apparent. The 
rationale for the above recommendation is that government 
must be made accountable and responsive in meeting its stat­
utory responsibilities and in carrying out legislative in­
tent with respect to services for children and families at 
risk. As the Children and Youth Service Planning Project 
notes earlier in their report, the definition of "high risk” 
certainly includes the 10,000 Maine children arrested, the 
3,500 who appeared in court, and the 1,500 incarcerated or 
placed on probation (1975 figures). There seems little 
doubt on the part of the authors of this report that the de­
nial of effective services to such juveniles and their fami- 
li es is not only an abrogation of public responsibility, but 
also has the effect of placing juveniles at risk of further 
juvenile justice processing and has, consequently, constitu­
tional implications.
Finally, the report expands on the application of the 
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard mandated by the 
Supreme Court in Winship (1971) for adjudicatory hearings in 
cases where juveniles are charged with the commission of 
crimes. It is recommended that this standard of proof be
required in neglect and abuse proceedings involving the in­
voluntary removal of a juvenile from his/her home. 
{1977:225)
As previously noted, the most Comprehensive of the re­
ports on Maine’s juvenile justice system during the post- 
Gault era were the reports of the Commission to Revise the 
Statutes Relating to Juveniles and Tjj the Public Interest. 
the report of the Governor's Task Force on Corrections. 
These reports are also the most comprehensive with respect 
to their discussions of and recommendations on the fairness 
issue, particularly due process in the juvenile justice sys­
tem.
The Governor's Task Force on Corrections adopted and ex­
panded on the ideal of fairness as expressed by the U.S. Su­
preme Court and the constitutionalist critics of juvenile 
justice. Of particular note is the position of the Task 
Force on due process in juvenile justice proceedings. On 
the basis of the assumption that the loss of freedom is a 
possible outcome of such proceedings. In the Public Interest 
insists that all the due process protections available to 
adults in the criminal justice system, not just the minimum 
mandated by the Supreme Court, be accorded juveniles in all 
juvenile justice proceedings. This was the only series of 
recommendations during the course of post-Gault reform in 
Maine that went this far in its formulation of the require­
ments of fair proceedings. Among the areas specifically
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covered in its recommendations are several recommendations 
with respect to the right to counsel and other rights of ju­
veniles before the juvenile court, the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court, preadjudicatory incarceration, due process 
in dispositions and corrections, as well as a number of more 
general recommendations. (1974)
The right to counsel was clearly regarded by the Task 
Force, as it was by the Supreme Court, as the most fundamen­
tal of due process rights. The right to counsel, the Task 
Force advised, must be provided for. The Task Force also 
recognized that attorneys often view their role in juvenile 
cases differently than in adult cases, seeing their major 
objective as "acting in the child's best interest," rather 
than providing the best plausible defense for their clients. 
The Task Force recommends that attorneys provide the same 
quality of defense for their juvenile clients as they would 
for their adult clients, even when they are of the opinion 
that a commitment to a training center would be in their 
client's best interest. Furthermore, the assignment of 
counsel should be automatic and juveniles should not be al­
lowed, let alone encouraged, to waive this right. And, in 
cases where there is a conflict between the wishes of the 
juvenile and his parents, the obligation of the attorney 
should be to the wishes of the juvenile client. in addi­
tion, the Task Force suggests that the juvenile must have a 
sense of the fairness of the proceedings. Consequently, all 
due process protections must be available. (1974:10)
An additional aspect of fairness vould suggest that juve­
niles not be convicted and punished for offenses that vould 
not be criminal if committed by adults. The Task Force thus 
recommends a considerable narrowing of the jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court to include only criminal offenses. 
(1974:9)
The report notes the common practice of confining a juve­
nile in one of the training centers for as long as a month 
to conduct diagnostic evaluations that should take no longer 
than three days. They further suggest that the centers are 
being used as jails on the pretext of evaluations. They 
write:
Me believe this practice to be a wholly unaccepta­
ble manner in which to inform some juveniles at 
first hand of the possible sanctions attached to 
the continuance of their alleged conduct, and such 
practices authorized by a presiding judge seem 
somewhat to beg the ultimate questions in the 
pending criminal case. (1974:11)
Further concern is expressed over the lack of criteria 
and the lack of due process in dispositional decisions. De­
terminate sentencing is recommended. Commitments to the 
training center should be for one year periods. This is 
both for the purpose of avoiding disruption to the academic 
progress of the juvenile and to avoid the unbridled discre­
tion that the superintendents have over juveniles upon re­
lease on entrustment from the institutions. Aftercare ser­
vices, the report claims, should be available on a 
continuing basis up to the age of eighteen, but must be vol­
untarily accepted by the juvenile. Along the same lines, 
the Task Force suggests a number of steps to increase the 
fairness of the correctional process, including a Bill of 
Rights for corrections inmates and inmate advocates outside 
of the control of the Department of Mental Health and Cor­
rections. (1974:57)
The report also expresses concern for those juveniles who 
are not subjected to the official juvenile court process. 
Strong advocates of diversion of juveniles from the system 
whenever possible, the Task Force recommended the creation 
of Youth Services Bureaus which would be outside of the law 
enforcement establishment and which would render juveniles 
referred for services beyond the reach of the courts. They 
do not envision a shifting of arbitrary state power from the 
courts to the diversionary mechanism. (1974:6)
In general. In The Public Interest argues that the juve­
nile justice system should be made more equitable and should 
not be a system used exclusively for juveniles from poor and 
broken homes. Finally, democratic principles should guide 
the system, providing its clients with dignity and the right 
to participate in decisions affecting them. (1974:1-5)
Quite obviously, the work of the Commission to Revise the 
Statutes Relating to Juveniles was central to the reform of 
Maine's juvenile justice system, the only one of the studies 
of juvenile justice that had a mandate to examine the system 
generally, with no narrowly circumscribed subject matter.
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Also, it was the only one with a mandate to propose a new 
system. The issue of fairness, particularly as it relates 
to due process, was prominent in the work of the Commission. 
It is discussed in several of its reports as it relates to 
the existing system, to various proposals for improved juve­
nile justice systems, and in its own proposed new Juvenile 
Co de.
Two of the Commission reports, prepared by consultants in 
consultation with Commissioners, review fairness and due 
process in the existing system. One is a review of statutes 
of Maine's juvenile justice system (1976:b) and the other a 
review of the goals of juvenile justice in Maine based pri­
marily on assumptions and implications of these statutes as 
well as on case law. (1976a) For the present purpose, the 
Commission's review of the goals is sufficient for ascer­
taining its views of the present status of due process and 
fairness.
First, the Commission's report, Goals of Maine's Juvenile 
Justice System. notes that existing juvenile law in Maine 
provides for some, but not all, of the due process rights 
mandated by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. (1976a) 
While the Court has required that juveniles be accorded the 
rights to notice of charges, counsel, against self-incrimi­
nation, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, 
and that allegations against them be proved "beyond a rea­
sonable doubt," the Maine Juvenile Offenders Act specifical-
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ly requires only that the -juvenile be accorded the right to 
representation by counsel or an interested party and the 
right to notice of charges. In addition, however, as the 
Commission notes, appellate rulings of Maine courts have re­
quired that all procedures to insure fairness be observed 
and that proof be beyond reasonable doubt. fS *** v State 
and State y. D***) (1976a: 9) There are other aspects of ex­
isting -juvenile law relevant to the fairness issue that the 
Commission takes note of, implying that they are deserving 
of consideration, some violating standards of fairness and 
others contributing to the fairness of proceedings. nnder 
the Juvenile Offenders Act, a -juvenile’s right to a hearing 
was not waivable. (1976a:10) Secondly, the statute al­
lowed, until overturned in Shone v. State, the transfer of a 
juvenile from the training center to an adult correctional 
facility at the request of the superintendent of the train­
ing center without any right to a hearing. (1976a:21) 
Third, the Act allowed adjournment of juvenile proceedings 
by the Court at any time so that an investigation might be 
ordered. (1976a:10) Fourth, the Act does not require due 
process in decisions of the superintendent of a training 
center returning a juvenile on entrustment to the institu­
tion. The Court in Bernier v. State upheld this denial of 
due process. (1976a:30) Finally, the Commission review of 
the goals of the juvenile justice system indicates that the 
definition of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over non-
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criminal juvenile offenses is quite broad and vague.
(1976a:5-7)
The positions ultinately taken by the Commission with re­
spect to fairness and due process are found primarily in the 
Pinal Report of the Commission and in its draft of a pro­
posed new Juvenile Code, both of which recommend a system of 
juvenile justice which adheres more strongly to ideals of 
fairness. (1977a, 1977b) In many respects, the Commission 
proposes a ” junior criminal court” in which juveniles are 
accorded most of the due process considerations granted 
adults in criminal proceedings. There is an accompanying 
recognition that juveniles are subject to the sane laws as 
are adults and suffer similar consequences for being found 
in violation of such laws. The proposed system would treat 
juveniles accused of Class A, B, or C crimes (felonies) in 
almost all respects as adults and would treat juveniles ac­
cused of misdemeanors and juvenile crimes in some, but not 
all, respects as adults. Specifically, juvenile proceedings 
vould be conducted as adult criminal proceedings except that 
there is no right to a jury trial and only hearings and re- 
cords in Class A, B, and C offenses would be open to the 
public. The new Code proposed by the Commission differs in 
a number of significant respects from the Juvenile Offenders 
Act. First, of course, all rights mandated by the U.S. Su­
preme Court are specifically granted in the proposed Code. 
The ideal of fairness, at least with respect to hearings, is
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stated at the very beginning of the proposed Code as one of
its purposes.
To provide procedures through which the provisions 
of the law are executed and enforced which will 
assure the parties a fair hearing at which their 
rights as citizens are recognized and protected.
(1977b)
In general/ there is a recognition in the proposed Code that 
procedural regularity is in many respects the essence of 
fairness. The Code is far more detailed than anything which 
preceded it with respect to the procedures to be followed at 
all stages of the juvenile justice process. Clearly speci­
fied, either directly or by reference to the Raine Pules of 
Criminal Procedure or other statutes, are procedures govern­
ing detention, adjudicatory, dispositional, bindover, and 
appellate hearings; procedures for arrest, arrest warrants, 
and interrogation; procedures and criteria governing deten­
tion and disposition; record keeping reguirements; and pro­
cedures to inform juveniles and other interested parties of 
their constitutional rights. As proposed by the Commission, 
the Code would seriously curtail the considerable discretion 
of pre-code juvenile justice, greatly decreasing the paten-
jtial arbitrariness of juvenile proceedings. Procedural spe­
cificity provides an objective basis for determining fair­
ness of the proceedings and in itself provides greater 
fairness in that the "rules of the game" are known in ad­
vance to both sides, giving the juvenile a more egual chance 
of effectively defending him/her self.
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The Fairness Ideal; Summary
Although as the preceding discussion indicates a wide va­
riety of points of view, concerns, and recommendations 
emerged from the reform process with respect to the ideal of 
fairness in the juvenile justice system, it is possible to 
state a number of "fairness principles" which seem common to 
most, if not all, of the studies reviewed.
1. Due process of law must be observed in all official 
proceedings of the juvenile justice system. Specific 
rights mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as 
a number which logically follow from their decisions, 
must be accorded juveniles in such proceedings in 
recognition of the similarity of these proceedings in 
jurisdiction and consequences to criminal proceed­
ings.
2. Similar protections against procedural arbitrariness 
are required in other aspects of the juvenile justice 
system proper when coercion is involved and also in 
other dealings of the state with juveniles, particu­
larly in the denial of services to juvenile justice 
clients.
3. The constitutional rights of juveniles should not 
cease to be operative at the entrance to the correc­
tions system. Juveniles need protection from arbi­
trary treatment in the guise of rehabilitation as 
well as from the arbitrary denial of their basic
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rights as citizens to privacy, correspondence, and so 
forth.
4. The juvenile justice system should provide equal jus­
tice; it should not be just for the underprivileged. 
Discrimination against any class of juvenile as well 
as discrimination against juveniles as a class (for 
example, in being punished for acts vhich are not pu­
nishable for adults) have no place in a justice sys­
tem.
5. Fair treatment of juveniles by all institutions and 
agencies has a significant role to play in the pre­
vention of crime and delinquency.
Chapter f
REFOBH IDEALS: REHABILITATIVE SERVICES
Introduction
Behabilitation has, of course, been the fundamental princi­
ple of juvenile justice in the United States since the turn 
of the century. Yet, the degree of attention that rehabili­
tation gets in post-Gault reforn clearly implies that all 
was not right with pre-Gault rehabilitation. As the previ­
ous chapter makes apparent, one of the major things wrong 
with it from the point of view of reformers was its use as a 
justification of the failure to provide constitutional pro­
tections against coercion. There is, however, a more funda­
mental criticism which suggests that rehabilitation was 
rarely more than a euphemism, that it seldom made the leap 
from theory to practice. At best, it was an empty promise; 
ajt worst, a fraud. Thus, genuine rehabilitation becomes 
central to the reform effort in an attempt to finally make 
rehabilitative justice a reality. If rehabilitation is 
meaningless in the pre-Gault era, what, if anything, does it 
mean in post-Gault reforn? The ultimate answer to this 
guestion must await an assessment of juvenile justice in the 
"reformed" system. First, however, the meaning of the reha-
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bilitative ideal in the context of the reform documents must 
be examined. Klthough the meaning of rehabilitative juve­
nile justice varies from study to study, from their various 
comments and recommendations emerge a set of more or less 
common Mprinciples of rehabilitative justice” that give some 
substance to the ideal, imply (and sometimes make explicit) 
criticism of pre-Gault socialized justice, and serve to dis­
tinguish between rehabilitation as the historical purpose of 
juvenile justice and rehabilitation as a principle of re­
form.
Hehabilitation and Prevention
The term "rehabilitation" does not fully encompass all that 
is implied in the continuing emphasis on "socialized" juve­
nile justice in the post-Gault era. Prevention, in fact, is 
preferred to rehabilitation. That is to say, "salvation" of 
youth before they fall into delinquency is far preferable to 
"rescuing" them after the fact. Thus, in the most general 
sense, the goal of the juvenile justice system in the post- 
Gault era nay be more accurately described as "ensuring that 
all juveniles become responsible, productive, and law-abid­
ing members of the community." Delinquency prevention and 
rehabilitation are two means of ensuring that this goal is 
achieved. Both prevention and rehabilitation are prominent 
in all of the post-Gault studies of Maine's juvenile justice
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system. A general theme that underlies all of these reports 
(although it is rarely explicitly stated) is that despite 
its official status as the primary objective of juvenile 
justice since the turn of the century, rehabilitation has 
never characterized juvenile justice practice. Yet, it is 
the only route to an effective system of juvenile justice 
and must be made to work.
The rehabilitative ideal of juvenile justice is a theme 
that runs through the post-Gault reform literature in Maine 
from the Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study to the Re­
ports of the Commission to Revise the Statutes. The differ­
ences lie in the various perspectives of the appropriate 
balance between rehabilitative justice and due process and 
the specific shortcomings of the existing system and specif­
ic proposals for remediation.
The Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study of the Coop­
erative Extension Service (1971) and the Batten, Batten, 
Hudson, and Shvab study commissioned by the Bureau of Cor­
rections (1972) are alone in their nearly exclusive focus on 
rehabilitation and neglect of due process and fairness con- 
siderations. These studies for the most part accept the 
philosophy of juvenile justice articulated in the old juve­
nile code, wherein it is the expressed purpose of the state 
in its juvenile justice system to provide for the "care, 
custody and discipline" of juveniles approximating "as near­
ly as possible that which they should receive from their pa­
rents or custodians; and that as far as practicable, they 
shall be treated not as criminals, but as young persons in 
heed of aid, encouragement and guidance." (Maine Legisla­
ture, 1965:519) The approach of the Coaprehensive Juvenile 
Delinquency Study is aade clear in its brief discussion of 
the various approaches to delinquency prevention where it 
rejects "punitive" and "aechanical" methods in favor of 
"corrective" ones, those which "eliminate the causes of de­
linquency." Crucial to this approach, the report argues, 
are social and community change and the identification and
f
treatment of delinquent and predelinquent youth.
The Governor’s Task Force on Corrections was specifically 
charged with, among other things, the identification of pro­
grams and services existing and needed related to the reha­
bilitation of juvenile offenders. Furthermore, the Task 
Force was to recommend to the Governor improvements in diag­
nostic and evaluation services to aid in sentencing and re­
habilitation. In its final report. In the Public Interest, 
the Task Force is highly critical of the existing system for 
its failure to live up to the rehabilitative ideal.
j
Despite the efforts of juvenile court profession­
als to avoid references to guilt and punishment, 
the focus of that system today is corrective and 
punitive rather than preventive —  that is, it 
aims at altering deviant behavior after it has oc­
curred rather than preventing it from occurring in 
the first place. (1979:3)
The present system has not succeeded, the Task Force argues,
in either correcting delinquency in juveniles nor in pre-
venting crime. Institutional rehabilitation in particular 
is singled out for criticism. The view of the correctional 
institution as a largely destructive experience for the in­
mate is strongly implied. The primary objectives of specif­
ic recommendations on juvenile justice is to expand the ca­
pacity of the juvenile justice system to identify the causes 
of delinquency and to eliminate them or reduce their poten­
tially damaging effects. '
The report of the Children and Youth Services Planning 
Project, Comprehensive Blueprint 11977), while it deals pri­
marily in concrete recommendations, indicates a general con­
cern for effective prevention and rehabilitation in juvenile 
justice and endorses the work of the Commission to Bevise 
the Statutes. It specifically refers to prevention and div­
ersion as general concerns in the area of juvenile justice 
and makes detailed recommendations for community-based 
treatment. Furthermore, the report is quite critical of the 
institutional treatment and the failure of the juvenile jus­
tice system to move in the direction of community treatment.
The reports of the Commission to Bevise the Statutes He-
jlating to Juveniles note that prevention and rehabilitation 
are the major goals of the existing system as expressed both 
in statutes and judicial decisions. Made v. Barren, for ex­
ample, stated that the purpose of the juvenile justice sys­
tem was to aid the youth in becoming a "useful citizen." 
The rationale of intervention in cases where "status offen­
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ses" are alleged is the assumption that such interevention 
is preventive of criminal behavior. (1976b:1) In S*** y- 
State, the Court argued that the types of non-criminal be­
havior constituting status offenses are likely to lead to 
criminal behavior if countermeasures are not taken. 
(1976b:25) The Commission notes that rehabilitation is the 
most important goal of juvenile justice in Maine and that 
salvation. not punishment, is its purpose. Hibbard y. 
Bridges. noted that the only purpose of commitment of juve­
niles is rehabilitation and L**» v. State, claimed that the 
juvenile must be assisted in "personal development and so­
cial responsibility." (1976b: 113) In the process leading to 
the formulation of legislative proposals, the Commission 
formulated "Suggested Goals." Hhile rehabilitation and pre­
vention lose their standing as the only goals of juvenile 
justice. the Commission continues to emphasize prevention 
and rehabilitation as major goals appropriate to post-Gault 
juvenile justice. (1976a:57-103)
Principles of Rehabilitation in the Post-Gault Era
Although there are several important principles of rehabili­
tative juvenile justice that emerge from the reform litera­
ture, both state and national, the central principle upon 
vhich all the others rests is:
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1. Provision of Services: A genuinely rehabilitative 
system requires that real rehabilitative services be 
provided and that such services be accessible to all 
who need them.
If there is one central criticism that has plagued the idea 
of "socialized" juvenile justice from its earliest begin­
nings in the 19th Century, it is the failure to bach up the 
ideal of rehabilitation with necessary resources. In ef­
fect, rehabilitation has been little more than a mask for 
harsh and arbitrary punishment. Additional principles of 
post-Gault rehabilitation are closely related to the provi­
sion of services. They may be summarized as follows:
2. Procedural Protections: The benevolent intentions of 
rehabilitative justice do not justify involuntary in­
tervention into the lives of juveniles without due 
process.15
3. Prevention: The most effecient and effective rehabil­
itative services are those which are provided prior 
to involvement with the juvenile justice system.
4. Community-based Treatment: Whenever possible, reha-
✓ bilitative services should be provided in the local 
community, preferably while the juvenile continues to 
reside with his/her family^ In any case, the princi-
15 This issue of essential fairness was addressed in the 
previous chapter. It is noted here because many believe 
that genuine rehabilitation is not possible if a juvenile 
feels that he/she has been treated unfairly. As Matza 
has pointed out, a sense of injustice nay serve to under­
mine a juvenile's respect for the law. (1969)
pie of the "least restrictive alternative" is to ap­
ply for all juvenile justice dispositions. 
Decrininalization: The jurisdiction of the juvenile
court needs to be narrowed considerably. The juvenile 
justice system with its coercive powers is not the 
appropriate forum for addressing problems represented 
by acts which are not criminal for adults. Such 
problems require the provision of social services, 
but must be voluntary.
Deinstitutionalization: Institutions have been coun­
terproductive in the rehabilitation of juvenile of­
fenders and, consequently, should be used as a last 
resort for only the most dangerous offender. A cor­
ollary is that offenders who are confined to institu­
tions receive adequate, fair, humane and effective 
treatment.
Diversion: The formal juvenile justice process tends
to stigmatize youthful offenders and, consequently, 
is counterproductive. Whenever possible, juveniles 
should be diverted away from formal processing and be 
provided with whatever rehabilitative services might 
be necessary in a non-stigmatizing manner.
Evaluation: An effective system of rehabilitative ju­
venile justice requires continued monitoring, evalua­
tion and planning in order to ensure that services 
are available and effective.
Not all of these require extensive discussion. Each of 
these "principles'* will be discussed in sufficient detail to 
document their status as post-Gault reforn ideals in Maine 
and to establish sone objectives against which the success 
of the reform may be measured.
The Provision of Services
Central to the recommendations of the various reports on 
Maine's juvenile justice system in the post-Gault era is the 
notion that the provision of resources - social, psychologi­
cal, economic, educational, and other services - is essen­
tial if rehabilitation and prevention are to represent any­
thing more than rhetorical rationalizations for punitive 
treatment of juvenile offenders. If there is one character­
istic that runs through the history of juvenile justice and 
its failure, it is the reluctance to provide these resources 
which are essential to genuine preventive/rehabilitative 
justice. M l  of the studies of Maine's system suggest that
such a judgement is applicable to it; and the call for the
jprovision of genuine services becomes one of the hallmarks 
of the post-Gault effort in Maine. The failure to provide 
resources for services is recognized as costly. The Gover­
nor's Committee on Children and Youth wrote:
If we do not begin investing our money in preven­
tive programs early in our children's lives, we 
surely will be spending increasing amounts to try 
to correct the problems which have been caused as 
a result of our neglect. (1973:i)
The comments of the Children and Youth Services Planning 
Project are typical in noting that the State is largely 
failing to neet its responsibilities to provide services to 
its youth.
It is the judgenent of the C&YSPP [Children and 
Youth Services Planning Project] that the State of 
Maine has lagged behind in developing responses to 
changing social indicators, has offered only frag- 
sented intervention systems to neet needs, has 
paid scant attention to quality control and evalu­
ation, has fostered regional inequities in state 
controlled services, and has generally failed to 
enphasize prevention, early identification, and 
treatment of probleas and needs. The resulting 
broken lives and untreated problems produce the 
necessity for later, nuch nore costly, renedial 
efforts.
The fragmented array of State funded and regu­
lated hunan services nay be characterized as Du­
plicative, Discontinuous, and Incoherent.
(1977s21)
Other reports are similarly explicit. The Governor's Con- 
nittee on Children and Youth concluded that "the unnet needs 
of children and youth are numerous.” (1975:i) The Gover­
nor's Task Force on Corrections criticizes Maine's communi­
ties for failing to provide necessary services and out of 
"ignorance and indifference" they have
foisted the problem off on lav enforcement offi­
cials, who in turn usually have relied upon the 
courts and training centers to provide solutions.
(1974: 3)
The wide range of specific service recommendations made in 
the Final Report of the Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency 
Study certainly implies that previously existing rehabilita­
tive services were inadequate.
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The central criticism of the previously existing juvenile 
justice system with respect to its rehabilitative ideals is 
that the State simpy failed to provide the resources neces­
sary to rehabilitation. There are, however, a nuaber of ad­
ditional points that arise in the studies that have a bear­
ing on the provision of rehabilitative services. These 
areas of criticisn go beyond the basic question of the quan­
tity of resources the State allocates to the prevention and 
rehabilitation of juvenile offenders and those at risk of 
entanglement in the juvenile justice system. They concern 
the effectiveness of the resources that are provided. Are 
the resources coordinated? Are they accessible to all who 
need them? Are they effective? In the previously existing 
system, the studies suggest, the answer to each question 
would appear to be a resounding "no".
Pirst, there are apparently serious discrepancies in the 
availability of services based largely on geographical con­
siderations. The Children and Touth Services Planning 
Project directed particular attention to this issue in sev­
eral instances, arguing, in general, that
j
Unfortunately, the geographical location of Maine 
children and families has a direct bearing on 
their access to supportive services from the 
State. [1977:20)
Among the examples cited are the following:
1- In spite of a State law passed four years 
ago mandating school lunch programs in the 
public schools of Maine, some 10,000 chil­
dren are not provided these lunches.
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2. Notwithstanding a statutory commitment to 
the principle of equal educational opportu­
nity, twenty-five hundred Maine high school 
students residing in towns without their 
own high schools are not provided school 
buses.
3. The likelihood of parents being notified of 
a vision or hearing problea detected in 
their child varies froa county to county.
4. The tendency for juveniles to be jailed at 
the Maine Touth Center pending trial is di­
rectly related to which county the child 
lives in.
5. Three Maine counties provide dental health 
prevention prograas within their schools. 
{1977:20)
The Children and Youth Services Planning Project report goes
on to note the general nature of the problea.
In a State of 31,000 square miles it should be ob­
vious that access to and availability of basic 
support services would be a concern to State poli­
cy makers. Sadly enough, the record in huaan ser­
vices is one in which little attention has been 
paid to the State*s responsibility to plan for the 
needs of children and families in Piscataquis 
County as well as those in York county. The evi­
dence contained in the data demonstrated too many 
instances where the State has abrogated its plan­
ning responsibility and equal obligation to all 
Maine residents by drifting and allowing most so­
cial planning to take place by non-governmental 
agencies. When the Legislature passes amendments 
to acts such as Priority Social Service Prograas, 
specifying that underserved rural areas shall have 
priority for service, and when these programs be­
come concentrated in the urban areas, this becomes 
a proaisory note rather than an authentic program. 
CSYSPP Task Forces throughout the State from coun­
ties such as Piscataquis, Hancock, Washington, 
Lincoln, Sagadahoc, Oxford, Franklin, Somerset, 
and Waldo testified as to their inability to re­
ceive equitable levels of State funded huaan ser­
vices programs. (1977:22)
Several years earlier, the saae point had been made, though 
not as emphatically, in the Comprehensive Juvenile Delin­
quency Study. Among the examples of geographic inequality 
is the point that Community recreation and "drop-in" centers 
for juveniles are located only in the most urban areas of 
the State. The report went on to note that there were, in 
fact, recreation programs in only twenty-four of the States 
communities. (1971:24-5)
Several of the studies suggested a connection between a 
family’s economic status and the accessibility of both regu­
lar and special services. The Final Report of Comprehensive 
Juvenile Delinquency Study, for example, suggests that vari­
ous educational and recreational programs require the pur­
chase of equipment and thus tend to be closed to those seg­
ments of the community that lacking sufficient resources to 
obtain such equipment. For example, the report notes the 
costly nature of winter recreation in Naine.
Minter recreation programs in the State are very 
costly and are primarily designed for either the 
well-to-do or the tourists. The cost in both fa­
cilities and equipment prohibits a large part of 
our population from taking part in these recrea- 
tional pursuits. (1971:24)
Similarly, several of the studies suggest that special ser­
vices that are available to children in higher income fami­
lies, services that in various ways mitigate the possibility 
of contact with or penetration into the juvenile justice 
system simply are not available to those in lower income 
categories. For example, while noting that delinquency is
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not peculiar to the disadvantaged, the Final Report of the
Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study points out that
there is a higher rate of juvenile justice processing anong
the less affluent.
This is probably related to the fact that the less 
affluent families tend to be less educated and 
tend to be unable to locate adequate remedial ser­
vices for their children. (1971353)**
The problem of access to rehabilitative services is exa­
cerbated, according to the studies, by artificial barriers 
erected by institutions and agencies. Children and Youth 
Caught in the Crunch, the report of the Governor's Committee 
on Children and Youth, suggests the nature of the problem in 
their recommendations regarding the administration of mental 
health services. Complete control of funding and operations 
for clinics, community mental health centers, and other men­
tal health facilities and programs should rest in the Bureau 
of Mental Health to avoid discrimination in the provision of 
such services to clients of other divisions, bureaus, or 
agencies.
We recommend that the supervision and control of 
facilities offering mental health related treat­
ment be within the division [Bureau of Mental 
Health], unlike the present situation where sever­
al agencies are setting up group care facilities.
This vould facilitate more equal accessibility of 
treatment for all children, no matter what agency 
they are referred to initially. (1973:26)
*• The more obvious point that the poor cannot afford the 
services available to the affluent was apparently lost on 
the researchers; but, nonetheless, the link is made.
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The Children and Youth Services Planning Project in their 
report. Comprehensive Blueprint, suggests that a major prob­
lem in juvenile justice is
recurring problem of offering services'to children 
and youth within the confines of narrow and in­
flexible functional areas. (1977: 1<*9)
In its recommendations, the Project further demonstrates its
concern with this issue as the following indicate:
To reduce pressures on scarce personnel resources 
at the Maine Youth Center and to reduce the grow­
ing numbers of youth who are referred to the Maine 
Youth Center for psychological examinations, the 
Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health 
and Corrections should exercise the authority and 
leadership of the Department by directing and en­
couraging the Community Mental Health Centers to 
provide needed psychological assessment services 
to the Juvenile Courts. Therefore: It is recom­
mended that the Department of Mental Health and 
Corrections, through specific contracting proce­
dures and administrative direction increase the 
level of Community Mental Health Center Services 
to children and youth referred by the Juvenile 
Courts.
It is the belief of C&YSPP that all programs 
for children and youth require the sane kinds of 
basic resources regardless of symptom. Coordinat­
ed services between the DHS [Department of Human 
Services] and the DMHC [Department of Mental 
Health and Corrections] could include the non-cat- 
egorical aid programs now housed in welfare de­
partments, such as foster care, adoptions, and 
protective services; residential programs such as 
open facilities for dependent and neglected youth, 
group residences, and secure intensive treatment 
units; field services which provide care and su­
pervision in the community and aftercare following 
institutionaliztaion.
To correct the separation of delinquency servi­
ces from related welfare services a separation
which overemphasizes the delinquent act and im­
plies that delinquents are basically different
from other youth with problems increases the
competition for limited State funds, and makes 
more difficult the assignment of priorities in the 
development of youth services:
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It is recommended that the Coaaissioners of Hu­
man Services and the Department of Mental Health 
and Corrections jointly take administrative meas­
ures which will insure that services to adjudicat­
ed juveniles provided by either department are co­
ordinated to improve the adequacy of services and 
to reduce duplication of effort. (1977:244)
Availability of services is further hampered by legisla­
tive refusal to back up its commitment to services with re­
sources through the mechanism of such escape clauses as 
"within practical limits" as in special education legisla­
tion cited in the Final Report of the Comprehensive Juvenile 
Delinquency Study. (1971: 82) Furthermore, when the State 
does attempt to provide services, they tend to be fragmen­
tary at best, constituting partial responses to the child*s 
needs. As the Children and louth Services Planning Project 
indicated, in an example of what it refers to as "disconti­
nuity," "counselling" seems to be a surrogate for all ser­
vice needs. (1977b:71)
To provide a runaway child with a counselor with­
out recognizing the immediate need for shelter is 
discontinuous. To provide counselling for the 
moderately handicapped without providing for their 
education and training is likewise an example of 
discontinuity. (1977:22)
General disarray in the rehabilitative service system is 
strongly suggested in several of the studies. This disarray, 
it is claimed, generally revolves around a near total lack 
of coordination in the provision of services to juveniles by 
the various agencies and institutions which do and/or should 
serve them. In particular, there is insufficient coopera­
tion between local schools and local service agencies, such
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as law enforcement and mental health service providers. The
Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study notes this general
problem in the context of its discussion of the school.
Cooperation between social agencies and schools 
appears to be somewhat on a hit or miss basis.
There appears to be no coordinated cooperative ef­
fort on the part of many community organizations.
An overall community-school-parent-police-church- 
social agency cooperative effort can alleviate 
many of the problems of each. (1971:16)
The classic example is on the level of state agencies and
involves the tremendous duplication due to the failure of
agencies to coordinate their efforts. This is tremendously
wasteful of scarce resources. Again, the Children and Youth
Services Planning Project:
The exact causes of duplication among state ser­
vice systems vary in each instance. For example, 
children's mental health diagnostic services have 
been virtually unavailable to the courts and cor­
rections system locally. Thus, a psychiatric 
evaluation capability was developed at our chil­
dren's correctional centers which, while meeting 
the needs of the courts, is extremely costly. 
Similarly, the correction system, recognizing the 
need for aftercare placement of children, devel­
oped its own placement system parallel to the 
child welfare services of the Department of Hunan 
Services. (1977:21)
Further, there are in these reports suggestions to the 
effect that the resources that could and should be providing 
genuine rehabilitative services are being poured into the 
bottomless pit of correctional institutions and secure de­
tention of juveniles. The Governor's Task Force on Correc­
tions was critical of corrections in general, juvenile and 
adult, on this ground.
This is an incredible waste of public resources 
and hunan lives when, according to the actual of­
fender characteristics of the Maine prison popula­
tion, at least 75-8055 of the persons presently
confined at public expense are clearly not violent
and could be assisted safely, and sore effective­
ly, at minimal cost, in the conaunity. (1974: iii)
Finally, the Commission to Revise the Statutes Relating 
to Juveniles includes several specific provisions in its 
draft of a proposed new juvenile code assigning to the De­
partment of Mental Health and Corrections responsibility for
Ensuring the provision of those services necessary 
to—
1. prevent children and youth from coming into
contact with the juvenile court system; and
2. support and rehabilitate those children and 
youth who do come into contact with the ju­
venile court.
In addition it assigns to the Department the task of gather­
ing appropriate information on service needs and proposing 
services to meet any unmet needs. (1977b:71)
Concrete service recommendations proposed by the studies 
constitute an extensive list. Taken together, they consti­
tute a broad system of rehabilitative services that is 
dpemed essential to juvenile justice in the post-Gault era. 
The system requires two basic types of services— general 
services which are theoretically available to all through 
the normal institutional structure of the community (i.e. 
education, health care, employment, etc.) and special cor­
rective, rehabilitative and remedial services to meet spe­
cial needs (i.e., meeting the needs of the disabled, crises
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in the family, substance abusers, etc.). The fact that some 
general services are unavailable to the community or some 
segment of it (usually the poor or otherwise disadvantaged) 
is presumed to be related to delinquency. The availability 
of special services addressed to particular problems is pre­
sumed to have the potential of preventing such problems from 
escalating to serious criminality.
Educational Services. Recommendations regarding the pro­
vision of educational services are prominent in the various 
studies of Haine»s juvenile justice system. As the Compre­
hensive Juvenile Delinquency Study accurately points out, 
"the only social institution to reach all youth, and to af­
fect every family, is the school. " (1971:13) Furthermore, 
the school has long been associated in various ways with the 
generation, control, and prevention of delinquency, and as 
crucial in efforts at rehabilitating the delinquent youth, 
making him/her a "productive citizen." The Commission to 
Devise the Statutes Delating to Juveniles pointed to a com­
mon theme of the studies on one of the more important con- 
nections between the school institution and delinquency.
Because of its very nature, an educational system 
provides an important method for preventing juve­
niles from becoming offenders. Thus, the Depart­
ment of Educational and Cultural Services seeks to 
provide each person with a high quality education 
which will allow him to become a self-reliant, 
productive and satisfied citizen. (1976d:1)
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Thus, the failure of some communities to provide adequate 
educational opportunities for all or some of their youthful 
population tends to exacerbate the delinquency problem and, 
conversely, to provide access to such educational services 
for all would presumably serve to prevent delinquency. The 
recommendations on education are aimed at mating the educa­
tional system work for all juveniles, particularly those 
problem students who experience behavioral difficulties, 
learning disabilities, lack of interest in traditional pro­
grams, truancy, and the like.
1. The failure of many of the state's communities to 
provide educational alternatives to "college bound" 
curricula, specifically, vocational education, is a 
serious flaw which is seen as partly responsible for 
truancy, dropping out, as well as discipline problems 
and educational failure —  all of which are assumed 
to be related to crime and delinquency. Thus, the 
reports recommend the expansion of vocational educa­
tion and apprenticeship programs. In addition, the 
schools should allow all students, regardless of aca- 
demic ability, to fully participate in all school ac­
tivities so that they night have some chance of suc­
cess in the academic environment. (CJDS, 
1971:17-20.79; GTF,1974:4)
2. There is considerable variation in the availability 
of guidance, counselling, and social work services
aaong districts and schools. In general, such servi­
ces are provided at an inadequate level and tend in 
general not to reach out 'to the non-middle class, 
non-college hound youth. (CJDS, 1971:12-20, 79-82)
All of the services that a child needs to be able to 
benefit fron the right to a public education (as 
guaranteed by statute) nust be provided. The failure 
of sone coanunities to conply with the State lav nan- 
dating transportation to the appropriate educational 
facility is an example of the kind of service that 
nust be provided. (CYSPP, 1977:20,308)
Existing law also required schools to provide Posi­
tive Action Conaittees and Pupil Evaluation Teaas to 
assess school failure and related probleas and devel­
op appropriate individual programs to deal with then. 
(CYSPP, 1977:307; GTF, 1974:8; CBS, 1976c:13)
Services aust be provided to truants and drop-outs in 
a effort to provide appropriate educational solutions 
to what are essentially educational probleas and to 
lessen the likelihood that such juveniles will engage 
in delinquent or criminal activity. (CJDS, 
1971:15-17, 79-82; CRS, 1977:8)
It nust further be noted that educational opportunity 
is considered to have a crucial role to play in the 
rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. Aaong the dif­
ficulties in this area that need attention are educa-
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tional services available at the juvenile correction­
al facilities in Maine. Of even greater iaportance 
is the need for the local school to reach out to such 
juveniles upon their return fron institutions and 
make every effort to reintegrate then into the school 
and provide any special services that may be neces­
sary to help make their educational experience a suc­
cess. (CJDS, 1971:20,79)
7. Finally, the schools should expand their educational 
missions into specific problem areas that are thought 
to relate to delinguency. For example, there should 
be curricular development in the areas of substance 
abuse, parenting, and so forth. (CJDS, 1971:18-19, 
79-82; CYSPP, 1977:308)
In general, the studies suggest that rehabilitation/preven­
tion in the context of the educational institution means es­
sentially that the objectives of the institution be defined 
more broadly and that the institution function more effec­
tively in serving these objectives.
j Family Services. The family also receives a great deal 
of attention in the formulation of the service component of 
the post-Gault rehabilitative ideal. As the Comprehensive 
Juvenile Delinguency Study notes, "Ho single unit of society 
is more vital in the prevention and control of delinquency 
than is the family." (1971:40) The importance of the family
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to the post-Gault reformers in Haine is similarly indicated 
by two of the reports in quoting from the 1909 White House 
Conference reference to the family as the "highest and fin­
est product of civilization." (GCCY, 1973:11; CBS, 1976a:81) 
Pron the first of the post-Gault studies, the popular as­
sumption of a connection between delinguency and "broken" 
families is accepted- There is in general a view that the 
community must take measures to strengthen the family and to 
address the difficulties of "problem" families. Neverthe­
less, specific recommendations with respect to family servi­
ces are few.*7 This general lack of specific recommendations 
may in part be understood in the context of the importance 
placed on the family as a more or less "private" rather than 
a "public" institution- Host comments on the family and its 
relation to delinquency involve recommendations affirming 
the central place of the family in the development of chil­
dren and suggesting various support services to the family 
and suggestions that the State abandon practices that are 
destructive of family life. Among the types of recommenda­
tions are the following:
1. Host of the studies claim that there is a need for 
improved services to families. The Comprehensive Ju­
venile Delinquency Study, for example, recommends the
17 The Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study, for exam­
ple, after calling the family the most important social 
unit in relation to delinquency, devotes less than two 
pages to specific discussion of the family and recommen­
dations on the family. [1971:40-41)
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establishment of Family Resource Councils in communi- 
ties to assist families in neeting their various 
needs. (1971:70)
It is suggested that one source of the delinguency 
problem is the lack of knowledge on the part of pa­
rents with respect to child rearing. Education in 
parenting is recommended as one response to the prob­
lem. (CJDS* 1971:19, 40; CYSPP, 1977:308)
There is also the suggestion that the single-parent 
family is particularly vulnerable to the emergence of 
delinquency and that special counselling services be 
offered to single-parent families. (CJDS, 1971:7 5) 
The Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study implies 
that some type of therapy may be needed by the poor 
family in order to overcome the poor self-image that 
comes with poverty. (CJDS, 1971:54)
The importance of the family in the rehabilitation of 
the juvenile offender is noted with numerous recom­
mendations that the family be actively involved in 
the rehabilitative process. (GTF, 1974:4)
There are several recommendations that urge the State 
to encourage rather than discourage family cohesive­
ness in its policies and practices. For example, the 
Governor’s Task Force on Corrections condemned the 
isolation of the correctional inmate from his/her 
family as unnecessary and repressive. (1974:15-16)
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The Commission to Bevise the Statutes indicates that 
one of the goals of juvenile justice in the State 
ought to be the improvement and support of the fami­
ly. In its draft code, among the stated purposes of 
juvneile justice is to secure care and guidance, 
preferably in the hone, and to preserve and strength­
en the family. (1977b: 1)
Hental Health Services. Hental health has, since at 
least the juvenile court movement, been associated with the 
"causes" of juvenile delinquency and the treatment of juve­
nile offenders. Delinquency is and has long been considered 
as somehow expressive of underlying psychological problems. 
Thus, mental health services would be considered central to 
both the prevention of delinquency and the rehabilitation of 
juvenile offenders.
As in the case of discussion of the family, specific rec­
ommendations are few, but their impact would presumably be 
significant if they were to be implemented. Among then are
the following:
«/
1. In general, children are not receiving their fair 
share of mental health resources. Several of the 
studies recommend that childrenBs mental health ser­
vices be drastically expanded. (GCCY, 1973:26ff; 
CYSPP, 1977:97-118,283)
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2. In particular, juveniles are underserved by Community 
Rental Health Centers.18 The reports are nearly unan­
imous on the point that diagnostic evaluations of ju­
venile justice clients must be provided by community 
mental health centers rather than the juvenile cor­
rectional institutions. 7 (GTF, 1974:11; CYSPP, 
1977:98; GCCY, 1973:27)
3. There is general agreement on the need for expanded
services in the mental health area. Host of the
studies, however, recommend that such services should
be provided through mental health care agencies rath­
er than corrections, the exception being the Compre­
hensive Juvenile Delinquency Study which made several 
recommendations relative to upgrading such services 
in the correctional institutions and probation de­
partments. {CJDS, 1971:65-66; GCCY, 1973:26-29; GTF, 
1974:11; CYSPP, 1977:97-98)
4. There is some suggestion of a need for a secure psy­
chiatric facility for juveniles as well as therapeu­
tic foster care and other more advanced psychiatric 
care capacity. (CHS, 1976a:92; CYSPP, 1977:97)
18 The Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency inaccurately as­
serts that community mental health services are available 
to all youth and adults in Maine. This is, according to 
others reports, at best theoretically true. (1971:52)
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Special Services. While reform of the community and its 
institutions seems to be considered in these studies as cen­
tral to delinquency control and prevention, there are limits 
as to what can be done; there are those who will no doubt 
fall through the cracks of the institutional structure, 
those with special problems beyond the scope of community 
institutions. Special services of various kinds are also 
necessary to rehabilitate these juveniles. Implicit in the 
various reports, however, is a notion that the better are 
the basic institutions, the less need there will be for such 
services.
Finally, the underlying point needs to be reemphasized. 
Juveniles have real needs that are not being net. The State, 
in carrying out its parens patriae role, is functioning as a 
neglectful parent, at best. If the juvenile justice system 
is to be a rehabilitative system, it must fulfill its prom­
ises of care, guidance, and treatment with real care, real 
guidance, and real treatment.
l* There are also numerous recommendations for services in 
other areas. Recreational opportunities, for example, 
are inaccessible to many juveniles for economic or other 




There are numerous suggestions throughout the post-Gault 
studies of Maine's juvenile justice system that point to 
prevention as the preferred approach to delinquency. Though 
few of the reports specify prevention strategies in great 
detail, the broad outlines of such strategies are implicit 
in all of them. In addition, they contain some concrete 
suggestions of elements of a juvenile justice system that 
would maintain such an emphasis. Preventive justice presup­
poses that there are alterable conditions out of which de­
linguency emerges, or "causes" of delinquent behavior that 
can be identified and altered before offending behavior has 
taken place. In fact, each of the studies at the very least 
implies such causes or conditions as generative of delin­
guency. M l  of the studies assume to a greater or lesser 
extent some community and/or social conditions as being 
linked to delinquency and subject to change as part of a 
strategy of prevention. Only the Comprehensive Juvenile De­
linquency Study, however, discussed prevention in terms of 
ttye identification of the "predelinquent." (1971:8-9) Nev­
ertheless, except in terms of making the traditional connec­
tion between "status offense" behavior and subsequent crimi­
nal activity, even this study places the greatest emphasis 
in prevention, judging by concrete recommendations, on the 
efforts to make community agencies and institutions mors re­
sponsive to the needs to young people. However, the concept
150
"predelinquent” is implicit in all of the reports in that 
they discass the need to respond to problens represented by 
"non-criminal misbehavior" in the context of delinquency 
prevention. Thus, for example, the juvenile who fails aca­
demically and is truant from school or a drop-out must be 
given access to various services at least in part to prevent 
this particular problem from eventually manifesting itself 
in criminal activity.
The Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study, for exam­
ple, emphasizes the removal of the "causes” of delinquency 
as the most economical and practical solution to the delin­
quency problem. (1971:8) It specifically recommends educa­
tional programs in drug and alcohol abuse; law enforcement 
involvement in the schools to develop an understanding and 
respect for law on the part of students; greater integration 
of youth into the community and its institutions in terms of 
recreational opportunities, religion, and employment; 
strengthening of family life; and the provision of educa­
tional, psychological, and social services to address prob­
lens before they result in delinquent behavior.
(1971:65-82)
The Governor* s Task Force on Corrections was charged by 
the Governor with recommending ”a more effective and mean­
ingful experience in the community to prevent the repetition 
of criminal or delinquent behavior.” (1974:2) The Task 
Force sees the public school system as the single most in-
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portant community institution in delinquency prevention and 
recoaaends that it assuae a broader view of its educational 
nission as including the vocational, social, emotional, rec­
reational, and political needs of its students. Further­
more, other community institutions —  social, civic, relig­
ious, recreational, and political —  must become involved 
with and encourage the active participation of juveniles in 
their activities, providing opportunites for constructively 
channeling juveniles' energy. There is also a need for rem­
edial efforts to address problems of juveniles before they 
express themselves in delinquent behavior. [1974:3-9)
The Children and Youth Services Planning Project dis­
cussed prevention in terms of "reducing risks" by providing 
for the social, economic, mental health, and other needs of 
children. (1977:149) The Governor's Committee on Children 
and Youth expressed the need for the supportive services for 
children and families in order that the present system ori­
ented toward "crisis intervention" become a preventive one. 
(1973:25)
The Commission to Revise the Statutes, in emphasizing 
prevention as a major goal of juvenile justice reform, re­
commends as specific goals the reduction of truancy, drop­
out rates, and formal juvenile delinquency petitions, and 
the increase in prevention programs and participation in 
them, and increased use of community counselling and other 
forms of non-judicial interevention. The Commission dis­
cussed in detail prevention through the educational system 
and through the establishment of youth services bureaus.
(1976b:1-24, Appendix Il-no page)
The Bole of the Community
k further theme that runs through these studies and which 
relates to the ideal of rehabilitation is the adherence to 
the sociological axiom that delinguency somehow emerges out 
of social relations in general and out of the community in 
particular. There are, of course, a number of variations on 
this theme in the various reports. However, there is unan­
imity on the basic point that some flaw in the organization 
of the community and/or its institutions, is ultimately re­
sponsible for the emergence of delinguency. Conseguently, 
it is only in the community that the problem can ultimately 
be solved. In the words of the Governor’s Task Force on 
Corrections,
[It] is the community, not the [correctional] in­
stitution, that offers the only real hope to the 
criminal offender. Thus, if the community is not 
presently motivated by compassion and fairness for 
fellow members who have broken the social con­
tract, as we believe it is prepared to do with 
sufficient information and resources, it nust act 
out of its own enlightened self-interest.
(1974: iv)
Thus, there is a tendency in all of the reports to favor 
various improvements in the community and its institutions, 
to favor community-based treatment of the juvenile offender.
and to assuae a somewhat anti-institutional stance. The 
role of the coaaunity and/or society is emphasized in the 
generation of delinquency, and in its prevention and treat­
ment. Only the coaaunity, not the institution, can ulti­
mately deal with the problem.
There are a number of ways in which the notion of "coaau- 
nity" enters into the various reports and recoaaendations. 
First, there is, particularly in the Final Report of the 
Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study and _In the Public 
Interest, the suggestion that delinquency emerges froa the 
coaaunity and that, consequently, the solutions to the prob­
lem must be found in the community. (CJDS, 1971:1-9, 13-41; 
GTF, 1974:iv) The second rationale for focusing on the com­
munity, one common to all of the reports, is that the commu­
nity is what the individual juvenile must adjust to, not in­
stitutional life, and that consequently, treatment based in 
the community is more natural and aore likely to lead to 
more normal development of the juvenile. Third, the commu­
nity is viewed as the alternative to correctional institu­
tions, widely regarded as incapable of rehabilitating delin- 
guents and, in fact, aore likely to encourage further 
delinquency and criminality. Finally, the coaaunity is seen 
as having the most direct interest in the rehabilitation of 
the juvenile offender and in the prevention of delinquency
In the case of the Final Report of the Comprehensive Ju­
venile Delinquency Study, "community" refers primarily to
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the local community. In the report of the Governor*s Task 
Force, l£ the Public Interest, both the local coaaunity and 
the larger society and its institutions are linked to the 
generation of delinquent behavior. In both, the requirement 
that the recoaaendations be practical results in a focus on 
the local coaaunity in terms of specific recommendations.
From these major theaes are derived three remaining pre­
scriptions of post-Gault reform both nationally and in 
Naine: decriminalization, deinstitutionalization, and div­
ersion. Each represents an attempt to bring these theaes to 
bear on soae particular aspect of the juvenile justice sys- 
tea.
Decriminalization
As previously noted, decriminalization in post-Gault juve­
nile justice generally refers to the reaoval of so-called 
"status offenses" from the jurisdiction of the juvenile jus­
tice system. Decriminalization is a curious ideal of post- 
Gault justice in some respects in that decriainalization was 
in fact one of the major rationales for the establishment of 
socialized juvenile justice in the first place. Juvenile 
Courts were established and functioned behind a veil of se­
crecy in order to protect the juvenile froa the negative 
consequences to reputation and so forth as a result of what
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were often seen as juvenile indiscretions. Maine's first 
juvenile court legislation, An Act to Extend the Jurisdic­
tion of the Nunipal Court in Certain Cases (1931), in fact, 
specified that convictions of juveniles under this statute 
were not to be construed as convictions of criminal offen­
ses. (Maine Legislature, 1931:273) The call for decriminal­
ization of juvenile justice in the 1960' and 1970's is tes­
timony to the failure of this long hel ideal of socialized 
juvenile justice.
Maine's juvenile law was typical in including the follow­
ing kinds of activities within the jurisdiction of the juve­
nile court. Included in the statutes (1965:522) are the 
following status offenses:
1. Habitual truancy.
2. Being in an incorrigible or indecent and lascivious 
manner.
3. Knowingly and willfully associating with vicious, 
criminal or grossly immoral people.
4. Repeatedly deserting one's home without just cause.
5. Living in circumstances of manifest danger of falling 
into vice or immorality.
In establishing such special offense categories for juve­
niles, the State is acting parens patriae in an effort to 
control behavior which is presumed likely to lead to crimi­
nality if left unchecked. (S*** v. State, in CHS, 1976a:2)
There are a number of grounds upon which criticism of the 
status offense jurisdiction rests. First, in a theae echoed 
by aany of the studies, the Comprehensive Juvenile Delin­
quency Study points out that there are certain problems (be­
haviors constituting status offenses) which are not essen­
tially legal in nature, but, rather, depending on the 
particular "offense", educational or medical problems appro­
priately dealt with by the educational systea or the health 
care system. (1971: 13-16,71-72) The same point is aade by 
the Governor's Committee on Children and Youth with respect 
to the problea of truancy, arguing that "coercion" is an in­
appropriate way of dealing with such probleas. (1973:19)
The second major area of criticism of the status offense 
jurisdiction is on the basis of the labeling perspective. 
(Leaert, 1951) The Governor's Task Force on Corrections 
makes the point that Maine juvenile justice professionals 
have reinforced delinquency through labeling and stigmatiza­
tion which accompanies foraal juvenile justice processing. 
There has also been a tendency for communities to foist off 
their problems on the juvenile justice system. School ad-
j
ministrators are cited as an example. (1974:8-9) The Com­
mission to Bevise the Statutes noted in its analysis of the 
goals of Maine's juvenile justice system that the status of­
fense jurisdiction which has prevention as its rationale, 
has, in fact, the opposite effect due to labeling. 
(1976a:80)
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The Governors Task Force implies and the Commission to 
Revise the Statutes makes explicit the criticism that the 
status offense jurisdiction tends to underaine the family. 
(GTF, 1974:9; CRS, 1976a:81)
A further line of criticisa is that the jurisdiction of 
the court over status offenses tends to undermine any real 
responses to the problem that such behaviors presumably sig­
nify. {CRS, I976a:81) It has long been recognized that juve­
niles often received the eguivalent of severe penal sanc­
tions for offenses that were not even considered criminal 
when committed by adults. The most obvious example is the 
possession of alcohol by a minor. But perhaps the aost pro­
blematic of these involve the vague designations of "incor­
rigibility" or "immoral behavior" or "danger of falling into 
vice or immorality" that were included in most pre-Gault ju­
venile codes. (GTF, 1974:9-10) The fact that juveniles could 
be and in fact were incarcerated for indeterminate periods 
of tine for such "offenses" and that they could be so incar­
cerated without the benefit of due process of law was clear­
ly a major concern of juvenile justice reformers and a major 
factor in the instigation of the most recent juvenile jus­
tice reform movement.
Finally, there is the criticism that the status offense 
jurisdiction is unfair, not only because it punishes chil­
dren for bahavior which is not punishable for others, but 
because the definitions of these "offenses" are broad and
158
vague in the extreme. This allows for discriminatory and 
arbitrary enforcement. (CRS, 1976a:79-82)
Recommendations on decriminalization range from rather 
modest proposals to develop more appropriate responses to 
non-criminal misbehavior to wholesale elimination of status 
offenses from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and the 
development of more appropriate structures where such are 
deemed necessary.
The Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study is unique 
among the post-Gault studies in that it adopts a fairly tra­
ditional attitude toward status offenses. There is in the 
Final Report no suggestion that decriminalization take 
place. Furthermore, there is little indication of any sen­
sitivity on the part of the researchers to the possible neg­
ative consequences of formal processing. There is, nonethe­
less, some slight move in the direction of decriminalization 
in the recommendations which prescribe non-judicial remedies 
for some of these "status offenses" such as the notion that 
educational problems (dropping out and truancy, for example) 
require educational solutions, not juvenile justice process- 
ing. The same is true of such problems as drug abuse, where 
the study concludes that treatment of such problems ought to 
be left to the professionals in mental health. (1971:13-16, 
71-72)
The Governor's Task Force on Corrections recommends the 
complete elimination of the status offense jurisdiction.
159
thereby decreasing the number of youth who enter the juve­
nile justice system and lessening the risk of stigmatiza­
tion. The Task Force goes a step further than existing law 
which prohibits the institutionalization of status offenders 
and recommends that they not be adjudicated at all. If the 
juvenile justice system is to deal with such youth, it must 
do so informally and nonjudicially and with the entire fami­
ly, not just the juvenile in question. This is particularly 
important considering the harm generally recognized as ac­
companying juvenile justice processing. {1974:9)
The report makes clear that in proposing decriminaliza­
tion, it does not intend that problems represented by “sta­
tus offenses" be ignored. Rather, it makes strong recommen­
dations for dealing with such problems in a more appropriate 
manner. For example, the educational system must be direct­
ed to address the needs of problem students. Teachers and 
guidance personnel must be trained to deal with aggressive 
behavior, poor academic performance, social pathology, and 
truancy. Programs tied to existing community resources must 
be established within the schools to deal with these prob-
j
lens. The report notes that existing statutes require 
school districts to address these probleas under threat of 
denial of funding. Pupil Evaluation Teams apparently being 
developed to implement this legislation should also be used 
as delinquency prevention tool. For too long, the report 
notes, school administrators have been foisting their prob-
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leas on the correctional system. In addition, there aust be 
cooperation between schools and the youth services bureaus 
which the Task Force proposes. (1974:8-10) The youth servi­
ces bureau is the central component of the juvenile justice 
system recommended by the Governor's Task Force. Clearly, 
such a bureau, offering services to youth, criminal and 
non-criminal, on a voluntary basis, would fulfill a central 
function with respect to those juveniles who were previously 
handled under the juvenile court's status offense jurisdic­
tion. (1974:6-7)
The Governor's Committee on Children and Youth has little 
to say directly on the issue of decriminalization- Neverthe­
less, there is implicit in the report the assumption that 
services rendered outside of the juvenile justice system are 
more appropriate in many cases. Also, as does the Compre­
hensive Juvenile Delinquency Study, the Governor's Committee 
recommends that such services be provided to truants and po­
tential truants on the grounds that coercion is an ineffec­
tive means of dealing with problems.
Laws which attempt to eliminate truancy through 
coercion are ineffective. Truancy is a symptom of 
the inadequacy of the educational institution and 
must be dealt with by providing services to the 
affected group of pupils. (1973:19)
The Children and Youth Services Planning Project endorses
decriminalization by virtue of their general endorsement of
the work of the Commission to Revise the Statutes. Apart
from this indirect endorsement, however, there are a number
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of suggestions that clearly indicate that such a goal is 
consistent with the thinking of the Project. In particular, 
the Project is quite critical of juvenile justice processing 
of runaways (suggesting instead that short-tern shelter fa­
cilities be developed) and truants (suggesting instead that 
Pupil Evaluation Teans respond to such problems). Further­
more, their report quotes approvingly from a study of the 
Stevens School (girls correctional center) conducted by the 
American Correctional Association which concluded that fully 
one third of inmates were more appropriately child welfare 
cases than correctional inmates. (1977:192)
Finally, the most detailed of the discussions of decrimi­
nalization is that of the Commission to Revise the Statutes 
Delating to Juveniles. Quite obviously, since it was 
charged with the development of specific legislation, its 
recommendations are more detailed. However, its recommenda­
tions do not differ substantively from those previously dis­
cussed. The Commission argued that statutes relating to 
status offenses are vague and inappropriate for juvenile 
court intervention (T977b:11-22) By 1975, the Legislature
j
had amended the Code to eliminate the possibility of incar­
ceration for such status offenses. The Commission itself 
continued such a prohibition and, most importantly, com­
pletely eliminated all but a few of these status offenses 
from the Court's jurisdiction. The offenses retained were 
the possession of alcohol, the possession of marijuana (de-
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criminalized in a reform of the Maine Criminal Code) and 
prostitution (also decriminalized for adults in Maine). 
Initially, the Commission recommended that there be no in­
carceration for any of these offenses. However, it subse­
quently reversed its position to allow it for all of them.
Finally, the Commission's strong statements indicating a 
commitment to the idea that decriminalization is not neglect 
need to be emphasized. Clearly, there is no intent to allow 
a juvenile to destroy him/herself with alcohol or drugs sim­
ply because judicial intervention seems inappropriate. Cer­
tain actions, argues the Commission, indicate a need for as­
sistance. Others represent a threat to the public. The 
latter (eg. driving while intoxicated) justify jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, behavior which represents no threat to 
the public but which may signify a serious problem for the 
juvenile must be met with psychiatric, medical, or other
nonjudicial services. In cases where the juvenile repre­
sents a serious threat to him/her self, temporary and limit­
ed custody may be justified. In general, however, behaviors 
previously defined as "status offenses" must be responded to 
non-coercively. Crisis-intervention centers, walk-in cen­
ters, temporary residential facilities, counselling, medical 
treatment, educational services, and mental health care 
should be available. Commissioners expressed concern about 
alcoholism, runaways, and sexual immorality. There was con­
cern that the mental health problems of such juveniles were
163
not being met. They recommended that these be given coun­
selling without reaoval fron their families wherever possi­
ble and that the school system be utilized for diagnosis and 
treatment. (1976a:82-85)
The Commission's views of the proper role of Maine's ju­
venile justice system with respect to status offenses is 
noted in their "Suggested Goals of Maine's Juvenile Justice 
System."
Goal: To decrease or eliminate the number of
children about whom petitions for non-criminal be­
havior are filed in juvenile courts.
Goal: To provide the juvenile court with juris­
diction over clearly specified and defines acts 
which threaten harm or which do harm to others.
Goal: To increase the availability and use on
non-court related treatment services to both non- 
criminally misbehavina children and their fami­
lies. (1976a: 83-85)
Deinstitutionalization and Institutional Beform
Deinstitutionalization in the context of juvenile justice 
reform has a broader connotation than the usual use of the
jterm, referring not only to the removal of juveniles fron 
the large, isolated, freguently punitive institutions, but 
also the removal of juveniles fron jails and, in general, a 
decreasing use of secure facilities. Furthermore, in the 
context of post-Gault reform in Maine, it is also necessary 
to include some discussion of institutional reform in the
context of deinstitutionalization, for it also assumes the 
meaning of "deinstitutionalizing institutions."
There are four fundamental reasons for deinstitutionali­
zation and decarceration. First, the historical failure of 
the juvenile correctional institution in its many forms con­
tinues into the modern era. There is simply no evidence 
that it has ever succeeded in rehabilitating its charges. 
Secondly, and related, is the widespread recognition of the 
negative consequences of institutionalization, particularly 
the likelihood of stigmatization and the history that sug­
gests that these institutions are more likely to be "train­
ing schools" in crime than "training schools" in "productive 
citizenship." Thirdly, the long held concern of juvenile 
justice reformers with the possible "contagion" of juveniles 
by housing then (in jails) with adult criminals is the major 
rationale behind the move to prohibit the incarceration of 
juveniles in adult facilities. Finally, fundamental fair­
ness is involved. For juveniles to be incarcerated in cor­
rectional institutions for offenses that result in only a 
fine for an adult, or no penalty at all (in the case of ju-
j
venile status offenses), strikes many reformers as inherent­
ly unfair, particularly in light of the failure of these in­
stitutions to fulfill their promises of care, guidance, and 
rehabilitation instead of punishment.
All of the studies to some degree share in these criti­
cisms of the existing system and call for some degree of
deinstitutionalization and decarceration. Nonetheless, 
there is a vide range of opinion on these issues expressed 
in the various reports.
The Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study, while soie- 
vhat critical of the institutions, does not appear to view 
the problem as fundamentally connected to the nature of cor­
rectional institutions. In fact, relying almost exclusively 
on "in house" evaluations of the training centers, the Com­
prehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study arrives at typical "in 
house" conclusions, essentially to the effect that the in­
stitutions simply do not have the resources adequate to 
their tasks. Additional social workers, pyschiatrists, 
counsellors, buildings, and so forth, that is to say insti­
tutional improvement, is the answer to whatever problems do 
exist. Some changes in institutional policy and procedure 
are also recommended. In particular, the institution should 
be made as natural an environment as possible, including 
such changes as decreasing the size of the institutions, 
making then "coeducational," increasing the personal privacy 
of the inmates, eliminating the extended period of "medical
y
isolation" upon entrance into the institution, and encourag­
ing the education of the inmates in the community when such 
is possible. There is, however, a call for the establish­
ment of halfway houses and other community-based treatment 
facilities, which seems to suggest that some degree of 
deinstitutionalization is possible. An additional reconmen-
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dation of relevance here is the establishment of a Gover­
nor’s Advisory Committee to aonitor the institutions and is­
sue periodic reports. [1971:44-50,65-68)
The Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study is more ex­
plicit on the issue of secure detention, recommending rather 
strongly that juveniles awaiting court appearance should be 
at home with their families. As a last resort, they may be 
held at the training centers. They may be held in jails 
only if there is a separate, specially designed section ex­
clusively for the detention of juveniles, and a separate en­
trance to the facility. [1971:73-74)
The Governor's Task Force on Corrections was a strong 
proponent of deinstitutionalization. The report argues that 
the largely institutional correctional systems are failing. 
There is, they note, a growing awareness in Maine and the 
nation that correctional systems are "simply not working". 
They neither deter nor prevent crime. There is concern over 
public safety, use of violence to solve problems, and over 
the "enormous disparity" between what the evidence suggests 
that we should be doing and actual correctional practices. 
There is also concern over the tremendous costs and failure 
of long-term confinement of large numbers of offenders and 
apparently lower cost and greater effectiveness of community 
based corrections. The Task Force makes numerous points in 
its report, XB the Public Interest, on this and related is­
sues. (1974: 11)
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First, the Task Force comments on the inappropriateness
of the institutional approach for aost of the clients of the
Haine correctional system, noting that the vast majority of
the population of correctional institutions in Haine were
convicted of non-violent offenses —  property crimes or vic-
tinless crimes in nearly 80% of cases. Host of these, the
Task Force claims, could be handled more appropriately by
connunity-based corrections if such a capacity existed. Mot
only is such an approach ineffective, it is also extremely
wasteful of scarce resources. The Task Force writes,
[For this3 largely non-violent average offender 
population of 741 persons, Haine spent $7,839,450 
in fiscal year 1973-74, the lion's share of this 
sum being allocated to simple institutional custo­
dial and security requirements....[ This is] an in­
effective and unnecessary misallocation of public 
resources. (1974:vi)
In general, the Task Force opted for the establishment of 
a much more community-based system, geared toward preventing 
the repetition of non-violent crime at the local level and 
aimed at addressing the socio-economic problems of offenders 
and their successful reintegration into the community as 
soon as possible after they have come into contact with the 
criminal justice system. Ideally, the new decentralized 
system would embrace all the public and private resources 
now available and would include others not currently avail­
able. (1974:vi,4) There is also a need for a system of group 
homes so that juveniles who need a residential facility are 
not confined to institutions. The Task Force recommends the
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establishnent of a Group Hone Advisory Board to plan and de­
velop such a system. The intent of the Governor's Task 
Force vas to sove toward complete deinstitutionalization by 
the gradual transfer of resources fron the institutions to 
community-based programs. It explicitly rejects the Hassa- 
chusetts approach of closing the institutions immediately on 
the grounds that such an approach is "simplistic and illogi­
cal." (1974:11-12)
tfhile the ultimate goal of the Task Force is to eventual­
ly completely replace institutions with a system of group 
homes across the State, a radically reduced role for the in­
stitutions is proposed for the interim. For example, the 
report refers to "that fraction of the offender population 
that must remain confined...." They must be provided with 
the rehabilitative services during and after institutional 
confinement that will make for them illogical a return to 
criminal activity and that will allow them to become first- 
class members of the community upon release. Furthermore, 
the Task Force calls for the creation of as natural and dig­
nified environment as possible. The institution should both 
minimize stigma and prepare the juvenile for re-entry into 
the community. (1974:vi, 11-12)
Such a program depends on willingness of Maine communi­
ties to cooperate. The Task Force recommends that the State 
provide incentives to encourage community cooperation in 
deinstitutionalization. Considering the annual per capita
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cost of confinement of $19,000 to $20,000, the provision of 
financial incentives to the local conmunity nates good fis­
cal sense to the State. (1979:12-13)
The Task Force also raises an additional issue under the 
broad rubric of deinstitutionalization that becane important 
in Maine's post-Gault reform effort, that is, the practice 
of extended confinement of juveniles at the training centers 
for purposes of preadjudicatory diagnostic evaluations. The 
report recommends that judges be instructed to cease using 
the training centers for this purpose. Instead, conmunity 
mental health facilities must be utilized. According to the 
Task Force report, juveniles were often confined for as long 
as a month at training centers for this purpose when in fact 
a complete diagnostic evaluation should take no longer than 
three days. The conclusion that centers were being used as 
preadjudicatory jails for juveniles is difficult to avoid. 
The Task Force writes,
He believe this practice to be a wholly unaccepta­
ble manner in which to inform some juveniles at 
first hand of the possible sanctions attached to 
the continuance of their alleged conduct, and such 
practices authorized by a presiding judge seen 
somewhat to beg the ultimate questions in the 
pending criminal case. (1979:11)
Not only is the practice unfair and counterproductive, it 
serves to divert training center resources away fron insti­
tutional programs and is not a cost effective approach to 
diagnostic evaluation.
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The report of the Children and Youth Services Planning 
Project, Comprehensive Blueprint. addresses three basic is­
sues of deinstitutionalization— the high rate of commitment 
of juveniles to training centers for treatment, the high 
rate of secure detention of juveniles in Haine, and the fre­
quent use of the training centers for diagnostic evalua­
tions. These are, of course, issues that have been previ­
ously raised. What the Children and Youth Services Planning 
Project contributes to the discussion is a slightly differ­
ent perspective on the appropriate path to deinstitutionali­
zation. In contrast to the earlier Governor's Task Force on 
Corrections study, the Project raises the question of wheth­
er the move from institutional to community-based treatment 
can be implemented without closing down the institutions. 20
Can the philosophy of the juvenile justice system 
truly become one of community-based alternatives 
without implementing changes as radical as the 
Massachusetts experiment of closing down all juve­
nile institutions? (1977:149)
Furthermore, the Children and Youth Services Planning
Project marshalled an impressive array of supporting data to
back up its conclusions. According to the Coaprehensive
Blueprint. Maine far exceeded the national standard in the
use of secure detention. 14% of the juveniles arrested were
so detained and 30% of those who were subsequently referred
20 This difference in perspective may be the result of the 
experience with "deinstitutionalization" in the interven­
ing years. As the Project report indicates, deinstitu­
tionalization had become incorporated into Maine juvenile 
justice policy, and the results, as will be apparent be­
low, were not particularly impressive.
171
to court. These secure detentions took place at the train­
ing centers and county jails. The point that the vast ma­
jority of these were unnecessary is illustrated with figures 
for fiscal year 1975. In that year, there were 1,340 secure 
detentions of juveniles. In the same year, only 281 juve­
niles were committed to the Boy's Training Center or the 
Stevens School. If more than a thousand juveniles repre­
sented a serious threat to themselves o r v the community, 
there presumably would have been a far greater proportion of 
then committed to the training centers. (1977:158) Perhaps 
more disturbing than than high rate of secure detentions is 
the dramatic increase in such detentions in recent years. 
For example, the number of inmates of the Boy's Training 
Center classified as "hold for court” in 1970 was 20; by 
FY1974 the number had risen to 512.21 (1977:152) The report 
also notes the waste of resources involved in unnecessary 
detentions. It estimated the cost of "unwarranted” deten­
tions in 1975 at $129,000. The practice is, claims the re­
port, "wasteful and potentially harmful." (1977:158) The 
frequent use of jails for juvenile detentions is also de- 
cried. The CYSPP indicates that it expects the practice to 
continue and insists that the jails that hold juveniles be 
inspected by the Department of dental Health and Corrections
21 The FY1974 figure is somewhat misleading in that it also 
includes those juveniles at the Center for diagnostic 
evaluations. These were thought to total approximately 
one-third of the 512 inmates. In any case, the increase 
remains dramatic.
jail inspector. (1977:198)
Like the Governor's Task Force on Corrections, the 
Project condemns the practice of conducting preadjudicatory 
diagnostic evaluations at the training centers and recom- 
aends instead that connunity aental health centers provide 
such services to the courts. The Department of Mental 
Health and Corrections, the report argues, must exert lead­
ership to see that cones about. Despite the nove to the 
"community-based" philosophy, the courts continue to indi­
cate a strong preference for institutional evaluations. 
Statistics indicate that such evaluations result in the 
needless lengthy confinenent of juveniles at the Boy's 
Training Center (an average of 17.5 days per evaluation) and 
the Stevens School (an average stay of 26.8 days). k fur­
ther problem with institutional evaluations is that they of­
ten result in transporting the juvenile a great distance 
from his/her home and family. Of the 196 evaluations con­
ducted at the Boy's Training Center in FYl97<t, more than 
half involved juveniles who lived outside of a fifty mile 
radius of the Center. (1977:150-157)
Finally, the excessive use of commitment to training cen­
ters as a court disposition is discussed. Again, the Chil­
dren and Youth Services Planning Project notes the disparity 
between the professed commitment to the connunity-based phi­
losophy on the one hand and the ever increasing populations 
of the training centers. The trend in the figures over re­
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cent years is disturbing.” The rather steady decrease in the 
population of both centers from FY1971 through FY1974 (fron 
247 to 198) is dramatically reversed in FY1975 when it in­
creases 41.9% to 281. The trend continues into FY1976 when 
an additional 14.9% is recorded (323 inmates). On the other 
hand, while there has been some increase in the in the num­
bers of residential placements between FY1972 and FY1975 
(from 9 to 107), the ratio of placements to commitments has 
increased only slightly. This perhaps explains the sugges­
tion of the report that deinstitutionalization may only be 
fully realized by the elimination of the juvenile correc­
tional institution. (1977: 184-191)
The Governor's Committee on Children and Youth also comes 
out strongly for deinstitutionalization and an end to diag­
nostic evaluations at the training centers. They recommend 
that such evaluations be conducted by community mental 
health centers "unless it is absolutely necessary for pro­
tection of the community" that the juvenile be confined. 
(1973:29) The report emphatically recommends the provision 
of community-based services in place of institutionalization 
and recommends that such services, whenever possible, be 
provided in the home. (1973:25)
Finally, the Commission to Revise the Statutes makes a 
number of recommendations with respect to the general issue 
of deinstitutionalization, most importantly in its draft of 
a proposed new juvenile code. First, with respect to the
TT-
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issue of detention of juveniles, the proposed code of the 
Commission would allow the detention of juveniles upon ap­
prehension by law enforcement only as long as necessary to 
obtain essential information.
K child shall not be detained by law enforceaent 
officials longer than is reasonably necessary to 
obtain his naae, age, residence, to contact his 
parent, guardian, or legal custodian and an intake 
worker. (1977b: 20)
Secondly, when secure detention of a juvenile is deeaed nec­
essary by an intake worker, the juvenile may be detained for 
not aore than forty-eight hours without a detention hearing 
and may only continue in detention if the juvenile court 
judge finds that detention is necessary in order to
1. to protect the person or property of others 
or of the juvenile; or
2. to secure the juvenile*s presence at the 
next hearing. (1977:26)
Further, neither the judge nor intake worker aay order a ju­
venile detained in a jail or other adult facility except:
1. when the jurisdiction of the matter as a
juvenile case has been waived...; or
2. when the judge or intake worker determines,
after consultation with the superintendent 
of a juvenile detebntion center that the 
child is beyond the control of the deten­
tion hoae staff; and
3. that the receiving facility contains a sep­
arate section for juveniles and has an ade­
quate staff to supervise and monitor the 
child*s activities at all tiaes. 
(1977:28-29)
Finally, on the central issue of deinstitutionalization, the
Commission's proposed code clearly establishes the principle 
that institutional dispositions should be used as a last re­
sort, that non-institutional dispositions are the preferred 
dispositions. This is nade clear, for example, in the pro­
visions of the proposed code setting forth the criteria for 
determining dispositions.
The court shall deal with a juvenile who has been 
adjudicated delinquent without imposing placement 
in a secure institution as disposition unless, 
having regard to the nature and circumstances of 
the crime and the history, character and condition 
of the juvenile, it finds that confinement is nec­
essary for protection because:
1. There is undue risk that during the period 
of a suspended sentence or probation the 
juvenile will commit another crime; or
2. The juvenile is in need of correctional 
treatment that can be provided most effec­
tively by his commitment to an institution; 
or
3. A lesser sentence will depreciate the seri­
ousness of the juvenile's delinquent con­
duct. (1977:57)
There is also a long list of additional considerations that 
"shall be accorded weight in favor of withholding placement
jin a secure institution." (1977:57) While there is no appar­
ent intent on the part of the Commission to eliminate the 
correctional institution for juveniles, it is clearly their 
intent that such institutions be rarely used for juvenile 
court dispositions.
Diversion
Perhaps one of the most significant developments in juvenile 
justice in the post-Gault era is the idea of "diversion" 
from the formal juvenile justice process. Although the term 
"diversion" is used in many ways, and in a general sense can 
be said to include decriminalization and deinstitutionaliza­
tion, the tern is used here in the narrower sense of divert­
ing juveniles from formal juvenile justice processing en­
tirely. Ideally, diversion implies the steering of 
juveniles away fron the juvenile justice system prior to ar­
rest. And there seems to be general agreement that, given 
the likely negative consequences of formal juvenile justice 
processing, juveniles should be diverted away fron the juve­
nile justice system whenever possible. The central debate, 
however, is over the nature of genuine diversion and the 
nost appropriate diversion mechanism. These issues are most 
thoroughly discussed in the report of the Governor's Task 
Force on Corrections and the reports of the Commission to 
Revise the Statutes Relating to Juveniles.22 In addition, 
the Comprehensive Blueprint of the Children and Youth Servi-
j
ces Planning Project, raises a number of important points 
and contributes some concrete data to the debate over diver­
sion.
22 The Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study and the Gov­
ernor's Committee on Children and Youth do not explicitly 
deal with the subject of diversion, but the principle is 
certainly consistent with the recommendations made in 
each report.
Official interest in diversion in Haine's juvenile jus­
tice system dates at least to 1972 when then Govenor Curtis, 
in his charge to the Governor’s Task Force on Corrections 
asked that they prepare recommendations "relative to the 
pre-trial diversion of juvenile offenders to more meaningful 
treatment alternatives." [1973:1) The basic point of view of 
these studies that inforas their recommendations on diver­
sion parallels their discussions of decriminalization and 
deinstitutionalization. That is to say, diversion recommen-* 
dations are premised on the lessons of the labeling/societal 
reaction theories and the considerable historical evidence 
that suggest that contact with the juvenile justice system 
is likely to result in more rather than less delinquency, 
[see Leaert, 1951) Thus, it is not surprising that a major 
post-Gault ideal is that whenever possible, juveniles be di­
verted away fron formal juvenile justice processing at the 
earliest possible point. The Governor’s Task Force .in its 
report, In the Public Interest, urges that all those whose 
problems could be handled by aore effective and less costly 
methods should be so handled. (1979:9) The Comaission to Be-
jvise the Statutes Relating to Juveniles suggests that the 
goals include to "decrease the nuaber of children about whoa 
petitions are filed in juvenile courts" and "increase the 
nuaber of delinquency and 'status offender* children needing 
counseling or other intervention services in their own com­
munities rather than referred to juvenile courts."
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(1976a:77) Furthermore, the Commission in its proposed Code 
gave clear preference to diversion over formal processing. 
(1977a: 3 2-34)
While there appears to be general agreement among the 
studies on the basic idea, there are a number of issues in 
diversion that are addressed in some of the studies that re­
quire further discussion.
Perhaps one of the most controversial issues in diversion 
is one raised in the Governor's Task Force report, namely, 
the appropriate nature and location of the diversion mecha­
nism. The Governor's Task Force discussed it in the context 
of the LEAA (Lav Enforcement Assistance Administration) 
funding of police diversion programs which it believed inap­
propriate largely because diversion by definition is an at­
tempt to avoid penetration into the juvenile justice system. 
Obviously, penetration into the police station involves a 
certain degree of stigmatization. The Task Force opts in­
stead for the Youth Services Bureau model of diversion which 
is located outside of the boundaries of the lav enforcement 
system. (1974:6-8) The issue is discussed at great length by 
the Commission to Revise the Statutes with many of the sane 
points being made. One of the important elements of the 
diversion mechanism is that it be nonstigmatizing, and the 
only nay of accomplishing this fully is to serve a broader 
clientele than simply the juvenile offender population. 
(1976a: 64-77)
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An additional issue that is raised particularly well by 
the Children and Youth Services Planning Project is the 
question of "diversion to what?" In other' words, there is a 
serious question as to whether diversion will be anything 
more than benign neglect, a failure to respond to juvenile 
criae and/or misbehavior. Clearly, as the Comprehensive 
Blueprint and the other reports suggest, genuine diversion 
involves the provision of services, real alternatives to of­
ficial processing, not merely the elinination of it. The 
Governor's Task Force suggests, for exanple, the establish­
ment of community arbitration councils as a possible addi­
tional diversion tool. Bather, as the Comprehensive Blue­
print points out, more important question than the diversion 
mechanism is the substance of diversion, "diversion to 
what?" (1977:199)
Finally, there are a number of serious concerns expressed 
with diversion, particularly with the possibility that it 
may not result in the intended decrease in the numbers of 
juveniles subjected to formal processing. The Children and 
Youth Services Planning Project provides data which raises
j
serious questions. Noting that "diversion" has been juve­
nile justice policy for a number of years, it points to dra­
matic increases in the numbers of juveniles processed. That 
is, the net has been widened. (1977:199-179) The Commission 
to Revise the Statutes raises a number of similar concerns, 
noting for example, that while diversion was one of the most
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widely supported concepts to emerge from the Presidents 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Jus­
tice, and the one that generated the aost hope, five years 
later fewer than 170 programs in the country were "signifi­
cantly related" to the idea of diversion. (1976a:64-65)
Evaluation and Planning
All of the studies under consideration stressed the need for 
constant planning and monitoring efforts as a aeans of en­
suring that the systen operate effectively and that reforms 
and plans get implemented. Indeed, the iapression comes 
through that a aajor reason for previous failures involve 
the unavailability of inforaation necessary to aaintain con­
trol over the system (s).
The Final Report of the Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquen­
cy Study calls for ongoing program evaluation which it con­
siders an essential component of any effort at delinquency 
prevention and control. {1971:9) It also recoaaends stan­
dardized state-wide record keeping in all areas of juvenile
j
justice. (1971:79) The establishment of a Governor's Advi­
sory Committee is recommended for the purpose of monitoring 
all juvenile institutions and a Juvenile Delinquency Adviso­
ry Coaaittee is recommended for the review of all programs. 
(1971:75) A Department of Touth Affairs is recommended to 
coordinate all services to youth, except public assistance
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and education. (1971:93) Finally, in the section on
"projects" a Juvenile Justice Association is suggested ap­
parently as a funding conduit to assist in developing Youth 
Services Bureaus and other services and programs. (1971:87) 
The Governor’s Task Force discusses at soae length the 
need for planning and coordination and recommends the estab­
lishment of a Youth Services Agency for this purpose. The 
report notes the almost complete lack of planning capability 
by the Bureau of Corrections and suggests that such capacity 
must be immediately developed. Among the more important of 
specific recommendations in this regard is the need to de­
velop continued monitoring and evaluation capacity to ensure 
effectiveness of correctional programs. (1974:6-7)
The Children and Youth Services Planning Project notes 
the tremendous duplication, incoherence, and discontinuity 
of the youth services structure and veil as the severe ineq­
uities. The implication is that remedying such problems re­
quires better information. The section on "Improved Struc­
tures" recommends a more comprehensive approach to the 
problem of service provision and is relevant to evaluation, 
monitoring and planning on a nuaber of points. The need for 
greater accountability and predictability are examples. 
Planning, evaluation, and monitoring capabilities are dis­
cussed in the context of procedures for developing policy. 
In place of the existing fragmented system, an Office of Re­
search, Evaluation, and Planning is recommended for each de­
partment. (1977:208-215)
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The issue of fragmented services is also raised in the 
report of the Governor's Connittee on Children and Touth. 
Also noted is the need to coordinate services and the ine­
quitable distribution of services- Presumably, these prob­
lems call for greater research, evaluation, planning, and 
monitoring. (1973:27)
The draft of the proposed code of the Commission to Re­
vise the Statutes Relating to Juveniles also contains provi­
sions requiring planning and evaluation capacities and pro­
cedures. Included under the rubric "Functions of the 
Department of Rental Health and Corrections" are planning 
and evaluating programs, needs, services, and agencies. 
(1977a:72-75)
Summary: The Rehabilitative Ideal
The ideals of post-Gault reform which emerge from the vari­
ous studies can be summarized as follows.
1. Rehabilitation: Socialized ideals of prevention and
i
rehabilitation are not incompatible with due process 
and continue to provide the philosophical basis for 
post-Gault juvenile justice.
2. Community: Delinquency is a problem that comes out of 
the community and must be solved in the community, by 
the community.
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3. Decriminalization: Behavior which is not criminal for 
adults and which is not a threat to the public should 
not be crininal for juveniles.
4. Deinstitutionalization: Large, centralized, correc­
tional institutions are ineffective and counterpro­
ductive. Snail, decentralized conmunity-based treat­
ment facilities represent more appropriate settings 
for rehabilitating juvenile offenders.
5. Diversion: Official processing through the juvenile
justice system involves negative consequences and 
should be avoided whenever possible.
6. Evaluation: Adequate information is necessary if the 
juvenile justice is to function effectively. Evalua­
tion, research, and planning components are vital to 
the juvenile justice systen.
Having established the principles or ideals of post-Gault 
reforn in Maine, the question which nust now be addressed is 
whether, and to what degree, naine*s reformed juvenile jus­
tice systen measures up to these reforn ideals.
Chapter VI
THE BEST OF BOTH VOBLDS? THE IDEAL IE PRACTICE
To what extent has the new system of juvenile justice in 
Haine measured up to the vision of the best of both worlds? 
Does the new system provide due process protections and 
fairness as well as effective prevention and rehabilitation? 
Or, is the new system most appropriately characterized as 
continuous with the historical failure of reform in juvenile 
justice?
The answers to these questions nay be discovered in exam­
ining the "reformed" juvenile justice system in light of the 
post-Gault ideals outlined in the previous two chapters- It 
is neither possible nor necessary to examine the systen with 
respect to every recommendation made by each of the post- 
Gault studies. The basic issue under consideration is more 
fundamental: Have the most basic and nost central aspects of 
post-Gault ideals been incorporated into the reformed sys­
tem? 2 3
23 Clearly, this research is not intended as an evaluation 
of the new juvenile justice system in Haine. Such an 
evaluation would require a far more detailed analysis of 
all of these recommendations, as well as independent data 
collection and analysis. The primary purpose of the 
present research is to place post-Gault reform in the 
historical context and to shed light on the historical 
reform process.
-  184  -
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This analysis is organized around four of the post-Gault 
ideals discussed previously. First, the new systen is exam­
ined with respect to confornity to'the ideal of fairness and 
due process. Secondly, the systen will be examined with re­
spect to the three major ideals that are subsumed under the 
general category of rehabilitation —  decriminalization, 
deinstitutionalization, and diversion. The remaining ideals 
discussed in the previous chapter quite obviously overlap 
with these and need not be addressed separately. All three, 
for example, require the provision of rehabilitative servi­
ces. They also assume the preference for "community-based" 
juvenile justice. The issue of evaluation/monitoring will 
be addressed in the concluding chapter since it is not only 
an ideal of post-Gault justice, but has a great deal to do 
with success or failure of reform.
The assessment of post-Gault juvenile justice in Haine 
requires an examination of the systen as embodied in the new 
Juvenile Code. Analysis of the provisions of the new Code 
in light of the reform ideals is thus an important component 
of this assessment. Perhaps even more important is an exam- 
ination of the actual operation of aspects of the juvenile 
justice system. Several sources of information are used in 
in this connection. The report of the United Hay Juvenile 
Code Committee, The New Juvenile Code: Its First Three
Months in Cumberland County. provides considerable data and 
analysis of the extent to which the provisions of the new
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Code are being implemented in Cumberland County, the larg­
est, most urban county in Maine. (1978) Secondly, a najor 
assessment of the nev system is found in a grant proposal 
submitted to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention by group intimately involved in Maine*s juvenile 
justice system for several years. Their rather thoroughgo­
ing assessment of the system is a large part of their ra­
tionale for funding of their youth advocacy organization. 
(MacDonald and Biskup, 1979)
The Department of Mental Health and Corrections annual 
reports called "Evaluation and Plan" provide some useful 
data. (1978-1983) Finally, the Legislative Committee to Mon­
itor the Implementation of the Nev Juvenile Code provided 
data from the Department of Mental Health and Corrections on 




Nothing is more central to post-Gault reform than the re- 
guirement that juveniles be treated fairly by the juvenile 
justice system and that, specifically, they be granted due 
process protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. 
Although fairness was clearly not the only concern of post- 
Gault reform, it was without doubt the moving force. The 
most recent reform movement in juvenile justice was born of
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a concern that under the guise of rehabilitation, juveniles 
were being denied their constitutional rights- Central to 
this concern with due process is the series of U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions from which the present reform era takes its 
name.
Court Mandated Rights
The first of the criteria against which to assess the suc­
cess of post-Gault reform must be the minimum criteria es­
tablished by the Supreme Court in Gault and related deci­
sions, that juveniles within the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court be accorded many of the rights to due process 
that are accorded to adults in criminal proceedings- To 
what extent does the Maine Juvenile Code provide for these 
rights?
The new Juvenile Code as it emerged from the Legislature 
in 1977, specifically grants juveniles the rights that the 
Supreme Court requires and, in general, attempts to bring a 
degree of procedural regularity and fairness to the proceed­
ings before the juvenile court- Most of these rights are 
explicitly granted in the new Maine Juvenile Code. For ex­
ample, the Court in Kent ruled that juveniles have the right
to counsel in waiver proceedings against them. (1967) In 
Gault, the Court expanded the requirement and ruled that ju­
veniles must be afforded the right to counsel in heariugs
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which may result in their commitment to an institution. 
(1968) The new Code requires that at the juvenile*s first 
court appearance, he/she must be advised of rights, includ­
ing the right to be represented by counsel at all stages of 
the proceedings. Further, in the event of indigence on the 
part of the juvenile or the parents, the court is required 
to appoint counsel if so requested and may appoint counsel 
even if not requested. (1977a:657)
The Court*s decision in Kent v. O.S. requires that juve­
niles have the right to "examination, criticism, and refuta­
tion" of records and other information that enter into deci­
sions by the juvenile court, in that particular case, a 
waiver decision. (1967:1058) Maine's new Code specifically 
requires that court records be made available to all parties 
and that in the case of indigence, they be provided at the 
court's expense. (1977a:662) As mandated by Winship. 
(1971) the new Code provides that the standard of proof in 
juvenile court cases must be the "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard as applied in adult criminal cases and that in cas­
es where such evidence is lacking, the case against a juve-
j
nile must be dismissed. (1977a:666) The right to cross-exam­
ine witnesses as required by the Supreme Court in Gault. 
(1968) is also explicitly granted in the new Code, including 
the right to cross-examine those who compile the social 
study for the court or other information. (1977a:668-9) The 
requirement in Gault (1968) that juveniles be furnished with
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notice of the nature of the charges against then is covered 
in the provisions of the new Code governing the fora, con­
tent, and processing of suanonses and the filing of peti­
tions. (1977a:659,652) Finally, the procedure for the con­
duct of bindover hearings in the new Code are designed to
avoid the problems of double-jeopardy at issue in Breed v.
Jones. (U.S. Supreme Court, 1977; Maine Legislature,
1977a:625)
Before examining aspects of that reality of the juvenile 
justice process, a few additional aspects of the new Juve­
nile Code have a direct bearing of the due process and fair­
ness issue. First, there seems to be a fairly radical shift 
in the underlying philosophy of the juvenile justice system 
away from the purely socialized conception and an effort to 
incorporate key provisions of the classical perspective un­
derlying criminal law. No longer are "rights" and "salva­
tion" taken as mutually exclusive purposes. Thus, the new 
Maine Juvenile Code has among its basic purposes:
To provide procedures through which the provisions 
of the law are executed and enforced and which
will assure the parties fair hearings at which
their rights as citizens are recognized and pro­
tected. (1977a; 613)
In addition, and perhaps of even greater significance with 
respect to the issue of due process, is the fact that the 
new Code makes frequent reference to adult criminal proce­
dure, such as the Maine Buies of Criminal Procedure, the 
Maine Buies of Evidence, and the Maine Criminal Code. In
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general, except in cases where there would be a specific 
conflict with the Juvenile Code, procedures in juvenile cas­
es should be identical to adult procedures. For example, 
the new Code states that "except where inconsistent and in­
applicable, juvenile proceedings shall be in accordance with 
Maine District Court Criminal Rules." As the commentary in­
dicates, this includes such areas as discovery and search 
and seizure. (1977a:669)
Finally, it appears that the new Code is more specific 
and detailed than the Maine Juvenile Offenders Act in every 
respect. This, obviously, has important implications for 
the possibility of procedural regularity; the less left to 
discretion, the greater the possibility of fairness or, at 
least, a lesser likelihood of arbitrariness without re­
course.
The new Code, then, clearly articulates the court-mandat­
ed rights of juveniles in the juvenile justice process. At 
the same time, it must be noted that while the statutory 
language nay have emerged from the post-Gault reform process 
in Maine, the rights themselves existed for Maine's juve-
j
niles prior to the enactment of the new Code. Even without 
having such procedures spelled out in the statutes, the law 
as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court and Maine courts 
reguired that such due process be observed and rights pro­
tected. 2* On the other hand, history shows that court deci-
Tn 1973, for example, Maine courts ruled that juveniles 
were entitled to all procedures necessary to ensure fair-
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sions are not self-enforcing {Faust and Brantingham, 
1979;387) and, thus, the importance of detailed statutory 
requirements should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, 
the inclusion of minimum due process rights mandated by the 
Court is not by itself a testament to the success of post- 
Gault reform. There is too much evidence of a vide gulf be­
tween juvenile justice systems as formally articulated and 
the reality of the juvenile justice process. Nevertheless,
with respect to due process and fairness, the new Juvenile
Code represents a fairly substantial improvement over previ­
ous juvenile law in Maine. Juvenile proceedings are now the 
same as adult proceedings in many respects. However, a num­
ber of important questions remain. Among then are the dif­
ferences that do remain between the juvenile justice system 
and adult criminal procedure-
Juvenile Court vs. Criminal Court
Although the rulings of the Supreme Court in Gault and re­
lated cases have put to rest the notion that the rehabilita- 
tive purposes of juvenile justice justified the denial of 
fundamental constitutional rights to juveniles, the specific 
mandates of the Court contained in these decisions are rela­
tively narrow. Kent, (1967) for example, applied only to
ness (S v. State), and that the "reasonable doubt" stan­
dard of winship was applicable for all elements of an of­
fense (State v. D). (CHS, 1976a: 9)
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procedures for waiving juvenile court jurisdiction. Gault., 
the broadest of the decisions, applied only to the adjudica­
tory stage of juvenile proceedings and, then, only under 
certain circunstances. In the words of Gault:
He do not in this decision consider the impact of 
these constitutional provisions upon the totality 
of the relationship of the juvenile and the state.
He do not even consider the entire process relat­
ing to juvenile "delinquents." For example, we 
are not here concerned with the procedures or con­
stitutional rights applicable to the pre-judicial 
stages of the juvenile process, nor do we direct 
our attention to the post-adjudicative or disposi­
tional process. (1968:1436)
Thus, the Supreme Court has left to the States the question 
of what rights and procedures are appropriate to their juve­
nile justice systems apart from those specifically mandated. 
To what extent ought juvenile procedures and rights parallel 
those of adults in the criminal justice process? Does fair­
ness require that they be identical? Or, perhaps, ought ju­
veniles receive even greater protections?
As indicated above, the new Juvenile Code in general 
adopts the procedures of the adult criminal court unless 
otherwise indicated. While the significance of this ought 
ngt be diminished, it is important to recognize that there 
are, nevertheless, important differences that remain between 
juvenile and adult procedures in Maine, differences that nay 
undercut the the ideal of fairness in the juvenile justice 
system.
The first of these distinctions is that under the new Ju­
venile Code juveniles have no right to jury trials. The is­
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sue received little consent in the studies that led up to 
the new Code. However, some of the studies, for example the 
Governor*s Task Force on Corrections, i»ply such a require­
ment in suggesting that juveniles be "afforded all appropri­
ate due process protections." (1974:4) The Commission to 
Revise the Statutes specifically included a provision for 
jury trials in some cases in its draft of a proposed new ju­
venile code. Section 3308 of the draft entitled, "Hearings, 
Publicity, Record," reads as follows:
1. Juvenile hearings conducted as they would 
be for adults. Hearings shall be held be­
fore the court without a jury but in all 
other respects will be conducted in a for­
mal manner as if the child were an adult 
accused of a crime except that juveniles 
accused of Class &, Class B, or Class C of­
fenses nay elect a jury trial. (emphasis 
added)
2. Juveniles who elect a jury trial. If a ju­
venile accused of a Class A, Class B, or 
Class C crime elects a jury trial, the ju­
venile court shall notify the district at­
torney and shall forthwith transfer the 
case, together with the physical custody of 
the juvenile and all physical evidence, pa­
pers, documents, and testimony, original 
and duplicate connected therewith to the 
appropriate superior court for a jury tri­
al.
3- Juveniles who elect jury trials - disposi­
tional powers of superior court. A Superi­
or Court shall only have the same disposi­
tional options as does a juvenile court
when it hears the case of a juvenile who
has elected a jury trial. (1977b: 43)
The Legislature, however, deleted this provision from the 
new Juvenile Code prior to passage, apparently on the ground
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that a provision granting the right to trial by jury only to 
these classes of juvenile offenders was of questionable con­
stitutionality. (Maine Legislature, 1977b:2301) Shy the 
Legislature chose to eliminate rather than expand the right 
to jury trial is not explained.
While the failure to grant the right of trial by jury to 
juveniles raises serious questions about the fairness of ju­
venile justice in Maine, of even greater concern are the 
consequences of the failure to provide to juveniles charged 
with serious crimes the opportunity to have their cases 
heard before the Superior Court, something which the provi­
sion on jury trials provided for. The significance of this 
is apparent in examining the differences between the Dis­
trict Court (the juvenile court) and the Superior Court. 
This issue is not centrally related to the issue of jury 
trials, but, rather, to the issue of the differences in the 
appellate structure for juvenile offenders and adult crimi­
nal offenders.
The appeals structure for adults in the criminal justice
i
system in Maine allows for the automatic appeal of cases
✓from the District Court to Superior Court for a de novo 
hearing. In other words, adult defendants have the right to 
a completely new trial if the results of the first are not 
satisfactory, or, they may reguest immediate transfer of the 
case to Superior Court. Juveniles, on the other hand, while 
they may appeal to the Superior Court, may do so only "on
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the basis of the record of the proceedings in juvenile 
court" and with respect to "errors of law or abuses of dis­
cretion." (1977a:691) That is, there is no automatic right 
to a rehearing of the case, regardless of the seriousness of 
the offense or the consequences of an adjudication. The 
full significance of this discrepancy between adult and ju­
venile justice, and the failure of the Legislature to grant 
jury trials to juveniles in Superior Court, is not apparent 
until the nature of the two courts are compared.
The Maine Youth Advocacy proposal, in commenting on this 
discrepancy, attaches the label "assembly-line justice" to 
the juvenile justice system. This is a charge that at least 
one post-Gault study also leveled at the system on the 
grounds that juveniles lacked proper access to Superior 
Court. The most revealing of comparisons between the two 
courts is in terns of caseloads. (See Table 1 below.)
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The Naine Youth Advocacy document cites 1978 figures from 
the Administrative Office of the Courts vhich indicate that 
the District Courts heard a total of 215,707 cases, an aver­
age of 10,700 for each of the 20 judges. In sharp contrast, 
the Superior Court with 14 judges heard a total of 15,464 
cases or an average of 1,100 per judge, that is, approxi­
mately 10H of the caseload of the District Court. To exa­
cerbate matters, the Superior Court has a higher budget than 
the District Court. [MacDonald and Biskup, 1979:34-35) 
Clearly, juveniles under such circumstances have a strong 
likelihood of being subjected to assembly-line justice rath­
er than the careful, deliberative procedures suggested in 
the Juvenile Code. It is difficult to imagine anything else 
under the circumstances. An additional factor that must be 
considered is that only 2.5% are juvenile cases. Thus, the 
degree of expertise in juvenile justice on the part of judg­
es vho can devote so little of the energy to these cases is
highly guestionable. Not only do juveniles fail to attain
appeal rights that are afforded to adults, they lose ground
in this area. Under the old Juvenile Offender's Act, a ju- 
venile had the right to a de novo appeal to Superior Court. 
[Maine Legislature, 1965:534-35)
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Specific Rights in Practice
In their article on the use of attorneys in juvenile courts,
• I  *
Duffee and Siegel pointed out that one of the problems that 
arises with respect to court-mandated rights is that the de­
cisions of the Supreme Court are not automatically put into 
practice; there are many ways in which they can be ignored, 
undermined, evaded, and so forth.
The Supreme Court historically faced the problem 
of finding the perspectives and values of its de­
cisions seemingly ignored or lost by the agencies 
that daily dispense justice in America. £1979:387)
Indeed, it is important that the observance of the spirit 
and letter of Supreme Court decisions not be assumed. Per­
haps the most important of the due process rights granted in 
Gault was the right to counsel. As the Court itself indi­
cated, the right to counsel is central to the exercise of 
all rights. In Gault, the Court wrote.
The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to 
cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry 
into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the 
proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a de­
fense and to prepare and submit it. (1968: 11*98)
In other words, without the right to counsel, the juvenile
jwould presumably be unable to exercise his/her other rights 
in an effective manner. There is, furthermore, no ideal on 
which the post-Gault studies in Maine are more unanimous 
than on this right to counsel, presumably for much the sane 
reason as the Court suggested. Thus, the right to counsel 
seems an appropriate issue to explore in greater depth to
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determine whether the guarantee of rights is more than a 
fornality.
The post-Gault studies went beyond the nandate of the Su­
preme Court on this issue. The Governor’s Task Force on 
Corrections stands out as offering the strongest recommenda- 
tions in this regard.
He recommend that every juvenile subject to the 
court’s delinquency jurisdiction have counsel au­
tomatically assigned by the court, unless the ju­
venile and his parents prefer to retain an attor­
ney privately. No waiver of the right to counsel 
should be permitted by the court. (1974:10)
Although not explicitly stated, the rationale for such a 
recommendation is presumably to protect the juvenile from 
being encouraged to waive his right to counsel and to pre­
vent the juvenile from underestimating the seriousness of 
the possible consequences of court proceedings. As the Task 
Force notes, the Supreme Court decision in In Re Gault sug­
gested that juveniles need the services of counsel "at least 
as much as would an adult." (1974:10)
The new Code as enacted by the Legislature does not re­
quire that the right to counsel be non-waiveable. Specifi­
cally, the right to counsel is provided for in Section 3306 
of the new Code as follows:
1. Notice and appointment.
a) At his first appearance before the 
court, the juvenile and his parents, 
guardian or legal custodian shall be 
fully advised by the court of their con­
stitutional right to be represented by 
counsel at every stage of the proceed­
ings. At every subsequent appearance
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before the court, the juvenile shall be 
advised of his right to be represented 
by counsel.
b) If the juvenile requests an attorney and 
if he and his parents, guardian or legal 
custodian are found to be without suffi­
cient financial aeans, counsel shall be 
appointed by the court.
c) The court nay appoint counsel without 
such a request if it deeas representa­
tion by counsel necessary to protect the 
interests of the juvenile.
2. State*s attorney. The district attorney or 
the attorney general shall represent the 
State in all proceedings under this chap­
ter. (1977a:65?1
ihat is the effect of the failure to require counsel on the 
actual utilization of counsel in the juvenile court? As can 
be seen froa Table 2, data froa FT 1980 court records indi­
cate that in many cases, juveniles continue to be unrepre­
sented. It aust be assuaed that in these cases that for 
whatever reason, counsel was not requested. Thus, despite 
the insistence that juveniles ought to be represented by 
counsel, court supplied data indicates that nearly one in 
five juveniles are appearing before the court without the 
benefit of counsel. It aight be argued that these are prob­
ably cases in which incarceration is not a possible outcome. 
On the contrary, aore than a third (35.1*) of unrepresented 
juveniles had sentences involving incarceration inposed by 
the court and 8.1% of unrepresented juveniles actually ended 
up incarcerated, the sentences not having been suspended. 











Source: Maine Juvenile Court Records. {Data on a sam­
ple of 25% of all juvenile rinses in FY1980, collected 
by staff of Legislative Committee to Monitor the Im­
plementation of the Juvenile Code.)
probation had probation revoked and ended up confined in the 
Maine Youth Center. Thus, the figures here are conservative 
estimates.)
In the majority of cases in which counsel is present, 
what is the quality of the defense? Clearly, the Supreme 
Court and the post-Gault studies intended that counsel be 
effective. To what extent are juveniles who are represented 
receiving an effective defense? Two central issues are 
raised in this connection —  the appropriate role of counsel 
in juvenile proceedings and the resources available to com­
pensate counsel for providing effective representation.
The question of the appropriate role of counsel in juve­
nile proceedings is raised in a number of the post-Gault
i.
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studies but is not resolved in the nev Code. As the Gover­
nor's Task Force recommends, the role of juvenile defense 
counsel should be exactly the sane as defense counsel in 
crininal proceedings.
He recommend that the attorneys retained or ap­
pointed to represent juveniles be instructed by 
the court to approach their legal responsibilities 
precisely as they would in an adult case, keeping 
in mind that a juvenile adjudged delinguent faces 
the possibility of a significant loss of personal 
freedom. He further recommend that should a con­
flict of interest between the juvenile and the pa­
rents arise, the attorney's responsibility shall 
be to represent the legal interests of the juve­
nile, and that under such circumstances the juve­
nile's right to seek appeal of any action by the 
court shall not be subject to parental consent.
(1974:10)
Although there have been no serious studies in Maine of the 
role of attorneys in juvenile cases, the evidence that does 
exist suggests that there is considerable confusion over the 
appropriate role of attorneys in these cases. Despite the 
recommendations on the national level and the state level, 
and despite the strong position taken by the Supreme Court 
on the importance of effective representation to due pro­
cess, there is apparently considerable adherence to the tra­
ditional role of counsel in juvenile cases where attorneys 
generally construed their role as acting along with other 
court personnel "in the child's best interest."
The United Hay Juvenile Code Committee concluded on the 
basis of six days of observation of the juvenile court pro­
cess in Portland that with some exceptions attorneys fail to 
offer vigorous, effective advocacy on behalf of their juve­
nile clients, instead following the recommendations of pros­
ecution, intake worker, and judge. In this instance, the 
study is referring to detention hearings.
Most of the attorneys seened willing to abide by 
the intake worker's decision, without further hav­
ing studied the situation carefully to ensure that 
the court and intake worker were placing the juve­
nile in the least restrictive facility. In only 
one of the hearings that the Committee's staff at­
tended did defense counsel actively oppose the in­
take worker's request for continued detention. 
(1978:79)
The Maine Youth Advocacy proposal nakes the sane point on 
the basis of the personal involvement of its staff in juve­
nile court on behalf of their clients.
A major problem of a rehabilitation oriented court 
is the lack of clarity of roles. The defense at­
torney is torn between his responsibility to advo­
cate for the client's innocence and his sense of 
obligation to "act in the client's best inter­
est"-... Even in a rehabilitative court, it is the 
position of MYA that the judge can sufficiently 
safeguard the "youth's best interest", while the 
defense attorney should concentrate on presenting 
the best possible defense for his client. (MacDo­
nald and Biskup, 1979: 37)
While this does not constitute definitive evidence, it does
raise serious questions about the effectiveness of counsel
in juvenile court. The situation is further exacerbated by
the involvement judges in the role of prosecutor. (United
Way, 1978:80)
Finally, because court appointed attorneys represent the 
vast majority of juveniles (about 80%), it is particularly 
important to examine the procedures for appointing counsel 
in juvenile court. Both the United Way report and the Maine
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Youth Advocacy proposal raise the issue of attorney fees as 
having a significant inpact on the effectiveness of repre­
sentation. The fee schedule for court appointed attorney's 
in Maine is a flat $50.00 regardless of the complexity of 
the case, the amount of time required for a competent de­
fense, or the seriousness of the charges. Thus, both re­
ports argue, attorneys more often than not fail to prepare 
adequately.25 In the words of the United Way study:
When representing a juvenile defendant, a court- 
appointed attorney receives a flat $50.00 fee, 
which most consider very low. During six days of 
observation in Portland, the Committee's staff was 
disturbed by the apparent lack of interest, with 
which some attorneys "represented" their juvenile 
clients.
Admittedly, some attorneys appeared to have 
spent a great deal of time mapping out a defense 
and argued zealously on behalf of a client in de­
tention, adjudicatory, and dispositional hearings 
(even though not always successfully). However, a 
large percentage of attorneys had their first con­
tact with a particular case only a brief time be­
fore they entered the courtroom or the judge's 
chambers. That was true whether they were sea­
soned attorneys or attorneys "still learning the 
ropes". (1978:79)
The Maine Youth Advocacy proposal makes the same point and
states the problem.
The payment of inadequate fees to court-appointed 
attorneys severely undermines the promise of the 
right to counsel. (1979:36)
25 The Supreme Court also made note of the problem in 
HcKeiver v. Pennsylvania. In a footnote to the decision, 
they note that the first meeting between court-appointed 
attorney and the juvenile took place at the court hear­
ing. (1972:1981)
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There is, then, good reason to believe that the formal 
right to counsel mandated by the Supreme Court and guaran­
teed by the nev Maine Juvenile Code is seriously undermined 
in practice.
Due Process Outside the Courtroom. The court, of course, 
is but one part of the juvenile justice system. There are 
components of the system that also make crucial decisions 
having important consequences for the juvenile and backed by 
the coercive power of the State. These include the police 
handling of the juvenile, particularly arrest, interroga­
tion, and detention; intake worker contact with juveniles, 
particularly detention decisions and informal adjustments; 
and the correctional end of the system, particularly the 
Maine Youth Center. As indicated above, the U.S. Supreme 
Court did not rule on the applicability of due process pro­
tections to these non-adjudicatory stages of the process, 
leaving the matter up to the states for the time being. The 
post-Gault studies in Maine, however, clearly envisioned a
system in which none of the components are allowed to exer-
✓
cise arbitrary discretion, free from constitutional con­
straints. Nevertheless, the charge has been made that under 
the new Code, the due process problem is not resolved, but 
merely moved from one segment of the juvenile justice system 
to another. According to the Maine Youth Advocacy critique 
of the new Code, the arbitrariness that formerly existed in
205
the courtroom shifted to the intake vorker. (MacDonald and 
Biskup, 1979:18)
It is necessary, then, to examine other important parts 
of the system to determine the effectiveness of post-Gault 
reform from the point of view of fairness. The most impor­
tant non-court component of the system under the new Code is 
Intake processing. First, however, a few observations about 
the arrest process and the correctional system are in order.
Arrest and Due Process. In general, the new Juvenile 
Code provides for arrest procedures in juvenile cases to be 
same as in adult criminal cases. Hhether procedures are be­
ing followed as required in the statute is impossible to de­
termine since no data on this issue has been collected or 
analyzed. However, there is one major area in which it is 
possible to draw some conclusion relative to the question of 
due process and the arrest of juvenile offenders. The Com­
mission to Revise the Statutes was particularly sensitive to 
the need for procedural regularity and protection during ar­
rest and interrogation of juvenile offenders. The Commis- 
sion in its proposed Code specifically prohibited the inter­
rogation of juveniles unless their attorneys and parents 
were present and prohibited the admission of any evidence 
obtained during the interrogation of juveniles under the age 
of fourteen years. Further, the proposed Code required that 
the police detain juveniles no longer than necessary to ob-
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tain their names, contact their parents and contact an in­
take worker. These sections read as follows:
1. k child shall not be detained by law en­
forcement officials longer than is reason­
ably necessary to obtain his name,age, and 
residence, to contact his parent, guardian, 
or legal custodian and an intake worker.
2. Once the infornation described in [the 
above paragraph] is obtained and the pa­
rent, guardian, or legal custodian and in­
take worker are contacted, the law enforce­
ment officer shall take the child directly 
to the intake officer or to the shelter 
placement or detention placement or agent 
of the Department of Human Services desig­
nated by the intake officer without unnec­
essary delay.
a) No statements, admissions, or confes­
sions of a child made as a result of in­
terrogation of the child by a law en­
forcement official concerning acts 
alleged to have been committed by the 
child which would constitute a crime if 
committed by an adult shall be admissi­
ble in evidence against that child un­
less a parent, guardian, or legal custo­
dian of the child was present at such 
interrogation and the child and his pa­
rent, guardian, or legal custodian were 
advised of the child's right to remain 
silent, that any statements made may be 
used against him in a court of law, the 
right to the presence of an attorney 
during such interrogation, the right to 
have counsel appointed if so requested 
at the time of interrogation, and that, 
after having been so advised, the child 
and his parents, guardian, or legal cus­
todian voluntarily waived them, except 
that, if a public defender or counsel 
representing the child is present at 
such interrogation, such statements, ad­
missions or confessions may be admissi­
ble in evidence even though the child's 
parent, guardian, or legal custodian was 
not present.
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b) Notwithstanding the provisions of [the 
above paragraph], statements, admissions 
or confessions of a child shall not be 
inadoissible in evidence by reason of 
the absence of a parent, guardian, or 
legal custodian if the child is emanci- 
pated from the parent, guardian, or le­
gal custodian.
c) Notwithstanding the provisions of [the 
above subparagraphs'], no statements, ad­
missions or confessions of any child un­
der the age of fourteen years made as a 
result of interrogation of the child by 
a law enforcement official concerning 
acts alleged to have been committed by 
the child which would constitute a vio­
lation of state or federal law shall be 
admissible in evidence against the 
child. (1977:20-23)
Clearly, the Commission was responding to the concerns ex­
pressed by the Supreme Court in Gault that juveniles need 
greater protection than adults in interrogation because they 
are presumably more susceptible to undue pressure to confess 
whether or not they are in fact guilty of the offense with 
which they are charged. The Court guotes a decision of 
Judge Ketcham of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court.
Simply stated, the Court's decision in this case 
rests upon the considered opinion —  after nearly 
four busy years on the Juvenile Court bench during 
which the testimony of thousands of such juveniles 
has been heard —  that the statements of adoles­
cents under 18 years of age who are arrested and 
charged with violation of law are frequently un­
trustworthy and often distort the truth.
(1968:1458)
In the new Code as enacted into law, all of the above lan­
guage is deleted, thereby opening the arrest and interroga­
tion process to question on the issue of due process.
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The importance of this issue is further indicated by the 
high rate of guilty pleas in juvenile proceedings. [See Ta­
ble 3 below.) In fact, the cases of sore than half of all 
juveniles petitioned are resolved by guilty pleas in which 
adjudicatory hearings are waived. Whether there is any con­
nection between interrogation and the high rate of guilty 
pleas is not known. However, because the procedural protec­
tions reconaended by the Commission are lacking, the possi­
bility of undue pressure undermining fairness and due pro­
cess is certainly real.
i----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1
Source: Maine Juvenile Court Becords. (Data on a sam­
ple of 25* of all juvenile cases in FT 1980, collected 
by staff of Legislative Committee to Monitor the Im­
plementation of the Juvenile Code.)
Intake and Due Process. One of the major innovations of 
the new Juvenile Code is the adoption of the so-called "in­
take model" screening and diversion mechanism. This is in
TABLE 3











contrast to the so-called "youth services bureau" model 
which was discussed at length in the reports of the Comnis- 
sion to Revise the Statutes and the Governor's Task Force on 
Corrections. The nature of the distinctions between the two 
approaches and many of the implications of the choice nade 
by the Legislature will be discussed later. There is, how­
ever, one important distinction that has important implica­
tions for due process and fairness. A major difference be­
tween the intake and youth services models is that the 
intake system is part of the formal juvenile justice system 
while the youth services bureau is typically outside of the 
juvenile justice system. Intake functions as an arm of the 
court, screens cases for court processing, and makes deci­
sions of a judicial nature in place of the court. Unlike a 
youth services bureau, the intake worker has considerable 
discretion and is backed by the coercive power of the state. 
Thus, while issues of due process may be marginal for the 
operations of a youth services bureau, involving perhaps 
some procedural considerations in appealing denial of servi- 
ces, the intake system functions in much the sane way as the
jcourt itself, and, thus, must be examined on the issues of 
due process and fairness. The Intake process is, in fact, 
as the commentary to the new Code refers to it, a "quasi-ju- 
dicial" process. (1977a:650)
The new Juvenile Code describes the functions of the In­
take Worker as follows;
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1. Intake Workers are called upon to decide whether a 
juvenile shall be detained or released pending court 
appearance.
2. The Intake Worker conducts preliminary investiga­
tions.
3. The Intake Worker decides, on the basis of the pre­
liminary investigation, whether further action is 
necessary.
4. The Intake Worker decides what further action should 
be taken in the case —  informal adjustment or peti- 
t ion.
5. The Intake Worker decides what conditions of informal 
adjustment are appropriate to the particular case.
6. The Intake Worker decides when, if, and under what 
circumstances informal adjustment will be revoked 
(although the Code does not appear to grant such au­
thority to Intake Workers.) (1977a:638, 648-49)
Three major problems are identified with Intake in relation 
to due process and fairness, all problematic by virtue of 
the judicial nature of the intake process.
j
First, the Intake process is virtually lacking in proce­
dural guidelines. The Intake Worker has nearly complete 
discretion in making the above decisions. There is virtual­
ly no guidance offered by the Code itself. The only excep­
tion is with respect to the initial detention decision made 
by the Intake Worker. The Code spells out the criteria that
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oust be used in Baking the detention decision and provides 
for a court hearing on detention within forty-eight hours of 
the initial decision. Furthermore, the decision of the 
court may be appealed by the juvenile. (1977a?638) Al­
though this is the only decision that may directly result in 
the immediate incarceration of the juvenile, the other deci­
sions are not without serious consequence to the juvenile 
and may even lead ultimately to incarceration. For example, 
the refusal of an Intake Worker to grant an informal adjust­
ment in a particular case results in a high probability that 
the juvenile will be found guilty by the judge and will be 
subjected to some sanction, often incarceration.24 The deci­
sions, then, as to whether a juvenile is to be "diverted11 by 
means of informal adjustment and whether such an arrangement 
is subsequently terminated in favor of court processing is 
of major consequence for the juvenile. However, there are
24 The court processing data will be discussed later. It is 
sufficient to note at this point that about one in five 
juveniles who appear in court have their cases dismissed. 
More than 77% of the cases are disposed of by "offense 
committed" verdicts or are "continued". There is, fur­
thermore, reason to believe that these results are not 
related exclusively to evidence presented in these cases 
in that age, sex, and seriousness of offense are related 
to adjudication. Of perhaps greater significance is that 
fact that in cases where the finding is "offense commit­
ted" (the vast majority of cases), 70% receive Maine
Youth Center or, in a few cases, jail, sentences. In 
many of these cases, the sentence is suspended. But, 
more than 20% of the juveniles are, in fact, sentenced to 
the Maine Youth Center. To these must be added the ap­
proximately 20% of cases in which probation is revoked 
and the Maine Youth Center sentence reimposed, which 
means that about a third of juveniles found guilty end up 
in the Maine Youth Center or jail. (MacDonald, 1982)
virtually no criteria, guidelines, standards, or procedures 
indicated in the new Juvenile Code for Baking these deci­
sions. Specifically, what the Code has to say about these 
decisions is as follows:
1. The decision on disposition fron Intake (dismissal,
referral, petition, or informal adjustment) is to be
Bade on the basis of the "preliminary investigation"
conducted by Intake Workers.
On the basis of the preliminary investiga­
tion, the intake worker shall choose one of 
the following alternatives. (1377a:648)
There is, however, no suggestion in the Code as to 
the nature, form, or content of such an investiga­
tion.
2. The only criterion to guide the decision of the in­
take worker as to whether or not to proceed with a
case is if "in his [intake worker's] judgement the
interest of the juvenile and the public will best be 
served by providing the juvenile with services volun­
tarily accepted...." (1977a:648) The criterion for 
dismissing a case in favor of referral for services
j is the intake worker's judgement. Should the judge­
ment be based on where the juvenile resides, his/her 
demeanor, who his/her parents are? The Code offers 
no guidance.
3. There are no criteria to guide the Intake Worker's 
decision as to whether informal adjustment is appro­
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priate. There are, however, preconditions that oust 
be met. The juvenile oust not have been adjudicated 
or been a party to an infornal adjustment in the pre­
ceding twelve months. Also, the facts of the case 
aust establish prima facie jurisdiction. Also, the 
intake worker must determine that the juvenile and 
his/her parents have been advised of their rights. 
(1977a:648-99)
There is similarly nothing in the new Code specifying what 
constitutes appropriate conditions of informal adjustment. 
The only guideline offered by the Code is that the juvenile 
and his/her parents aust agree to such conditions and aust 
do so in writing. (1977a:649) There is nothing to suggest 
what night be reasonable conditions. Is meeting with the 
intake worker periodically an appropriate informal adjust­
ment? Restitution to the alleged victim? What about condi­
tions which result in publicly demeaning (and not inciden­
tally labeling) the juvenile? Finally, as noted above, the 
Code has nothing whatsoever to say about the revocation of 
informal adjustment agreements on the part of the intake 
worker, whether the intake worker possesses such authority 
(presumably, he/she does) and under what circumstances the 
authority should be invoked.
As the Commentary to the new Code points out, the Legis­
lature left it up to the Department of Mental Health and 
Corrections to promulgate various Administrative proce­
dures'*. Also, the Code
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gives the Department of Mental Health and Correc­
tions broad discretion, within the standard of 
"serving the best interests of the juvenile and 
the public", to promulgate guidelines for not
seeking a petition as well as for making voluntary 
referrals. (1977a:650)
In fact, no such guidelines have been promulgated. The "Ju­
venile Intake Procedures Manual" published by the Department 
of Mental Health and Corrections offers little in the way of 
guidance. It does specify the general fora and content of 
the "preliminary investigation" upon which intake disposi­
tion decisions are to be made. However, it specifies no 
criteria other than the preconditions set by the Code itself 
for determining who should receive what disposition. On the 
most important issue of nature of informal adjustment, the 
Manual includes one paragraph, half of which comes directly 
from the Code. The rest is as follows:
The Intake Worker will establish the conditions 
that are appropriate for the juvenile during the 
period of the Informal Adjustment and include 
these on the consent form. Such conditions shall 
be designed to be conducive to the rehabilitation 
of the juvenile- Examples of such conditions may 
include, but are not limited to, the following: 
restitution, public service work, counseling, fos­
ter home placement, etc. The Area Intake Worker 
shall monitor the conditions of Informal Adjust­
ment. The scope of Informal Adjustment, which 
cannot exceed six months of duration, is limited 
only by the ingenuity of the Intake Worker. (DMHC,
1978: 11)
With respect to the decision to terminate an informal ad­
justment, the Manual specifies three reasons for termina­
tion. The first, the most problematic from the due process 
point of view, is that the Intake Worker may terminate the
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agreeaent for "non-compliance with Informal Adjustment con­
ditions," (DMHC, 1978s11) There is no indication of any pro­
cedure for arriving at such a deternination. It would seea 
that such a deternination is nade by the Intake Worker on 
whatever basis he/she deens appropriate. The Code provides 
for the termination of an Tnforaal Adjustment agreeaent at 
the reguest of the District Attorney- This is repeated in 
the Intake Manual. It should be noted that neither here nor 
in the Code is there any indication that such a deternina­
tion must be nade within a specified period of time, nor are 
any criteria specified as appropriate grounds for such a de­
cision by the District Attorney, other than that the State 
must act within a six month period. Conceivably, a juvenile 
could have met every condition of informal adjustment per­
fectly and, on the last day of the adjustment period, be no­
tified that the District Attorney has decided to bring the 
case to court.
Due process and fairness in our system of justice depends 
in large measure on procedure. This is underscored by the 
Supreme Court decision in Gault which quoted Justice Frank­
furter on this point.
The history of American freedom is, in no small 
measure, the history of procedure. But, in addi­
tion, fashioned from the generality of due process 
are our best instruments for the distillation and 
evaluation of essential facts from the conflicting 
welter of data that life and our adversary methods 
present. It is these instruments of due process 
which enhance the possibility that truth will 
emerge..., [1968:14U0)
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Clearly, the argument suggested by critics of the new Code 
that the due process problen has been shifted from the court 
stage to the intake stage is affirmed by an analysis of the 
Code and the so-called "Procedures Manual".
The second major concern is that the juvenile has no re­
course in the event that he/she believes that the decision 
of the Intake Worker with respect to any of these decisions, 
except detention, is unfair. The decision of the Intake 
Worker cannot be appealed. The decision to petition rather 
than informally adjust a case is final. Conditions of in­
formal adjustment may be offered by the Intake Worker on a 
"take it or leave it" basis. In such cases, the juvenile is 
faced with court and, as previously noted, a high probabili­
ty of being found guilty and punished.
Finally, there is some bias built into the system that 
seems to presume guilt rather than innocence. Or, rather, 
the admission of guilt is encouraged whether or not a juve­
nile is guilty. In the original version of the new Code en­
acted by the Legislature, the admission of guilt was a pre­
condition of informal adjustment. This was repealed before
j
the Code became effective. Nevertheless, Intake continues 
to operate as if the section were not repealed.*7 The Manual 
reads
If the juvenile denies having committed the of­
fense, the investigation should cease and the case 
should be referred for further disposition by the
27 Telephone interview with Intake Supervisor. (October 15, 
1981)
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law enforcement agency and the District Attorney,
using fora IW-7. (DMHC, 1978:10)
The juvenile is thus placed in the position of risking pros­
ecution and possible incarceration if he/she aaintains his/ 
her innocence. This issue is a difficult one. It is com­
plicated by the structure of the system, wherein the court 
has every reason to presume that a thorough screening of 
cases has already taken place and only the more serious cas­
es in which there is convincing evidence are being referred 
for adjudication. This one problem examined in isolation 
from the reality of the juvenile court in Maine, nay seen 
trivial- But the reality of "assembly-line justice" makes 
injustice in such cases a more likely outcome.
Finally, the evidence necessary to determine the extent 
to which the rights to due process and fairness of juveniles 
are being observed in the Intake process is not available 
and would be extremely difficult to obtain. It is in part 
for this reason that there is in our law such emphasis on 
procedural safeguards. What can be said is that there is 
ample opportunity for Intake to trample on the rights of the 
jjivenile.2* It should be further noted that Intake has not 
been particularly faithful to following the few procedures 
that are in fact mandated by the Code itself. One example 
is the requirement that the juvenile admit guilt as a pre­
2® This, of course, is a completely separate issue from 
whether Intake Workers actually treat their charges fair­
ly- Presumably, they are good and decent and competent 
people. That, however, under our system of constitutional 
law, is not enough.
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condition of infornal adjustment. Another raised in the 
United Way study and confirmed by our analysis is the while 
the Code clearly requires a "preliminary investigation" by 
Intake Workers in every case, and that dispositional deci­
sions be based on such, the Department of Mental Health and 
Corrections and the Probation and Parole Supervisor in Dis­
trict I have set forth several circumstances in which the 
investigation is waived and prosecution is automatic. The 
Code itself reguires prosecution only in cases where there 
was an infornal adjustment or adjudication in the previous 
twelve months. The unlawful addition of five categories to 
the list of automatic petitions results in preliminary in­
vestigations being conducted in only half of all cases re­
ferred to Intake.** The intent of the Code was to require 
that disposition from intake be made on the basis of the in­
vestigation, not that the investigation be conducted depend­
ing on the disposition determined by Intake. Thus, the only 
criterion for making such decisions specified by the Code is 
undermined by Intake procedures.
Corrections and Due Process. Little has changed with re­
spect to due process and fairness in the correctional end of 
the juvenile justice system, particularly, the Maine Youth 
Center {previously two separate sex segregated institutions 
known as the Boy’s Training Center and the Stevens School
29 Telephone interviews with Intake Supervisor and Intake 
Worker. (October 15, 1982)
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for Girls). As noted in Chapter 4, numerous recommendations 
vere made and criticisms offered in relation to due process 
and fairness in correctional institutions. The Comprehen­
sive Juvenile Delinquency Study recommended that the "stu­
dents" at the institutions be granted a greater right to 
privacy, particularly the right to send and receive uncen­
sored mail. (1971:66) Greater democratization of the insti­
tutions and respect for the rights and dignity of the in­
mates was urged by the Governor*s Task Force on Corrections. 
The Task Force also recommended independent advocates for 
inmates and an inmates "Bill of Rights." Hone of these 
things has been brought about. (1974:57)
The Children and Youth Services Planning Project drew at­
tention to another aspect of the fairness issue, that is, 
the overrepresentation of disadvantaged groups among the
population of the training centers. In particular, the ov­
errepresentation of lower income groups is noted. Comparing 
the 1975 figures included in their report to more recent 
figures indicates that, if anything, the discrepancy is more
pronounced. (See Table 4 below.)
«/ There is also an indication that the emotionally dis­
turbed are overrepresented. Juveniles from single-parent 
families were also considerably more likely to be among the 
training center population (601?) of the training center pop­
ulation in 1975. Onfortunately, there is no data to use for 
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Source: CYSPP, 1977:191; Bureau of Corrections,
1982:55.
♦Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding. 
♦♦Figures for 1980 begin with "below $10,000."
ever, no indication of any steps taken to institute reforn 
with respect to these inequities.30 Finally, in considering 
the ideal of due process and fairness in practice under the 
"reformed" juvenile justice system in Maine, it is appropri­
ate to indicate one of the specific due process shortcomings 
at the Maine Youth Center. That is, the superintendent of 
the institution has unbridled power over juveniles in its
jcare, power that is largely unchecked by any process of ap­
peal of decisions. Maine Statutes give the Superintendent 
parental powers over the incarcerated juveniles.
30 As the Children and Youth Services Planning Project indi­
cates, there is no way to determine whether juveniles in 
these groups commit offenses at such a drastically hiqher 
rate or simply that they are at greater risk of juvenile 
justice processing. {1977:187}
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The superintendent shall have all the power which 
a guardian has to his ward, and all the power 
which parents have over their children, as to per­
son, property, earnings, and the rehabilitation of 
every child committed to the Center. (Maine Legis­
lature, 1980b:602)
Further, this power extends beyond the walls of the institu­
tion. Juveniles released on entrustment may be brought back 
to the institution whenever the superintendent shall deem it 
appropriate. There is no appeal.
On being satisfied at any time that the welfare of 
the child will be promoted by return to the Cen­
ter, the superintendent may cancel such trust and 
resume charge of such child with the same powers 
as before the trust was made. (Maine Legislature, 
1980b:602-603)
Clearly, whatever protections may be afforded juveniles un­
der the new Code while they are before the judge, such pro­
tections cease once they leave the courthouse, and they be­
come subject to the whims of the institutional personnel. 
Again, this is not to say that treatment at the institution 
is arbitrary and capricious, only that the law offers no 
protection against this possibility. Clearly, these are in 
violation of the spirit if not the letter of reform recom­
mendations. There is virtually no change in the due process 
✓requirements for the correctional end of the juvenile jus­
tice system under the new Code.
Behabilitative Ideals
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The post-Gault ideals of decriminalization, deinstitutional­
ization, and diversion are most closely connected to the 
qeneral goal of rehabilitation that continues to character­
ize juvenile justice, despite the closer alignment of juve­
nile justice with criminal justice. To what extent is each 
of these ideals incorporated into the new Juvenile Code? To 
what extent is each reflected in the juvenile justice pro­
cess in practice?
Decriminalization
As noted in the previous chapter, decriminalization, in the 
context of post-Gault juvenile justice reform has two basic 
components. First, it refers to the elimination of the so- 
called "status offense" jurisdiction, that is, acts which 
are criminal only for juveniles, from the juvenile justice 
system. Secondly, it is generally taken to include the sub­
stitution of more appropriate responses to the kinds of 
problems presumably represented by such acts. That is to 
say, appropriate therapeutic services are to be provided in 
place of the previous judicial response. Maine's post-Gault 
studies generally subscribed to both of these components, 
most recommending the elimination or sharp reduction of sta­
tus offenses from Juvenile Court jurisdiction and all re­
commending more appropriate non-judicial responses to the
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non-criminal ■isbehavior of juveniles. These are, then, the 
two criteria on which Maine's post-Gault reforn effort aust 
be neasured with respect to whether it neets the ideal of 
decriminalization.
On the first point, Maine's new Juvenile Code has made 
substantial strides in the direction of eliminating the sta­
tus offense jurisdiction. None of the language of the Juve­
nile Offenders' Act defining delinquency to include the 
vaguely designated status offenses such as
habitual truancy; behaving in an incorrigible or 
indecent and lascivious manner; knowingly and 
willfully associating with vicious, criminal or 
grossly immoral people; repeatedly deserting one's 
home without just cause; living in circumstances 
of manifest danger of falliuq into habits of vice 
and immorality... (Maine Legislature, 1965:522)
is included in the new Code. By and large, the Legislature 
has followed recommendations of the various post-Gault stud­
ies in defining "juvenile offenses" largely by reference to 
the Maine Criminal Code. Section 3103 of the new Juvenile 
Code defines juvenile crime as
Conduct which, if committed by an adult, would be 
defined as criminal by Title 17-A, the Maine Crim­
inal Code, or by any other criminal statute out­
side that code,.... (1977a:628-29)
According to a O.S. Department of Justice study, Maine thus
"goes the farthest of any statutory revisions passed to date
in terms of decriminalizing traditional status offenses."
(Smith et al, 1980:44)
Despite Maine's position on the cutting edge with respect
to decriminalization of status offenses, the reforn has not
completely eliminated then froa the juvenile justice systea. 
The paragraph following the above cited description of juve­
nile criae makes two major exceptions to that definition. 
Specifically, it states that "the possession of a useable 
anoont of marijuana" and "offenses involving intoxicating 
liquor" also are included in "juvenile criae." (1977a:629) 
the possession of a small amount of marijuana was decrimi­
nalized for adults in the reform of the Maine Criminal Code, 
as was drunkeness. The possession of alcoholic beverages 
remains as a juvenile only crime. Thus, while most of the 
status offenses have been eliminated, some significant ex­
ceptions remain.
A further distinction between adult and juvenile criae 
must be mentioned in this connection. Several years prior 
to the new juvenile code, the Juvenile Offenders Act was 
amended to prevent juveniles adjudicated as status offenders 
from being committed to the Maine Youth Center. ICRS, 
1976b:101) Such a prohibition continues under the new Code 
for the above cited status offenses. However, juveniles nay 
be committed to the Center for these offenses if they refuse 
to pay a fine or violate probation conditions. Also, pros­
titution is no longer a crime punishable by imprisonment in 
Maine. However, the new Code allows juveniles to be commit­
ted for the criae. (1977a:629, 632)
The exceptions to the elimination of status offenses and 
differential definitions of crime and punishment for juve­
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niles and adults are not without significance in the actual 
juvenile justice process in the State. Marijuana and alco­
hol possession accounted for 11% of charges against juve­
niles referred to Intake in FY1980. Something referred to 
as simply Hstatus offense" in Intake records account for an 
additional 1% of Intake referrals. This represents a de­
crease from pre-Code levels. In 1970, for example, police 
records from major departments in Maine indicate that ap­
proximately 39% of their juvenile cases involved status of­
fenses. However, the decrease in the proportion of status 
offense cases is is far less dramatic if the period immedi­
ately preceeding the new Code is examined. Figures prepared 
by the Maine Department of Mental Health and Corrections in­
dicate that the percentage of arrests that involved status 
offenders decreased only slightly from pre-Code FY1978 to 
FY1979 and FY1980. As indicated in Table 5, the decrease in 
status offense arrests in FY1979 is guite small and the 
FY1980 figures are not what would be expected after "decri­
minalization."
Moreover, fewer of these juveniles are being released by 
the police. In FY1978, more than 82% of juveniles arrested 
for status offenses were released without further action. 
In 1980, slightly over 75% were released. This may be re­
lated to the addition of the Intake Workers as the screening 


















Source: Bureau of Corrections, 1982:21
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Perhaps the most serious of the problems with the imple­
mentation of the ideal of decriminalization is the failure 
of the Legislature to provide alternative responses to the 
problems presumably represented by such behavior. As indi­
cated in the previous chapter, an essential part of the ra­
tionale for decriminalization is that judicial responses 
were inappropriate and ineffective ones. Truancy, for exam­
ple, as most of the post-Gault studies pointed out, is es­
sentially an educational problem susceptible to educational 
splutions, not criminal sanctions. Thus, educational solu­
tions are the appropriate ones. The Commission to Revise 
the Statutes exemplified this position in the proposed Code 
that they submitted to the Legislature. It has, among other 
things, an extensive section on education, outlining the ap­
propriate educational responses to these educational prob-
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leas.31 (1977b:90-98) Unfortunately, as the Departaent of 
Justice survey points out, this is typical of the "refort" 
with respect to the issue of decriminalization. The alter­
native services promised are simply not provided for by the 
Legislature. Under such circumstances, decriminalization 
becoaes little aore than neglect. In their criticise of the 
"junior criminal court model" of post-Gault juvenile jus­
tice, Faust and Brantingham suggest.
There is no good reason to permit children to be­
come alcoholics or to fall into the wasteland of 
the unskilled school dropout in a technical socie­
ty.... {1979:460)
Indeed, genuine decriminalization suggests nothing of the 
kind. Its advocates would argue that responding to such 
problems with court hearings and commitments to institutions 
is counterproductive. Genuine decriminalization implies ef­
fective responses to juveniles* problems, not neglect.
Deinstitutionalization
The ideal of deinstitutionalization in the 1 post-Gault stud­
ies in Maine included a number of objectives. Host funda­
mentally, it means the removal of juveniles froa large cor­
rectional institutions. Secondly, it implies the creation 
of community-based correctional alternatives. Thirdly, it
31 The Conaission draft includes specific requirements that 
truants, for example, be referred to Pupil Evaluation 
Teams for evaluation and specific program recommendations 
and special education arrangements that may be necessary.
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sometimes aeans reforn of the institutions for the few whon 
it will be necessary to confine. It also means the elimina­
tion of most cases of preadludicatory incarceration at jails 
or at the Maine Youth Center for purposes of diagnostic 
evaluations. Finally, it means the creation of special ju­
venile detention facilities for holding juveniles who must, 
be detained for their own protection or that of the communi­
ty.
Only one of the studies of of Maine's juvenile justice 
system suggests that the elimination of the juvenile correc­
tional institution nay be necessary for reform. JCYSPP, 
1977:199) Yet, the general thrust of the studies is in the 
direction of gradually phasing out the use of such facili­
ties and replacing them with community-based alternatives. 
In the interim, institutions are to be used only as a last 
resort; the principle of the "least restrictive alternative" 
is to be observed. Indeed, the new Code does in fact incor­
porate the "least restrictive" principle. It adds a sub­
stantial number of sentencing options to the traditional al­
ternatives of incarceration and probation and indicates that 
the court shall always utilize the least restrictive alter­
native possible in a given case. Section 1313 of the new 
Juvenile Code entitled "Criteria for Withholding Institu­
tional Disposition" allows institutional dispositions only 
when necessary "for protection of the public..."
1. Standard. The court shall enter an order 
of disposition for a juvenile who has been
adjudicated as having committed a juvenile 
criae vithout imposing placement in a se­
cure institution as disposition unless, 
having regard to the nature and circumstan­
ces of the crime and the history, character 
and condition of the juvenile, it finds 
that his confinement is necessary for pro­
tection of the public because:
a) There is undue risk that, during the 
period of a suspended sentence or proba­
tion, the juvenile will commit another 
crime; or
b) The juvenile is in need of correctional 
treatment that can be provided most ef­
fectively by is commitment to an insti­
tution; or
c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the 
seriousness of the juvenile’s conduct.
Additional consideration. The following 
grounds, while not controlling the discre­
tion of the court, shall be accorded weight 
against ordering placement in a secure in­
stitution:
a) The juvenile’s conduct neither caused 
nor threatened serious harm;
b) The juvenile did not contemplate that 
his conduct would cause or threaten se­
rious harm;
c) The juvenile acted under strong provoca­
tion;
d) There were substantial grounds tending 
to excuse or justify the juvenile's con­
duct, though failing to establish a de­
fense;
e) The victim of the juvenile's conduct in­
duced or facilitated its commission;
f) The juvenile has made or has agreed to 
make restitution to the victim of his 
conduct for the damage or injury that 
the victim sustained;
g) The juvenile has not been previously ad­
judicated to have committed a juvenile
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crime or has led a lam-abiding life for 
a substantial period of time prior to 
the conduct which formed the basis for 
the present adjudication.
h) The juvenile's conduct was the result of 
circumstances unlikely to recur;
i) The character and attitudes of the juve­
nile indicate that he is unlikely to 
commit another juvenile criae;
j) The juvenile is particularly likely to 
respond affirmatively to probation;
k) The confinement of the juvenile would 
entail excessive hardship to himself or 
his dependents. (1977a:672-73)
The Commentary to the new Code further indicates that the 
purpose of this section of the Code is to implement the in­
tent of the Commission to Revise the Statutes that juveniles 
be taken from parental custody "only as a last resort." 
(1977a:673)
The Code lists nine specific dispositional alternatives 
as well as probation. They include allowing the juvenile to 
remain in his parents custody under any conditions the court 
may impose, participation in work or service programs which 
may or may not be linked to restitution, placement in foster 
homes or halfway houses, the imposition of fines, commitment 
to the Haine Youth Center, incarceration in jails, proba­
tion, and unconditional discharge. (1977a:673-75)
However, the Legislature failed to provide funding for 
any additional alternatives. Consequently, the court dispo­
sition (sentencing) pattern does not significantly deviate
231
from that of the pre-reform period. According to available 
documents, sentences in the pre-Code period almost always 
were commitment to the Boys* Training Center or the Stevens 
School or probation. Data on court disposition under the 
new Code reveals a similar pattern- (See Table 6)
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Source: Maine Juvenile Court Records. (Data on a sam­
ple of 25% of all juvenile cases in FY1980, collected 
by staff of Legislative Committee to Monitor the Im­
plementation of the Juvenile Code.)
Another important indicator of deinstitutionalization is 
^he commitment pattern pre- and post-Code to the Maine Youth 
Center. As evident in Table 7, if anything is obvious, it 
is the reverse of deinstitutionalization.
Detentions. The same basic principles were to apply to 
secure detention of juveniles, namely, that detentions were 








Fiscal Number Fiscal Number
Year Year
1972 225 1979 350
1979 200 1980 297
1976 325 1981 350
1978 315
CYSPP, 1977:175; Bureau of Corrections,
C. Detention, if ordered, shall be in the least 
restrictive residential setting that will ade­
quately serve the purposes of detention. Deten­
tion may be ordered only where it is necessary to:
1. Ensure the presence of the juvenile at 
subsequent court proceedings;
2. Provide physical care for a juvenile who 
cannot return home because there is no pa­
rent or other suitable person willing and 
able to supervise and care for him ade­
quately;
3. Prevent the juvenile from harming or intim­
idating any witness, or otherwise threaten­
ing the orderly progress of court proceed­
ings;
9. Prevent the juvenile from inflicting bodily 
harm on others; or
5. Protect the juvenile from an immediate 
threat of bodily harm. (1977a:638)
In addition, juveniles were not to be held in adult facili 
ties, viz. jails, but were to be held, if absolutely neces 
sary, in special juvenile detention centers.
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On the basis of the State*s own statistics, it is not do­
ing a very good job on this aspect of deinstitutionaliza­
tion. (Maine Department of Corrections: 1982) Immediately
following the new Code, there was a substantial increase in 
the number of secure detentions ordered. Thereafter, the 
numbers returned to pre-Code levels, suggesting that nothing 
has changed despite the fairly strong language of the new 
Code in spelling out specific and narrow criteria in deten­
tion decisions. (See Table 9)
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Source: Bureau of Corrections, 1982:31,
Not only are more juveniles being securely detained, the 
special facilities for the detention of juveniles insisted 
on by reformers simply do not exist. County jails continue 
to serve as juvenile detention facilities in most cases. 
The strong post-Gault recommendation that such detentions be 
strictly prohibited was gradually eroded to an insistence
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that juveniles detained in jails be kept strictly segregated 
from adult inmates.
Finally, the recommendations against preadjudicatory di­
agnostic evaluations being conducted at the Maine Youth Cen­
ter have not been adhered to. According to post-Code court 
data, 76% of such evaluations are preadjudicatory. 78% are 
conducted at the Maine Youth Center.
TABLE 9




1975 221 1979 215
1980 212
1981 211
♦Source: Only available pre-Code data, furnished to 
CYSPP by staff of Boy*s Training Center and the Ste­
vens School.
♦♦Source: Bureau of Corrections, 1982:31.
Diversion
Apart fron issues of due process and fairness, there is no 
ideal of post-Gault reform more central than the diversion 
of juveniles from formal juvenile justice processing. As 
noted in the previous chapter, the main rationale of diver­
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sion is that juvenile justice processing is likely to result 
in wore rather than less delinquency, due largely to the 
stigmatization and contagion associated with crioinal and 
juvenile justice processing. Diversion is not, however, 
merely a decision not to proceed against a juvenile or to do 
nothing. It is, rather, a decision to respond to the alleg­
ed criae or misbehavior with alternative rehabilitative ser­
vices outside of the juvenile justice system. That is to 
say, diversion implies a non-judicial rather than a judicial 
response. The basic principle of diversion is that whenever 
possible, juveniles will be provided with access to rehabil­
itative services that will presumably address their needs/ 
problems instead of being processed through the juvenile 
court system.
As noted in the previous chapter, diversion is a post- 
Gault reform ideal common to all of the post-Gault studies 
of Maine's juvenile justice system. The most extensive dis­
cussion of the issue is found in a report of the Commission 
to Revise the Statutes Relating to Juveniles, Goals of 
Maine*s Juvenile Justice System. (1976a: 64-77) In their 
discussion they note that diversion was one of the most 
promising recommendations of the President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, and, at 
the same time, one that has been largely unfulfilled. 
(1976:64) The report defines diversion, explains its ra­
tionale, discusses major issues associated with it, and
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specifies some of the aajor prerequisites of diversion. The 
report takes its operational (sic.) definition fron the Re­
port of the Corrections Task Force of the National Commis- 
sion on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.
Diversion refers to formally acknowl­
edged...efforts to utilize alternatives to...the 
justice system. To qualify as diversion, such ef­
forts must be undertaken prior to adjudication and 
after a legally proscribed action has oc­
curred. ... Diversion implies halting or suspending 
formal criminal or juvenile justice proceedings 
against a person who has violated a statute in fa­
vor of processing through a non-criminal disposi­
tion. (1976a:69)
The rationale for diversion is as follows:
Diversion, in theory, is based on policy analysis 
that juvenile justice processing is frequently de­
trimental to some youth, and such youth, who oth­
erwise would receive such processing, should be 
"diverted" to youth services programs. (1976:73)
The Legislature seems to have accepted the principle of 
diversion and the basic rationale for it. Indeed, one of 
the major changes in juvenile justice in Maine as a result 
of the new Juvenile Code is the addition of a diversion 
mechanism in the form of Intake Workers. The Intake Worker, 
whose place in the juvenile justice system ■ is between law 
enforcement and the juvenile court, has several functions, 
the major one being screening cases and diverting juveniles 
whenever possible. In screening cases and making determina­
tions as to processing, the Intake Worker is given several 
options in the new Code. The Intake Worker may:
1. Decide that no further action is required 
either in the interest of the public or of 
the juvenile. If the intake worker deter-
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■ines that the facts in the report prepared 
for hi* by the referring officer.-.are suf­
ficient to file a petition, but in his 
judgeaent the interest of the juvenile and 
the public will be served best by providing 
the juvenile with services voluntarily ac­
cepted by the juvenile and his parents, 
guardian or legal custodian if the juvenile 
is not emancipated, the intake worker nay 
refer the juvenile for that care and treat­
ment and not request that a petition be 
filed;
2. Make whatever informal adjustnent is prac­
ticable without a petition- The intake 
worker nay effect whatever informal adjust­
ment is agreed to by the juvenile and his 
parents, guardian or legal custodian if the 
juvenile is not emancipated---. [Or,]
3. If the intake worker determines that the 
facts are sufficient for the filing of a 
petition, he nay request the prosecuting 
attorney to file a petition. (1977a:648-49)
Although referral is a forn of diversion, informal adjust­
ment is the typical form- In an informal adjustnent, the 
Intake Worker establishes whatever arrangements seen appro­
priate as a rehabilitative program for a particular juve­
nile. If the juvenile agrees to the conditions of informal 
adjustment, the juvenile enters into an informal adjustment 
agreement and is diverted from court processing (unless the 
District Attorney or the Intake Worker later decide that 
court processing is appropriate or that the conditions of 
informal adjustment have been violated).
In attempting to assess the extent to which the ideal of 
diversion has been incorporated into the reformed juvenile
justice system in Maine, it is necessary to first determine
238
whether juveniles are being informally adjusted and, second­
ly, to determine whether informal adjustment in fact consti­
tutes diversion.
The discussion of diversion in the Commission report in­
cludes among its "Suggested Goals" for Maine's juvenile jus­
tice system, "To decrease the number of children about whom 
delinquency and 'status offender' petitions are filed." 
(1976:77) This represents one measure of diversion. More 
specifically, to what extent has formal court processing de­
clined in relation to other options. Among the decisions 
that the Intake Worker can make with respect to disposition 
from the Intake process, petition and informal adjustnent 
represent the most freguent chosen options. As Table 10 be­
low indicates, approximately half of all juveniles referred 
to Intake are being "petitioned" (referred to court for for­
mal processing). The remaining juveniles nay, in the most 
general sense of the term, be considered as having been di­
verted. 32
Comparisons of post-reform and pre-reform diversion rates 
present major difficulties. Diversion prior to the enact-
jment of the new Juvenile Code in Maine was primarily police 
level diversion which may take place prior to or following 
arrest. That which takes place prior to arrest cannot be
32 A number of the cases included among the "diverted" like­
ly reflect a decision to take no further action due to a 
lack of evidence and, thus, are not properly considered 
as "diverted." The percentage of cases disposed of by 
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Source: Juvenile Intake Records data supplied by the
Department of Mental Health and Corrections.
measured because there are usually no records. The role of 
the lav enforcement officer after arrest has changed consid­
erably vith the addition of Intake Workers. Decisions on 
post-arrest processing are left largely in the hands of the 
Intake Workers- What effect this has on police level deci­
sions is impossible to assess vith any accuracy. There is, 
nevertheless, a sharp, consistent decrease in the percentage 
of juveniles released by the police after arrest and a 
small, but steady, increase in the arrest rate.3:1 Clearly, 
police are •‘diverting" fever juveniles after arrest. Also, 
the rising arrest rates suggest that there is less "street- 
level" or pre-arrest diversion of juveniles by police. On
33 The percentage of juvenile arrest cases handled by the 
police and released steadily decreased from 60.7% in 1975 
to 35.6% in 1983. Although the number of juvenile ar­
rests decreased, the arrest rate for juveniles, calculat­
ed on the basis of the population of 14-17 year-olds, in­
creased from 127 per thousand in 1976 to 141 per thousand 
in 1981. (0.S. Bureau of Census, 1976-1981; State of
Maine Department of Public Safety, 1976-1984)
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the other hand, there is some decrease in percentage of ar­
rested juveniles petitioned to juvenile court {from hit in 
FY1976 to 35% in FY1981) and in the rate of petitions to ju­
venile court calculated on the basis of the 14-17 year-old 
population of the State (from 53 per thousand in 1976 to 49 
per thousand in 1981). (0. S. Bureau of Census, 1977-1982;
State of Haine Department of Public Safety, 1977-1982) This 
suggests that vhile there is a slight increase in diversion 
in one part of the system, there is a decrease in diversion 
in another part. And, in any case, greater numbers of juve­
niles are passing through the gates of the juvenile justice 
system.
Intake as Diversion. Of perhaps greater significance is 
the appropriateness of Intake as a diversion mechanism. 
There appear to be inherent problems to the "intake model" 
as well as several aspects of Maine*s version of Intake 
which decrease the likelihood of genuine diversion taking 
place.
In their discussion of diversion* the Commission to Re- 
vise the Statutes focus almost exclusively on the youth ser­
vices bureau model as the appropriate diversion mechanism. 
The only reference made to the intake model is a suggestion 
that it is an inappropriate one. As noted in the report, a 
major rationale of diversion is that "it permits the state 
to provide services through a youth services program without
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labeling the youth a delinquent or tainting the youth's 
identity with a stigmatizing judicial experience." 
(1976a:71-3) There are, then, two najor criteria of diver­
sion specified in the report. First, diversion involves the 
provision of services. Secondly, in order to avoid labell­
ing, it must be community-based, outside of and independent 
of the formal juvenile justice system. The long term fail­
ure of socialized juvenile justice to deliver promised ser­
vices leads to a preference for an alternative service de­
livery system. But the avoidance of labelling provides the 
strongest push for a community-based diversion system. 
Clearly, an intake system which is part of the formal juve­
nile justice system, is made up of intake workers who are 
officers of the court and employees of the Department of 
Corrections, and who deal exclusively with juveniles who are 
referred to them on the basis of alleged juvenile crime, is 
incapable of avoiding labellinq. The following points are 
noted:
1. Under the intake model, the juvenile has already pen-t
etrated the systen when so-called diversion takes
✓
place.
2. Juveniles being "diverted" by Intake are not "truly" 
diverted as "true" diversion is defined by Cressey 
and McDermott and accepted in the Commission report. 
An essential element of "true" diversion is that the 
person diverted actually leaves the juvenile justice 
system.
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If "true" diversion occurs, the juvenile is 
safely out of the official reals of the ju­
venile justice syst.es and he is issune from 
incurring the delinquent label or any of 
its variations.... Further, when he walks 
out the door from the person diverting him, 
he is technically free to tell the diverter
to go to hell, (guoted in CBS, 1976a:73)
In an Intake system, a diverted juvenile remains 
within the grasp of the system until the diversion 
program is completed.
3- In an Intake system which serves only juvenile jus­
tice clients, contact with the system which is of ne­
cessity involved in "diversion" is highly likely to
be stigmatizing, certainly no less so than meetings
with probation officers.
It is, then, difficult to imagine how an intake system can 
be viewed as a genuine diversion mechanism. By definition, 
it fails to meet the most fundamental criteria of diversion.
Particular aspects of Maine's Intake system make it pe­
culiarly ill-adapted to serve as a diversion mechanism.
Among the points to consider are the following:
1. The Intake Worker is an employee of ' the Bureau of 
Corrections which has ultimate responsibility under 
the new Code for supervising the intake (diversion) 
function and, among other things, promulgating guide­
lines for informal adjustments, the most common av­
enue of diversion under the new Code. Corrections
is, as the Maine Youth Advocacy proposal points out,
at the opposite end of the juvenile justice system
from diversion. One can penetrate no deeper into the 
systea than Corrections. As the Maine Youth Advocacy 
proposal further notes. Corrections is not particu­
larly well known as service provider. (MacDonald and 
Biskup, 1979:2*4)
The Coaaiission report, having equated a youth servi­
ces agency with diversion, claims that
It is the combination of direct services 
and the co-ordination of existing services 
which serves to identify a youth service 
agency. (1976:70)
The failure of the Legislature to provide for any ad­
ditional services Bakes it highly unlikely that the 
Intake Worker will be able to provide services to 
meet the juvenile*s needs. Genuine diversion is thus 
unlikely to occur. In fact, as Table 11 indicates. 
Intake Workers infrequently assuae the role of ser­
vice broker for "diverted" juveniles. Diversion, un­
der Maine*s Intake system, seens to amount to little 
more than "informal probation" conmon in the pre-re­
form period. Intake Workers, instead of referring 
diverted youth to coamunity agencies for appropriate 
rehabilitative services, are carrying ongoing case­
loads to which they offer "counselling." This coun­
selling apparently amounts to (and, considering the 
large caseloads and bureaucratic tasks required of 
the Intake Worker, it probably cannot be more) little 





Conditions of Informal Adjustnent (FY1980)
Percent Number
Condition


















| *10% of all cases involved both types of resti- |
| tution. 61.7% of cases involved either or both |
| types of restitution. I
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3. The ease with which diversion can be reversed under 
the new Code further disqualifies informal adjustment 
as a form of genuine diversion. A diverted juvenile 
may be "undivertedH at any time during the six month 
period from the time of initiation of informal ad­
justment. And, as noted in the previous discussion 
of due process, this can be accomplished without any 
requirement that due process be observed. The deci­
sion to "undivert" as the initial decision to divert 
or not to divert is not appealable to anyone.
4. Concern has been expressed that diversion ultimately 
might serve to increase the number juveniles subject-
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ed to the juvenile justice system instead of decreas­
ing that number.
[T]here is the concern that diversion is 
becoming a mechanism for increasing unwar­
ranted state intervention into more and 
more young lives.... It has been suggested 
that diversion statistics nay be bloated by 
thousands of youth "scooped up" into the 
juvenile justice system who previously were 
dismissed. Such figures may serve to nasi 
the fact that those youth who traditionally 
were processed through to correctional in­
stitutions are still processed through 
without any benefit from all the diversion 
efforts. JCRS, 1976:74-75)
The structure of the diversion mechanism under 
Maine's new Code has considerable potential for wid­
ening the net of juvenile justice. The assumption 
that Intake Workers can provide juveniles with needed 
services and treatment would presumably encourage po­
lice to make referrals to Intake in cases where, un­
der the old system, they would have practiced "street 
level diversion." The result would be that greater 
numbers of youth would be stigmatized under the sys­
tem designed expressly to avoid stigmatizing youth. 
The available evidence suggests that there is a ten­
dency in this direction under the new Code.
One final point that must be made with respect to Intake 
diversion under Maine's new Juvenile Code. Although the 
Code offers little guidance as to criteria for choosing one 
intake disposition over another, the Code's requirement that 





































♦Includes all cases not handled by the police and re­
leased.
Source: Maine Department of Public Safety.
vestigation conducted by the Intake Worker suggests that the 
Legislature expected the decision on whether to divert a ju­
venile to be based on a deliberative examination of a wide 
range of factors that would relate to the interests of the 
juvenile and the public. In fact, the diversion decision 
sterns in most cases to be an automatic one based almost ex­
clusively on seriousness of offense and prior record of con­
tact with law enforcement or intake. (See Table 13 below)
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TABLE 13
Factors in Juvenile Intake Dispositions (FY1980)
Not
Petitioned Petitioned Number
TOTAL 50. 5% 49.5% 4,019
AGE^
6 to 13 Years 29.5% 70.5% 492
14 to 15 Years 50.0% 50.0% 1 ,175
16 to 18 Years 55. 3% 44.7% 2,311
SEX^
Ma le 53. 1% 46.9% 3,130
Female 37. 2% 62.8% 648
SERIOUSNESS OF CHARGE^
More Serious 71. 1% 28.9% 895
(A. B„ C)
Less Serious 44. 5% 55.5% 3,070
(D, E, F)
PRIOR RECORD^
Yes 88.0% 12.0% 1 ,379
No 29. 3% 70.7% 2,529
INTAKE DISTRICT^
I 41.9% 58. 1% 1,123
II 50. 1% 40.9% 766
ITT 51. 5% 48.5% 664
IV 56. 8% 43.2% 906
V 43. 1% 56.9% 508
♦Denotes that chi square is statistically significant 
at the .05 (95%) level.
Source: Juvenile Intake Records data supplied by the
Department of Mental Health and Corrections.
Chapter VII
COHCLUSIOB: OIDEHSTAIDIWG THE FBILUBE OF BEFOBH
Findings
The effort to refora Maine's juvenile justice system in the 
post-Gault must be judged a failure with respect to its most 
fundamental objectives. Post-Gault juvenile justice was to 
combine the best elements of the existing criminal and juve­
nile justice systems. From the criminal justice system es­
tablished on classical legal theory would come the guarantee 
of fairness. From the juvenile justice system based on po­
sitive criminology would cone a system of rehabilitative 
services. As the previous chapters indicate, the "re­
formed" system, at least in Maine, does not, in fact, repre­
sent the "best of both worlds." In general terms, the new 
system provides neither fairness nor rehabilitation in a 
measure significantly greater than that which existed in 
Maine prior to the the 1978 reforms.
There have, of course, been some modest improvements in 
juvenile justice systems in Maine and elsewhere in the na­
tion. With respect to fairness there are two areas of prog­
ress. First, the formal guarantee of certain constitutional 
rights by virtue of U.S. Supreme Court decisions and the
- 248 -
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application of these in state courts. Secondly, reforms 
have brought increased formality and procedural regularity 
by virtue of incorporating large segments of criminal jus­
tice procedure into the juvenile justice process.
Several points, however, undermine the significance of 
these developments as indicators of genuine reform. First, 
the reform of Maine's juvenile justice system represented by 
the enactment of a new Maine Juvenile Code was not the vehi­
cle by which juveniles were guaranteed their constitutional 
rights to due process; most of the improvements with respect 
to the fairness ideal of post-Gault reform were already 
guaranteed to juveniles in Maine due to earlier changes in 
juvenile statutes and applications of Gault and other Su­
preme Court decisions to Maine's juvenile justice system. 
Secondly, despite the ideals of post-Gault reformers, there 
continues to be substantial disparity between the rights of 
juveniles in the juvenile justice system and the rights of 
adults in the criminal justice system, particularly with re­
spect to appeal rights and the right to a jury trial. 
Thirdly, the formal guarantee of rights may not be very 
meaningful in a system where most cases are resolved by 
guilty pleas, where most are represented by court-appointed 
attorneys—  often underpaid, inexperienced, confused about 
their appropriate role, and unprepared to offer a competent 
defense of their clients. Fourth, the failure to expand due 
process rights beyond the doors of the courtroom —  to the
intake and corrections systems and to arrest and interroga­
tion phase of the juvenile justice process is to exempt most 
of the juvenile justice system from due process. Finally, 
the efforts to reform the juvenile justice system failed in 
the final analysis to address the extreme class bias of the 
system, failing even to investigate the issue in any way. 
The poor and those from single-parent families continue to 
be grossly disproportionately represented in the juvenile 
justice system, and especially in juvenile correctional in­
stitutions.
The situation is similar —  though progress is even less 
evident —  in the area of rehabilitation. The promise of a 
rehabilitative services system operating in accordance with 
post-Gault principles, is most evident in Haine's new Juve­
nile Code- However, this promise, as indicated previously, 
is nearly empty. ks is the case with the ideal of fairness 
in Haine's reformed juvenile justice system, the ideal of 
rehabilitation has been incorporated into the "reformed'' 
system largely as formal principles. The new juvenile jus­
tice system formally recognizes a number of principles of
j
post-Gault rehabilitative justice, among them, deinstitu­
tionalization [and the principle of the least restrictive 
alternative), decriminalization, and diversion. Yet, in 
terms of the actual operation of the system, these princi­
ples appear to be largely meaningless. Despite the concerns 
of reformers with the incarceration of juveniles in correc­
tional institutions and jails and the incorporation of the 
principles of deinstitutionalization in the new Juvenile 
Code, juveniles are being incarcerated in greater nunbers 
than previously. There is little evidence of any signifi­
cant expansion in community-based rehabilitative services. 
Despite the elimination of most status offenses, large nun­
bers of juveniles continue to be subjected to the jurisdic­
tion of the juvenile justice system for behavior that is not 
criminal for adults, and such "status offenders" continue to 
constitute a significant proportion of the juvenile justice 
system's clientele. More importantly, a central component 
of decriminalization —  the provision of alternative, nonju— 
dicial services to address the problems represented by such 
behaviors as sustance abuse, running away, truancy, and so 
forth —  has been ignored, thus transforming decriminaliza­
tion into neglect. Finally, the principle of diversion is 
incorporated into the reformed system by means of a mecha­
nism that fails to meet the fundamental criteria of genuine 
diversion. "Informal adjustment" takes place after the ju­
venile has penetrated the juvenile justice system, fails to 
remove the juvenile from the system, provides brief "coun­
selling" sessions with Intake Workers instead of access to a 
rehabilitative services system, and fails to significantly 
reduce the number of juveniles who are adjudicated.
Like so many "reforms" which have gone before, the ini­
tial verdict on post-Gault juvenile justice reforms is usu­
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ally that they have succeeded. The reform represented by 
the new Haine Juvenile Code appears to offer to Maine's de­
linquent youth "the best: of both worlds." But, on closer 
examination, the gulf between the formal ideals of statutory 
language and the actuality of juvenile justice practice be- 
cotes ever wider.
The Continuity of Failure
The major purpose of this dissertation was to discover 
whether the nost recent reform efforts in juvenile justice 
share the fate of earlier reform efforts. The answer which 
emerges from this case study of post-Gault reform is that 
these efforts seem to have met the same fate of the earlier 
efforts, that a just and effective juvenile justice system 
continues to elude reformers. Before attempting to specu­
late on the reasons for this failure, it is necessary to 
place it in the larger context. First, to what extent is 
the failure of post-Gault reform in Haine representative of
the fate of post-Gault reform elsewhere? Secondly, how does
✓post-Gault reform fit into the larger historical context?
On the basis of the evidence which is beginning to 
emerge, recent reform experiences in other parts of the 
country have not net with significantly greater success than 
Maine's.34
34 It should be noted that such failures are not character­
istic only of efforts at reforn in juvenile justice.
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New York and California were the pioneers in the most re­
cent reform of juvenile justice in the early 1960’s, even 
before Gault. Prescott’s recent book. The Child Savers, is 
a journalistic account of the day to day juvenile justice in 
New York’s "family court," a creation of the 1960*s reform. 
It is a story of utter chaos, horrendous physical condi­
tions, absence of due process, inadequate legal representa­
tion, crowded facilities, overcrowded dockets, lack of ser­
vices, and so forth. (1981) The California story seems to be 
a similar one. Lemert (1970) presents evidence of a number
of fundamental problems in the implementation of reform in
California, not the least of which is the lack of effective 
counsel in juvenile court. (1970:20, 176-177, 182) The Mas­
sachusetts approach to post-Gault reform is perhaps the best 
known nationally due to the dramatic move of Jerome Miller 
in closing down the large juvenile correctional institutions 
in the Commonwealth as the only effective way of bringing 
about deinstitutionalization and a serious move to communi­
ty-based treatment. The approach is judged a success by 
many in that it clearly did not result in a major youth 
crime wave as many had predicted. However, when judged in 
terms of the extent to which genuine deinstitutionalization 
and community-based treatment resulted, its success is ques­
tionable, at the very least. Significant numbers of juve­
Parallel developments have taken place in criminal jus­
tice and appear to have shared the fate of juvenile jus­
tice reform. See, for example, Feeley (1983). Or for 
Maine, see Anspach et al, on sentencing reform. (198 3)
254
niles in Nassachusetts continued to be locked up in facili­
ties arguably worse than the institutions which they re­
placed long after Miller's action- (Robb, 1980) Further­
more, as Fabricant points out in his study of the 
Massachusetts approach, so-called "hardcore delinquents" 
continue to be institutionalized, but are sent to other 
states for this purpose. Nor, it seems, are adequate commu­
nity-based services provided to replace institutional pro­
grams. (Robb, 1980; Fabricant, 1980) In Washington State, 
the adoption of a new juvenile code was intended to reduce 
institutional commitments by eliminating commitment as an 
disposition in non-serious, first offense cases. The new 
code had "a dramatic but temporary impact on commitments to 
state institutions- After the initial period of implementa­
tion, commitments returned to the pre-code levels." (Steig­
er, 1981:5)
The central debate over deinstitutionalization in recent 
years has involved the deinstitutionalization of the mental­
ly ill. Rather than community-based treatment, deinstitu- 
tionalization for the mentally ill has apparently meant 
homelessness. The failure to substitute alternatives for 
institutional treatment has also apparently characterized 
deinstitutionalization in juvenile justice systems. Scull 
(1984) concluded that "the gap between promise and perform­
ance has been astonishingly vide....Here the grant of the
negative right to be free from the organized interference in 
one’s life has all too often meant the denial of the posi­
tive right to care and attention."
One fora of decriminalization in the post-Gault era has 
been the removal of "runaways" from the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court. HcKelvy (1984) reports on such an effort in 
the State of Washington and concludes that this decriminali­
zation took place without the provision of sufficient servi­
ces to address the problems of juvenile runaways and thus 
represented not genuine decriminalization, but the abroga­
tion of the State’s responsibility to its youth.
Various studies of diversion have arrived at the conclu­
sion that there is at least as wide a gulf between true div­
ersion and the kinds of programs that are generally labelled 
as such as there is between promise and practice of deinsti­
tutionalization. Latessa, et al (1984) argue that actual 
diversion programs tend to be characterized by attributes 
the opposite of genuine diversion. They are, it is claimed, 
stigmatizing, incompatible with due process, ineffective, 
and, instead of diverting juveniles who would have otherwise 
been subjected to the juvenile justice system, divert those 
who would have been released outright without a "diversion" 
program. Bojek and Erickson (1984) report a similar finding 
with respect to net-widening. Polk (1984) points out that 
most diversion programs of the youth si rvices bureau type 
are the result of the "grant game" and do not differ in
practice from their pre-diversion status or from non-diver- 
sionary juvenile justice agencies such as probation —  ei­
ther in philosophy or practice. They pursue a largely indi­
vidual therapeutic approach.
That these failures echo the earlier history of juvenile 
justice reforms, from the movement to establish houses of 
refuge and similar institutions the early nineteenth century 
to the juvenile court movement in the early twentieth, is 
beyond doubt. While there are quite clear difference? be­
tween these reform eras, the similarities of "reform ideals" 
as well as results are indeed striking. The major rehabili­
tative "ideals" of post-Gault reform —  decriminalization, 
deinstitutionalization, and diversion —  are in most re­
spects simply modern formulations of the main themes of "so­
cialized" justice that lay behind the efforts of earlier re­
formers. The desire to remove children from the criminal 
justice system, particularly adult jails, on the assumption 
of the contagious nature of such experiences, seems to have 
been a major impetus for all three reform eras, each in turn 
a confession of the failure of the previous efforts to bring
j
about that goal. The most recent reforms differ primarily in 
that the target of reform —  the system from which children 
are to be rescued (diverted) —  is the juvenile justice sys­
tem instigated by previous reformers, rather than the crimi­
nal justice system. It had come to be characterized in a 
short time by the same flaws as the system which it emerged
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to replace, but was worse in soie respects because of a lack 
of procedural regularity. To make the point as directly as 
possible, after each refora era, thie system of juvenile jus­
tice which emerged was one in which children were■brutalized 
and punished despite the presumed inability of children to 
be fully responsible for their actions, a system in which 
children were incarcerated in adult jails, a system in which 
treatment and training services —  the very heart of the 
system —  were not available, a system which failed to curb 
juvenile crime and misbehavior and which failed to prevent 
adult crime through the early intervention of the juvenile 
justice system. In short, the result of reform in each era 
was a continuation of a brutal, punitive, and ineffective 
system.
Clearly, Maine's experience with post-Gault reform is but 
the latest chapter in a long history of failure in juvenile 
justice reform. From the presumably benevolent efforts of 
those who established the houses of refuge more than a cen­
tury and a half ago, to the reformatories, to the socialized 
juvenile court, few efforts at juvenile justice reform can 
be judged successful by any standards.
Explaining the Failure of Reform
If, as the evidence suggests, the case of post-Gault reform 
in Maine is representative of the more general problem.
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would-be reformers, policy-makers, and anyone with an inter­
est in a just and effective system to deal with the delin­
quency problem must understand why reform fails. It is a 
complex question. The growing literature on reforms in 
criminal justice and juvenile justice since the 1960's of­
fers a variety of answers that may be useful in explaining 
what vent wrong.
One of the more common explanations of the failure of re­
form is that change is resisted, subverted, or circumvented 
by individuals or organizations within the system who are 
responsible for implementing reforms. Typically, the re­
forms are considered as counter to individual or organiza­
tional interests or are simply resented as externally im­
posed.
In his recent analysis of court reform, Feeley points to 
the fact that while change is frequently initiated by "out­
siders,n the ultimate task of implementing reforms rests 
with those who staff the agencies and institutions.
When they do, the original intent can be neglected 
or deflected. Avoidance, evasion, and delay are 
familiar responses to innovation. (1983:36)
The most crucial stage in reform, he goes on to point out,
is not its initiation and early stages, but its routiniza-
tion. If reform is to be routinized, if permanent funding
and implementation are to be assured, the commitment of the
institution or agency to the reform, particularly on the
part of those charged with carrying out the reforms, is es­
sential. The failure to secure such commitment is frequent­
ly a reason for the failure of refora.
Two additional factors are related to institutional re­
sistance which tend to undermine reforms. First is the need 
of reforms to adapt to the entrenched bureaucracies if they 
are to survive. In so doing, their reform ideals are fre­
quently compromised. A second, and related, point is that 
in even the best of circumstances, imperatives of organiza­
tional survival gradually crowd out reformers' principles. 
{Feeley, 1983:201)
Fabricant (1980:5) analyzes deinstitutionalization in 
Massachusetts primarily in terms of organizational self-in­
terest. He argues that frequently organizational goals are 
substituted for reform goals. He cites police substitution 
of their interests in security and control for the goals of 
deinstitutionalization as an example of "goal displacement."
Lemert's study of juvenile justice reform in California 
rests similarly on the notion of conflicting interests. Re 
defines successful social action or reform in terms of the 
reprioritizing of values for satisfaction. Reform, from Le- 
aert's view, inevitably involves advancing the interests of 
one group or individual, thus forcing the interests of other 
groups or individuals to relatively lower positions. The 
group which ultimately bears the burden of reform can be ex­
pected to resist such reform by means of apathy, superficial 
compliance, sabotage, subversion, defiance, organized con­
flict, and so forth. (1970:20-21)
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Forms of this problem are very much in evidence in post- 
Gault reform in Haine. Local police, for example, are said 
to undermine the intent of the new Juvenile Code in a number 
of ways. Where the new Code requires that police contact an 
Intake Worker immediately after a juvenile is taken into 
custody, and that a juvenile may not be held in excess of 
six hours without a decision by the Intake Worker, police 
use these provisions as a license to impose a mini-jail sen­
tences of six hours on juveniles before releasing them.35 
Police in a small Maine community reported the practice of 
arresting juveniles that they suspect are potential trouble­
makers on trivial charges so that a prior record will exist 
when they believe real action is warranted. The intent of 
such a practice is to ensure that juveniles are not diverted 
at a later date due to the existence of a prior record.36 
The failure of other sectors of the juvenile justice system 
to carry out provisions of the Code and the resistence to 
the spirit of the law in other instances represent major 
erosion of the reform. Among the most notorious examples is
the failure of juvenile court judges to order predisposi-
✓
tional social studies as required by the new Code.37
35 Interview with a member of the Portland Police Depart­
ment.
3* Interview with members of a small. Southern Maine Police 
Department.
37 The data obtained from court dockets indicates that so­
cial studies were done in only a few cases. This ap­
peared to be a case of information simply not being re­
corded. In fact, according to Judge Donovan of the
The failure of Intake Workers to follow the law by refus­
ing to conduct investigations to determine whether court or 
diversion is most appropriate in a particular case is but a 
further example of what might generally be called "institu­
tional resistence."3®
The kinds of problems explained by the above might also 
be explained as problems of coordination which are inevita­
ble given the complexity of the institutional structures 
that the reforms are required to alter. The problems of co­
ordination of an often fragmented system are immense and, 
perhaps, insurmountable. Furthermore, many of the parts of 
these fragmented systems are pursuing quite contradictory 
interests. Feeley argues that the coordination required to 
translate abstract goals into practical policies represents 
"perhaps the single largest obstacle to change." It is, he 
argues, difficult to coordinate a fragmented system with 
large numbers of participants. (1983:37) It might also be 
argued that much of the institutional resistence is merely 
institutional inertia. There nay be a natural tendency for
complex organizations to continue to operate in the estab-
✓lished manner.
Portland District Court, social studies are rarely or­
dered. (Interview. February 20, 1985)
38 Telephone interview with Intake Supervisor. (October 15, 
1981)
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The need to adapt reforms to overcome the opposition of 
entrenched bureaucracies helps to explain the recommenda­
tions of reformers to maintain the existing correctional in­
stitution while arguing vehemently for deinstitutionaliza­
tion and a move to community-based corrections on the 
grounds of inevitable failure of correctional institutions. 
The subsequent failure to make of deinstitutionalization 
more than a rhetorical ideal is not surprising in light of 
the decision to accomodate the correctional bureaucracy. 
This, indeed, is the issue raised by the Children and Youth 
Services Planning Project in asking whether gradual deinsti­
tutionalization is possible. (1977:149)
Other explanations of failure of reform focus not on or­
ganizational and personnel resistence but on the role of re­
formers themselves in subverting the ideals they profess to 
seek. There are two major strands of this argument. First 
is the argument that the reforns are often ineffective be­
cause those whose agencies are the targets of reform are as­
signed the reformer role. Peeley points to the findings of 
the Hickersham Commission calling for reform and regulation 
in the criminal justice system and then notes, Mbut, as with 
so much regulation in general, those to be regulated them­
selves shaped the legislation. n (1983:43)
There is in the membership of the various commissions and 
task forces which carried out most of the reform effort in 
Maine since 1970, ample evidence of this practice. Host are
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constituted by what night be called the "juvenile justice 
establishment". The membership of the most important com­
mission in post-Gault reform in Maine is most illustrative. 
The Commission to Revise the Statutes Relating to Juveniles 
was chaired by a District Attorney. Its membership consist­
ed of an attorney, a child psychiatrist, three legislators, 
a guidance counselor, a school principal, the director of a 
county counselling service, the superintendent of the Maine 
Youth Center, the former sheriff of Cumberland County, the 
Director of Youth Aid for the Cumberland County Sheriff's 
Department, a District Court {Juvenile Court) judge, a rep­
resentative of the Department of Human Services, and the 
head of the Maine Chiefs of Police Association. Conspicu­
ously absent were juveniles, ordinary citizens, and juvenile 
advocates. Clearly, the composition of the Commission is 
such as to preclude radical change, but, more to the point, 
change that would be counter to the interests of the con­
stituencies of the Commission membership.
A closely related argument focuses on what r»ight be re­
ferred to in a general way as "hidden agendas." Juvenile 
justice reforms (and criminal justice reforns) have largely 
failed to achieve their stated objectives because the stated 
objectives were not the real objectives. Those directly or 
indirectly connected to reform proposals have their own pur­
poses that are hidden within the reform proposals. These 
are sometimes discussed as self-interest "masquerading" as
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reform, or the "latent goals" of reform, that have little to 
do with stated goals. Scull, for example, has argued that 
decarceration as a reform is useful as "ideological camou- 
flage, allowing economy to masquerade as benevolence and 
neglect as tolerance." (1977:152) The only significant 
change in juvenile corrections during the post-Gault period, 
the closing of the Stevens School for Girls and combining it 
with the Boys Training Center at its South Portland site 
forming what is now called the Maine Youth Center, repre­
sented a substantial financial savings to the State. Evi­
dence of "neglect as tolerance" is documented in the previ­
ous chapter in discussions of the failure to provide 
alternatives to institutional treatment. A similar point is 
made by Feeley in suggesting that the Nixon administration 
used the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) 
imposed reforms to bolster its political image and that LEAA 
itself found such reforms as diversion as opportunities to 
redeem itself from charges that it was "arming the police." 
(Feeley, 1983:83,194)
Frequently, ulterior motives involve the availability of 
funding. Olson-Raymer (1984) points out that the Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention forced its own 
priorities on the states by means of attaching strings to 
funding. Thus, in adopting reforms, the states’ level of 
commitment to them is„ at the least, suspect. A similar 
point is made by Polk in relation to a discussion of various
Youth Services Bureaus that sprung up in response to the 
federal govern*ent's insistence on diversion programs as a 
prerequisite for funding in the area of delinquency control 
and prevention. (1984) These programs are, according to 
Polk, the results of the "grant game" and amount to nothing 
more than old programs with new descriptions. In his dis­
cussion of the history if juvenile justice reform, Bothoan 
(1979:57-59) cites evidence that expansion of "turf" was a 
motive of many reformers, quoting Healy that it was the 
"duty of the State to strengthen the hands of the different 
Child-saving Societies.,.."
Casper and Brereton (1984:126) point out that those whose 
task it is to institute reform, that is to say, legislators 
and others in the political arena, benfit. politically from 
appearing to be ;,doing something" about a particular prob­
lem. However, the real benefits "accrue from the passage of 
legislation or the formal adoption of a policy rather than 
from its actual translation into behavioral change." Their 
particular example is an informative one. The California 
legislature apparently in response to a growing public con- 
cern about crime and a demand that government "get tough" 
with lawbreakers, enacted mandatory minimum sentences for 
certain offenses. To implement such legislation would, how­
ever, be extremely costly. Thus, in passing the legisla­
tion, the lawmakers had no intention of seeing it implement­
ed. They were, nonetheless, able to cite their voting
records as indicative of tough stances against criminals 
while avoiding the political costs that would have accompa­
nied additional public expenditures for new prison facili­
ties.
Others have argued that the primary goal of juvenile jus­
tice reform has been the maintenance of traditional princi­
ples of juvenile juistice. Latessa et al argue with respect 
to diversion programs that the appeal of diversion as a re­
form is that it is not really a reform in that it allows for 
the continuation of the traditional goals of the juvenile 
justice system while maintaining the appearance of change in 
the face of a constitutional onslaught. (1984:146)
Finally, Casper and Brereton (1984:126) suggest that the 
existence of so many "latent goals" unrelated or even con­
trary to the manifest goals of reform is encouraged by the 
reform process itself, particularly the need build coali­
tions of diverse groups with different and often competing 
interests in order to enact reforms.
Aspects of this "hidden agenda" explanation are relevant 
to post-Gault reform in Maine. The "rhetorical" nature of 
much of the new Juvenile Code, the final product of reform, 
is strongly suggestive of Feeley Vs argument that "reform" is 
often the product of a political process which requires the 
appearance of something being done without upsetting the 
system or expending scarce resources. Furthermore, Maine’s 
reforms are at least in part responses to dicta from the
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federal government rather than responses to real concerns 
about juvenile justice in the State. The Comprehensive Ju­
venile Delinquency Study, the first in the long series of 
studies that constitute the post-Gault reform process in 
Haine, was required by the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention 
and Control Act of 1968 as a prerequisite to LEAA funding. 
The resulting report is typical of studies conducted to sat­
isfy some legal requirement rather than to find something 
out. This is, indeed, symtomatic of the problem. (Coopera­
tive Externsion Service, 1971:i)
A number of students of reform have sought to explain its 
failure as the inevitable result of attempting to accomplish 
the impossible or of expectations far in excess of what 
might be realistically expected. Feeley presents one form 
of this explanation in arguing with respect to criminal 
court reform that the courts cannot be expected to make up 
for the many failings of all other major social institu­
tions.
What the family, community, workplace, school, and 
church have failed to achieve cannot be accom­
plished by a brief encounter in the courts, how- 
, ever speedy or deliberate, lenient or harsh. 
(1984:xiii)
Similarly, many court reform advocates do not fully appreci­
ate the difficulty of the task before them.
At best, they suffer from trying to do too much —  
offering a single, simple solution for what is in 
fact an extremely complex problem. (Feeley,
1984:185-6)
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The argument presented by Empey (1979:291) is a similar 
one.
The aims of preventing delinquency and the expec­
tations of definitively treating a profusion of 
child and parental problems have laid an impossi­
ble burden upon the juvenile court, and they may 
be considered to have no proper part in its phi­
losophy....
He goes on to suggest that perhaps the only defensible phi­
losophy for the juvenile court is "judicious noninterven­
tion," viewing the juvenile justice system as a last resort 
when all other remedies have failed. (1979:291)
The problem of permanent funding and the provision of ad- 
eguate resources is one that plagues many reform efforts, 
fts previously noted, the payoff of reform efforts for poli­
cy-makers is often in the formal enactment of reform rather 
than its actual implementation. Furthermore, passing legis­
lation does not involve much expense unless the legislation 
mandates the provision of certain resources. Temporary 
funding of glamorous pilot, demonstration, or experimental 
programs obviously provide a high political payoff and a re­
former label to policymakers. The permanent funding of 
programs, while perhaps contributing to the public good, may 
have taxpayer revolt as one of its payoffs. There are a 
number of related problems here.
Feeley suggests that reformers and innovators are not 
generally good financiers. Since programs do have costs, 
financial backing must come from somewhere. In the process 
of obtaining funding, reform goals, ideals, and objectives 
are often compromised.
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New programs have a tendency to adapt to the in­
terests and views of those who ultimately pay for 
them. This fact alone causes serious adjustments 
away from the original focus of some programs.
(Feeley, 1983:36)
Feeley also notes that innovative programs often die for 
lack of permanent funding. One example of general problems 
in obtaining permanent funding is the Oakland ROR project, 
funded for two years by the Ford Foundation. Local takeover 
was, however, declined after the initial two years. It took 
ten years and LEAA assistance before it eventually got more 
permanent funding.' Such a process is not uncommon and most 
programs do not survive it- (Feeley, 1983:62,84) He also 
points out that funding levels are freguently unrealistical- 
ly low. (1983:201)
In the early 1960*s, the establishment of the Family 
Court placed New York on the forefront of juvenile justice 
reform. Yet, the problem of grossly inadequate resources 
continues to undermine the goals of that reform. Prescott 
(1981) makes it abundantly clear that even the most basic 
necessities —  adequate court buildings and detention facil­
ities with heat, space, toilet facilities —  are not provid- 
✓ed for, let alone some of the more glamorous items such as 
staff* legal counsel, social services, etc.
The federal government has played a major role in funding 
of juvenile justice reform in recent decades. The dollar 
flow began with the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses 
Act of 1961. It was followed by the Juvenile Delinquency
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and Control Act of 1968, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act of 1974 and so forth and so on. As Decker’s 
analysis of federal delinquency policy indicates, there are 
a number of difficulties associated with federal funding. 
First, rather than long-term funding, the federal role has 
usually involved providing seed money or funding demonstra­
tion projects. Secondly, most of the funding has been con­
tingent on the development of "a wasteful bureaucratic lay­
er,” the State Planning Agencies for LEAA, which have 
absorbed large shares of the funds in bureaucratic mainte­
nance. These planning agencies were also largely political, 
Third, actual funding was generally lower than that author­
ized by Congress. Fourth, funding was not generally target­
ed to where it was most needed. Finally, the Office of Ju­
venile Justice and Delinquency Prevention is criticized for 
forcing its priorities onto the states through strings-at- 
tached funding. Commitment to reform probably not there at 
the state and local levels —  commitment to funding was. 
(Decker, 1984:35ff)
The issue of funding reforms is also raised by Spiro 
(1984) in his discussion of decriminalization of status of­
fenses in juvenile justice systems. Alternative means to 
meeting the needs of these youth are not likely to receive 
funding. The net result of decriminalization, he predicts, 
will be that the juvenile justice system loses clients, and 
thus some of the funding which it needs.
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A similar point is made by HcKelvy in her report on the
removal of runaways from court jurisdiction in Washington
state. She quotes Justine Wise Polier's dissent before the
IJA/ABA Commission to the effect that status jurisdiction
should not be given up without
requirements for creating alternative, accessible, 
and appropriarte services....The premature ending 
of juvenile court jurisdiction before there is a 
growth of such services will only lead to losing 
sight of children and families most in need of 
such services. [1984;109)
Lack of adequate funding of juvenile justice reform has a 
long history. Lemert notes that after the establishment of 
state reform schools in California in the 1860*s as an al­
ternative to the practice of placing juveniles in prisons, 
the approach failed due largely to a refusal on the part of 
the state or communities to provide funding to transport ju­
veniles to the reform schools. (1970:32) Lemert also notes 
that the first attempt at establishing a juvenile court in 
California was blocked by a cost-conscious legislature. 
Ryerson notes the general criticisms that historically, the 
juvenile justice system has not been able to fulfill its 
promise of rehabilitative services. (1978:138)
While the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 prohibited 
placing juvenile in adult facilities and required that they 
be detained in special facilities designed for juveniles, 
the Illinois Legislature failed to provide funds necessary 
to construct and operate such facilities. (Platt, 
1969:146-7) Fox has written of the "resource starvation
that has characterized both juvenile and adult justice." 
(1970:1238)
With respect to post-Gault funding problems, Christina 
Hobb's account of deinstitutionalization is a classic case. 
There is no element of the failure of Massachusetts' "re­
form" that stands out more sharply than the failure to pro­
vide a reasonable level of alternative services and facili­
ties- Thus, children in that state are incarcerated in 
decrepit mental hospitals and roach infested YMCA's. (Robb, 
1980)
Empey sums up the problem:
In light of society's failure to grant the juve­
nile court the resources necessary to fulfill its 
mandate, current reforms may turn out to be noth­
ing more than an officially sanctioned form of be­
nign neglect. (1979:293)
The failure of post-Gault reform in Maine is directly re­
lated to the failure to provide resources for the alterna­
tive services necessary to a community-based system. By 
failing to shift funding from institutional to community 
treatment, the fate of community-based alternatives was 
sealed. Despite the principle of the "least restrictive al- 
ternative," the preference for community facilities, the nu­
merous references to the provision of necessary services, 
the State in fact failed to provide any additional resources 
for the "new" juvenile justice system. The approach is ex­
emplified in sections of the new Code detailing the provi­
sion of emergency placement for referred juveniles.
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Within the U n i t s  of available funding it shall 
be the responsibility of the Department of Human 
Services to provide the foster home, group care 
home, and other shelter and nonsecure detention 
placements necessary....
Within the liaits of available funding it shall' 
be the responsibility of the Department of Mental 
Health and Corrections to ensure the provision of 
the secure detention placements necessary for the 
emergency placements.... (Maine Legislature, 
1980a:702; emphasis added)
There are a number of explanations of the failure of re­
form that are subsumed under the general rubric of inade­
quate knowledge. The most general of these argues that so­
ciety in general, and reformers in particular, simply lack 
the necessary knowledge of the "causes” of juvenile crime 
and, consequently, do not know how to intervene effectively 
to remove those factors which generate it. (Rutter and Cill­
er, 1984) Ryerson (1978:161) puts forth the least optimis­
tic form of this argument. She writes.
All the changes in the juvenile court which have 
already occurred, and virtually all of those which 
may occur, confess directly or indirectly the be­
lief that we do not know what to do about juvenile 
crime, and a fear that we can do nothing. This 
seems to be true even for the demands for harder 
sanctions: They represent more a desire to find
symbols of community outrage than to advocate a 
stategy with any promise of success.
Others argue for a more limited failure of knowledge. Fee­
ley (1983:104), for example, argues that reformers have fre­
quently failed to understand the nature of the systems they 
were attempting to reform. He cites an example quite apro­
pos to juvenile justice reform as well as criminal justice 
reform, that of imposing administratively organized struc-
tares on an adversary system. Diversion mechanisms, for ex­
ample, become simply another weapon in the prosecutorial ar­
senal. Feeley also suggests that reformers tend to be so 
overwhelmed by their enthusiasm for reform that they neglect 
to think through the possible implications of their propo­
sals. And they fail to adequately think through the nature 
of the problem. He writes of their "burning desire to find 
solutions even before problems are understood." (1983: 166)
Empey (1979:296) suggests a similar point when he writes 
that juvenile justice reformers in the post-Gault era have 
been content to focus their efforts critically or negatively 
and have failed to define the positive content of genuine 
juvenile justice. Indeed, the principles of diversion, 
deinstitutionalization, and decriminalization are essential­
ly negative, based on knowledge of what does not work, rath- 
ern than on any sense of what does work.
Finally, there appears to be historically a tendency to 
neglect what knowledge is available and formulate reform 
proposals in such a way as to make them consistent with 
ideological assumptions rather than existing knowledge about 
the nature of the problem. Thus, for example, scholarship 
on delinquency has long suggested a link between social fac­
tors and juvenile crime. Yet, reforms have always proceeded 
as if crime were somehow generated from within the individu­
al. Juvenile justice systems have thus always focused on 
changing individuals whether through punitive or therapeutic 
means. (Ryerson, 1978:107; Rothman, 1979:95)
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The major studies of juvenile justice in Maine prior to 
the enactment of the nev Maine Juvenile Code in 1977, re­
veal, at best, tremendous confusion over the "causes" of de­
linquency and, consequently, the solutions. One of the few 
such studies to attempt some theoretical understandinq of 
delinquency prevention and treatment was the Final Report of 
the Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study. Its theory is 
so confused as to defy summary. It is an eclectic theory 
composed of vague elements of social disorganization theory 
and psychotherapeutic approaches.
Since it is the action and reaction between the 
juvenile and his society which results in a delin­
quency judgment, it is obvious that an imbalance 
of internal and extrenal pressures on the part of 
both are at the root of the misbehavior. These 
internal and external pressures on the part of 
both, must be brought into balance. This can in 
no way be achieved if either party is segregated 
from the other. For integration to take place, 
both must be allies to that integration. It must 
occur through a mutual acceptance of responsibili­
ty, the willingness to make changes and the will­
ingness to adapt to them. (Cooperative Extension 
Service, 1971:4)
The Governor's Task Force on Corrections quite clearly 
adopts a theoretical orientation which emphasizes the role 
ojE social inequality in the generation of juvenile and adult 
crime. Yet, it abandons the theory on pragmatic grounds, 
since its mission clearly does not include the reorganiza­
tion of society. All its recommendations are, thus, geared 
at the reform of the correctional system which the report 
concedes cannot ultimately solve the problem.
[Tjhe Task Force is persuaded that the causes of 
crime in Maine are multiple, complex, and inextri­
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cably related to social, economic, pyschological, 
and political factors that are far beyond the 
reach and power of the correctional system alone 
to control.
The Heport goes on to gaote from Ramsey Clark's Crime in
America, that "Most crime in America is born in environments
saturated in poverty and its consequences." It concludes.
Thus, while the correctional system does not and 
cannot deal with the underlying forces that 
produce anti-social behavior, it can and does have 
a crucial and lasting influence upon the lives of 
those who exhibit such behavior. (1973:iii)
What is even more striking is that there is so little ef­
fort to bring any knowledge of delinquency to bear on the on 
the reform process in Maine. While our knowledge of delin­
quency is far from adequate, it would seem essential to take 
into account what knowledge there is. Even when an effort 
to review existing knowledge is evident, such as discussions 
of the issues in diversion and youth services mechanisms in 
the Reports of the Commission to Revise the Statutes, such 
discussion appears to be completely unrelated to conclusions 
and proposals which emerge fron these studies.
Although theoretical knowledge is most fundamental, ade­
quate information on the existing system would seem equally 
essential to fruitful reform efforts. Yet, in none of the 
reports, nor in the work of the Legislature in studying pro­
posed legislation, is there any indication of efforts to 
gather independent information on the performance of impor­
tant segments of the juvenile justice system, most notably, 
the correctional institutions. A great deal of the informa­
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tion in nost of the studies originates in the very agencies 
who are the object of refora efforts. The only detailed 
analyses that appear to accompany the reform efforts are the 
in depth studies of the goals, regulations, and statutes of 
Maine's juvenile justice system conducted by the consultants 
to the Commission to Bevise the Statutes. Information on 
the actual functioning of the system and the extent to which 
spirit and letter of current goals, regulations, and stat­
utes were being met remained largely ungathered.
An exceedingly important aspect of knowledge in the im­
plementation of reforms is the knowledge of results. In or­
der to ensure that reforns are implemented, monitoring or 
evaluation are necessary. One of the major difficulties in 
reforming these complex institutions is represented by the 
difficulties of genuine monitoring and evaluation. Without 
evaluation and/or monitoring, it is impossible to determine 
whether reforns are being implemented. Consequently, ad­
justments, corrections, and redirection are impossible.
One problem with evaluation that Feeley points to is that 
evaluation is usually conducted in the initial phases of re­
form implementation when there is the greater likelihood 
that the reforms are being observed and implemented. It is, 
however, in the routine stage of reform implementation that 
real difficulties tend to emerge. These difficulties are 
not, then, discovered in evaluation. (1983:38)
There is the further problea of agency resistance to 
evaluation. Agencies accept funding for various reform 
projects or programs contingent upon evaluation and then 
refuse to cooperate in the evaluation process by failing to 
keep proper records, refusing to collect necessary data, and 
so forth. (Feeley, 1983:83)
A further problea with evaluation is that the goals of 
refora may be adjusted to fit the results of evaluation. 
The Manhattan Court Employment project gradually evolved 
from a job search program to a "rapping," counselling-type 
program in response to evaluation conclusions that all the 
project was accomplishing was "rapping" with clients. "Suc­
cess" is subsequently redefined from getting a job to show­
ing up for scheduled counselling sessions. Thus, the 
Project can claim a 55% success rate! (Feeley, 1983:89)
A number of commentators have made the point that evalua­
tions often confuse formal enactment of reforms and official 
policy statements with actual operational policy. As Ryer- 
son points out, when the ideal and the actual in juvenile 
justice are compared, the results are discouraging. 
(1978:97) Stanford's discussion of proliferation of diver­
sion programs in the 1970's illustrates the problem. Such 
wild proliferation was facilitated by a lack of critical 
analysis. The traditional evaluative approaches confuse 
ideals and officially stated goals with actual goals. He 
suggests that a more dynamic approach to evaluation re­
search, the "multi-goal evaluation technique" would help to 
avoid this problem. (1984:60ff)
Perhaps the most glaring example of the failure of the 
evaluation and monitoring function is the work of the Legis­
lative Committee to Monitor the Implementation of the New 
Juvenile Code. After several years, the Committee went out 
of existence without conducting any serious evaluation of 
the functioning of the new system and without issuing any 
report to the Legislature or the public. The only other ef­
fort that relates to evaluation is the compilation of juve­
nile justice data (from Intake records) by the Department of 
Mental Health and Corrections. The Department discontinued 
this practice a few years ago convinced that the data was no 
longer necessary in view of the satisfactory functioning of 
the system- Thus, despite the insistence of all post-Gault 
reports on the importance of continuous evaluation, monitor­
ing, and planning, knowledge of the actual functioning of 
the system remains scant.
Finally, there are more radical forms of the "hidden 
agenda" explanation of the failure of reform. Typically, 
these explanations assume some form of the argument that re­
forms were not intended to provide a just and effective sys­
tem of juvenile justice, but, rather, represent the efforts 
of the middle and upper classes to maintain their privileged 
position in society. Ryerson, for example, has argued that 
juvenile justice reforms had the imposition of middle-class 
values and behavior upon the poor as a primary purpose.
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In sach declarations of purpose, the reforners ex­
hibited a desire not simpry to improve upon the 
criminal justice system but to retrain the child 
offender and his family in life patterns that were 
more acceptable to the middle class. (1978:48)
She goes on to point out that, like most reformers, those 
associated with the juvenile court movement had as their 
purpose both humanitarian reform and protection of the sta­
tus quo. (1978:49)
Similarly, Fox (1970:1226), has argued that the pursuit 
of self-interest has always had a great deal to do with ju­
venile justice reform. He further suggests that punishment 
and repression of the poor has always been among its latent 
functions. It was to avoid nullification, the refusal to 
proceed against juveniles on the belief that sanctions were 
too severe, that reforms were supported. (1970:1194,1199)
The work of Anthony Platt perhaps best exemplifies this 
approach. Platt has argued that
Efforts to reform the juvenile court system (and 
other criminal justice institutions) are a re­
sponse by corporate and government policy-makers 
to the deepening economic and political crisis, a 
crisis which has its roots in systematic instabil­
ities in the world capitalist economy and the 
post-McCarthy era resurgence of militant mass 
movements. (1977:80)
Similarly, Schwendinger and Schwendinger (1979:257) write of
"the political and economic conditions whose dual effect
contributes to crime while prohibiting genuine alternatives
to crime control." These kinds of explanation relate both
to the sources of delinquency and the failure of reforms to
effectively address the problem.
281
Although it is difficult to see how the new Naine Juve­
nile Code furthers the interests of the dominant classes, it 
is not difficult to understand that the Code and the process 
from which it energed ignored substantial evidence that the 
juvenile justice systen in naine finds a disproportionate 
share of its clientele aaong the poorest of its citizens. In 
nearly all of the post-Gault studies, there is at least soae 
hint of recognition that the source of the delinguency prob­
lea lies deeply in the organization of aodern American soci­
ety. The conaents of the Governor’s Task Force on Correc­
tions have already been cited. Siailarly, the Coaprehensive 
Juvenile Delinquency Study recognizes the role of social in­
stitutions in the generation of delinquency. The Children 
and Youth Service Planning Project is emphatic in linking 
delinquency to inequality and lack of opportunity. Yet, 
none of these reports moves beyond recoaaending programs 
that will approach the problem by attempting to act in some 
way upon the individual.
i
✓ The Failure of Reform
These and other factors certainly played an important role 
in ensuring that post-Gault reform in Maine resulted in lit­
tle change in juvenile justice. Each of then, however, 
leaves important questions unanswered. why do organizations 
and individuals resist and subvert reforns? Is self-inter­
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est, individual or organizational, an inevitable law of so­
cial relations? Why do legislatures fail to provide re­
sources necessary to carry out meaningful reforns? Why does 
the public pressure legislators to avoid such expenditures? 
Why are the regulated chosen to be regulators? Can reforns 
get implemented? If so. Can they solve the problens?
The answer in part seens to lie in the fact that each of 
the above explanations relates to the nature of reforn it­
self. What stands out nost clearly in examining post-Gault 
reforns in relation to the history of such efforts is that 
the liberal reforn strategy itself seems doomed to failure.
Juvenile justice in the United States has been subjected 
to innumerable reforms in the decades since the founding of 
the New York House of Hefuge in 1825. K comnon thread in 
these efforts is that whether the problem was defined as de­
fective or unfortunate juveniles or a preyed upon public, 
the solutions were defined in terms of minor adjustments to 
the social system, or, even more typically, adjustments to 
the character of the individual juvenile. Through the pro­
vision of special services (job training, shelter, educa­
tion, etc.) or treatment (counselling, psychiatric care, 
isolation, etc.) whatever kinks in the social system or 
flaws in the individual could be worked out. Although there 
appear frequently through the history of juvenile justice 
reform some recognition that the problem is ultimately root­
ed in the structure or organization of society and/or its
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institutions, there continues an inexplicable faith in the 
ability to eliminate the problem without altering the world 
fron which it emerges. In their Crisis in American Institu­
tions, Skolnick and Currie characterize the view of social 
problens and policy dominant in the 1960's and 1970's. It 
seens an apt description of the views that informed juvenile 
justice reform in the post-Gault era.
The social problems literature of the 1960»s —  
and the official policies that paralleled it —  
assumed that the problems of American society 
could be solved by pieceaeal measures. If people 
could be given enough training, there would be no 
unemployment and no "social dynamite" in the ghet- 
toes. If criminals and drug addicts could be "re­
habilitated,"there would be no more crime and so­
cial disintegration. This approach, like those 
before it, although giving considerable lip ser­
vice to the idea that "society" was to blame for 
social problems, ultimately laid the burden of 
change on individuals. And when in the seventies 
things began to get worse instead of better, many 
social scientists could only conclude that there 
was something fundamentally wrong with people.
The new, gloomy social science of the 1970's 
rediscovered, and made respectable, some of the 
old theories of degeneracy and defectiveness....
(1982: 12-13)
The above characterization seems applicable not only to the
1960*s reform era of which post-Gault juvenile justice was a
✓
result, but to the long history of such efforts. And, in­
deed, their inevitable failures have typically heralded the 
onset of another era of reaction.
The reformist approach which has so characterized ef­
forts to solve social problems in the United States is dou­
bly flawed. The first of these flaws is clearly implied in
28H
the more radical explanations of the failure of justice re­
form referred to above. That is, the refornist approach 
fails to appreciate fully the source or "cause" of the prob­
lem it attempts to remedy. Or, as has often been the case, 
it fails to recognize that the problem can only be solved by 
addressing it at this fundamental level. Specifically, 
whether the problem itself is defined as the behavior of the 
delinquent or the application of the delinquent label, it 
must be understood that these actions are rooted in the or­
ganization of society and cannot be solved without making 
fundamental changes in the organization of the social sys­
tem. K case in point is the recognition in the report of 
the Governor's Task Force on Corrections that much of the 
problem of crime and delinquency emerges in a society marked 
by poverty and inequality. Yet, in keeping with the liberal 
perspective, the Task Force fails to understand that such 
conditions are endemic to American society and can only be 
effectively addressed at the level of social structure. 
Liberal reform, in short, cannot solve the problem because
in failing to understand the nature of the problem, it of-
/fers tinkering where radical change is required.
The second aspect of reform that is suggested by the for­
egoing research as well as the literature is that liberal 
reform is doomed to failure also because it fails to under­
stand that the mechanism through which it seeks change, the 
basic institutions of society, are in fact part of the prob-
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lea. The political institution, for example, is so consti­
tuted as to make compromise of reform ideals a prerequisite 
of any action- The end result of such a process is the kind 
of document represented by the new Maine Juvenile Code. 
Furthermore, in implementation by resistant agencies and in­
stitutions who define the reforms as contrary to their in­
terests, what little correspondence remained between the re­
forms as ideal and actual is typically eliminated. Whatever 
principle can be said to motivate the process, whether it be 
expediency, self-interest, power, force, or class dominance, 
it serves to undermine the implementation of reform poli­
cies. In short, not only does the liberal reformist ap­
proach propose policies inadequate to the task, it seems 
incapable of getting these policies implemented.
Is reform, in the final analysis, futile? Are there no 
meaningful and potentially effective directions in which 
policy can move closer to a just and effective system of ju­
venile justice? While there is not a considerable basis for 
optimism, an understanding of the severe limitations of the 
reform approach may be a fruitful place to begin a study of 
alternatives. Secondly, a decent juvenile justice system is 
unlikely to emerge from narrowly based thinking and research 
on juvenile delinquency and juvenile justice which does not 
recognize that both are tied intimately to the organization 
of society and cannot be significantly altered without al­
tering the basic structure of society. Like criminal jus­
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tice, juvenile justice is "inextricably interwoven with, and 
largely derivitive fro* a broader social justice." (American 
Friends Service Committee, 1971:142) There is, ultimately, 
no such thing as juvenile justice; there is only justice. 
Ontil reformers recognize this, a just and effective juve­
nile justice system is likely to be elusive.
REFERENCES
Addams, Jane.
1972 The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets. Urbana, 
[1909] Illinois: University of Illinois Press.
American Friends Service Committee.
1971 Struggle for Justice. New York: Hill and Nang.
Anspach, Donald P, Peter M. Lehman, and John H. Kramer.
1983 Ma ine Rejects Indeterminacy. Portland, Maine: 
University of Southern Maine.
Associated Press.
1982 "Juveniles Get Jail Sentences." Maine Sunday 
Telegram. November 7.
Bartollas, Clemens and Stuart J. Miller.
1978 The Juvenile Offender: Control, Correction and 
Treatment. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Batten, Batten, Hudson, and Swab.
1972 Comprehensive Correctional Study: State of Maine. 
Augusta: Maine State Printing office, May 1.
Binder, Arnold.
1989 "The Juvenile Court, the U.S. Constitution and When 
the Twain Meet." Journal of Criminal Justice.
12: (355-366) .
Bortner, H.A.,
1982 Inside a Juvenile Court: The Tarnished Ideal of
Individualized Justice. New York University Press: 
New York.
Brantingham, Paul J.
1979 "The Classical and Positive Schools of Criminology." 
(pp. 36-98 in Faust and Brantingham, Juvenile 
Justice Philosophy. St. Paul: West Publishing Co.).
1979 "Juvenile Justice Reform in California and New York 
in the Early 1960*s." (pp. 259-268 in Faust and 




Brusten, Manfred; John Graham; Norbert Herriger; and Peter 
Nailinovski.
1984 Youth Crime, Social Control and Prevention;
Theoretical Perspectives and Policy Implications. 
International Document and Study Center for 
Conflicts of Youth; Wuppertal.
Carneiro, Robert L. (ed.).
1967 The Evolution of Society; Selections from Herbert 
Spencer* s "Principles of Sociology." Chicago; 
University of Chicago Press.
Casper, Jonathan D. and David Brereton.
1984 "Evaluating Criminal Justice Reforms." Law 6 
Society Review. 18;(121-144).
Children and Youth Services Planning Project.
1977 Comprehensive Blueprint. Augusta; Maine State 
Printing Office, February.
Commager, Henry Steele (ed.).
1967 Lester Ward and the Welfare State. New York; Bobbs- 
Merrill.
Cooperative Extension Service.
1971 Comprehensive Juvenile Delinquency Study Final 
Report. Orono: University of Maine.
Decker, Scott.
1984 Juvenile Justice Policy: Analyzing Trends and 
Outcomes. Beverly Hills; Sage Publications.
Duffee, David and Larry Siegel.
1979 "The Organization Man: Legal Counsel in the Juvenile 
Court." (pp. 36-48 in Faust and Brantingham, 
Juvenile Justice Philosophy. St. Paul: West 
Publishing Co.).
Durkheiu, Emile.
1933 The Division of Labor in Society. Glencoe,
[1893] Illinois: Free Press.
Empey, Lamar T. (ed.).
1979 Juvenile Justice; The Progressive Legacy and Current 
Reforms. Charlottesville; University Press of 
Virginia.
Fabricant, Michael.
19 80 Deinstitutionalizing Delinguent Youth: The Illusion 
of Reform? Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman.
Faust, Frederick L. and Paul J. Brantingham.
1979 Juvenile Justice Philosophy; Readings. Cases and 
Comments. St. Paul: West Publishing Co.
289
Feeley, Malcolm M.
1983 Court Refora on Trial: Why Simple Solutions Fail. 
New York: Basic Books.
Fox, Sanford.
1970 "Juvenile Justice Reform: in Historical
Perspective." Stanford Law Review 22:(1 187-1239).
Governor's Committee on Children and Youth.
c1973 Children and Youth Caught in the Crunch. Augusta: 
Haine State Printing Office.
Governor's Task Force on Corrections.
1974 In the Public Interest. Augusta: Haine State 
Printing Office, August.
Kolko, Gabriel.
196 3 The Triumph of Conservatism: _A Reinterpretation of 
American History. 1900-1916. New York: Free Press.
Latessa, Edward J. , Lawrence P. Travis III, and George P.
Wilson.
1984 "Juvenile Diversion: Factors Related to Decision 
Making and Outcome." (pp« 145-165 in Scott Decker, 
Juvenile Justice Policy. Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications.
Lemert, Edwin N.
1951 Social Pathology. New York: NcGraw-Hill.
1970 Social Action and Legal Change: Revolution within 
the Juvenile Court. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.
Lenzer, Gertrud (ed.).
1975 Auguste Comte and Positivism: The Essential 
Writings. New York: Harper and Row.
MacDonald, Dennis W.
1982 Juvenile Justice Processing in Haine Under the New 
Juvenile Code. Manuscript. ~
MacDonald, Thomas B. and Richard Biskup.
1979 Youth Advocacy Proposal. Portland, Haine: Maine 
Youth Advocacy, Inc. (Proposal submitted to the 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention).
Mack, Julian.
1979 The Juvenile Court, (in Faust and Brantingham, 
Juvenile Justice Philosophy. St. Paul: West 
Publishing Co.).
290
Maine’s Coamission to Revise the Statutes Relating to 
Juveniles.
1976a Report on Task _1: Goal s of Maine's Juven ile Justice 
System. Augusta: Maine State Printing Office, 
February.
1976b Report on Task 3: Statutes of Maine* s Juvenile 
Justice System. Augusta: Maine State Printing 
Office, March.
1976c Report on Ta sk Regulations of Maine* s Juvenile 
Justice System. Augusta: Maine State Printing 
Office, July.
1977a Final Report of Recomaendations. Augusta: Haine 
State Printing Office, March.
1977b Final Working Draft of Proposed Juvenile Code. 
Augusta, Maine: Maine State Printing Office.
Maine Department of Corrections.
1981 Evaluation and Plan: Haine Juvenile Code. Augusta,
Maine: Maine State Printing Office.
1982 Evaluation and Plan: Maine Juvenile Code. Augusta,
Maine: Maine State Printing Office.
Maine Department of Mental Health and Corrections.
1978 Intake Manual. Mimeo.
1980 Evaluation and Plan: Maine Juvenile Code. Augusta,
Maine: Maine State Printing Office.
1979 Evaluation and Plan: Maine Juven ile Code. Augusta,
Maine: Maine State Printing Office.
Maine Department of Public Safety.




1931 "An Act to Extend the Jurisdiction of the Municipal 
Courts in Certain Cases, (pp. 273-279 in Laws of
Maine. Portland, Maine: A.J. Huston.).
1993 "An Act Relating to the Jurisdiction of Municipal
Courts in Criminal and Civil Cases.'• (pp. 397-398 in 
Acts and Resolves as Passed by the Ninetieth and 
Ninety-first Legislatures of the State of Maine. 
Augusta, Maine: Kennebec Journal).
1999 "Magistrates in Criminal Cases." (pp. 1912-13 in
The Revised Statutes of the State of Maine.
Augusta, Maine: Kennebec Journal).
291
1943 "An Act Relating to the Jurisdiction of Municipal
Courts in Juvenile Cases." (pp. 420-421 in Acts and 
Resolves as Passed by the Ninety-second and Ninety- 
third Legislatures of the State of Maine. Augusta, 
Maine: Kennebec Journal).
1959 "An Act Relating to Juvenile Offenders." (pp.
598-611 in Acts an Resolves as Passed by the Ninety- 
ninth Legislature of the State of Maine. Augusta, 
Maine: Kennebec Journal).
1965 "Juvenile Offenders." (pp. 519-541 in Maine Revised 
Statutes Annotated 1964. St. Paul: Vest Publishing 
Co.).
1975 An Act to Create a Commission to Revise the Statutes 
Relating to Juveniles Tncluding Statutes Relating to 
the Juvenile Court. Legislative Document 1752.
April 2.
1977a An Act to Establish the Maine Juven ile Code. 
Legislative Document 1581. April 7.
1977b Legislative Record. (p. 2301).
1980a "Maine Juvenile Code." (pp. 6 08-708 in Maine
Revised Statutes Annotated. 1964. St. Paul: West 
Publishing Co.).
1980b "Committee to Monitor the Juvenile Code." (pp«
709-710 in Maine Revised Statutes Annotated. 1964.
St. Paul: West Publishing Co.).
1980c "Training Centers." (pp. 600-605 in Maine Revised
Statutes Annotated. 1964. St. Paul: West Publishing 
Co.) .
Maine Supreme Court.
1950 "Wade v- Warden of the State Prison." (pp. 120-169 
in Maine Reports 145. Augusta, Maine: Kennebec 
Journal).
Marris, Peter and Martin Rein.
1973 Dilemmas of Social Reform. Chicago: Aldine.
Marshall, Chris E., Ineke Haen Marshall, and Charles W.
Thomas.
1983 "The Implementation of Formal Procedures in Juvenile 
Court Processing of Status Offenders." Journal of 
Criminal Justice. 11:(191-211).
Natza, David.




1984 "Removing Runaways froa the Justice Systea: The 
Experience in Washington State," {pp. 95-111 in 
Scott Decker, Juvenile Justice Pol icy. Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications.
Nennel, Robert M.
1972 Thorns and Thistles: Juven ile Delinquents in the
Onited States. 1825-1940. Hanover, N.H.: University 
Press of New England.
Olson-Rayaer, Gayle.
1984 "National Juvenile Justice Policy: Myth or Reality?" 
(pp.19-57 in Scott Decker, Juvenile Justice Policy. 
Beverly Hills: Sage Publications-
Platt, Anthony.
1969 The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1973 The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1977 Review of Steven t. Schlossnan, "Love and the
Aaerican Delinquent." Crime and Social Justice.
8: (80-82).
Polk, K.
1984 "The Irrelevance of Theory and Evidence: Diversion 
Reconsidered." (pp. 21-27 in Manfred Brusten, et 
Youth Crime. Social Control and Prevention: 
Theoretical Perspectives and Policy Implications. 
Wuppertal: International Document and Study Center
for Conflicts of Youth.
Prescott, Peter.
1981 The Child Savers. New York: Knopf.
President*s Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
/ Administration of Justice.
1967a Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth 
Crime. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office.
1967b The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society.
Washington, D-C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Reuterman, Nicholas A. and Thomas R. Hughes.
1984 "Developments in Juvenile Justice During the Decade 
of the 70s: Juvenile Detention Facilities."
Journal of Criminal Just ice. 12:(325-333).
293
Rojek, Dean G. and Maynard L. Erickson.
1981 "Reforming the Juvenile Justice System: The
Diversion of Status Offenders." Law C Society 
Review. 16: (291-264) .
Robb, Christina. "Locking Up Children."
1980 Boston Globe Magazine, October 26.
Rothman, David J.
1979 "The Progressive Legacy, Development of American
Attitudes toward Juvenile Delinquency." (pp. 34-68 
in Empey, Juvenile Justice: The Progressive Legacy 
and Current Reforms, Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia) .
Rutter, Michael and Henri Giller.
1984 Juvenile Delinguency: Trends and Perspectives. New 
York: Guilford Press.
Ryerson, Ellen.
1978 The Best-Laid Plans: America^ Juvenile Court 
Experiment. New York: Hill and Hang.
Schlossman, Steven L.
1977 Love and the American Delinguent; The Theory and 
Practice of "Progressi ve" Juvenile Just ice 
1825-1920. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Schwendinger, Herman and Julia Schwendinger.
1979 "Delinquency and Social Reform: A Radical 
Perspective." (pp. 245-87 in Empey, Juvenile 
Justice: The Progressi ve Legacy and Current Reforms. 
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia).
Scull, Andrew T.
1977 Decarceration: Community Treatment and the Deviant:
A Radical View. Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs.
1984 "De-institutionalization and the Rights of the
Deviant." (pp. 9-20 in Manfred Brusten, et al.. 
Youth Crime. Socia1 Control and Prevention: 
Theoretical Perspectives and Policy Implications. 
Wuppertal: International Document and Study Center
for Conflicts of Youth.
Senna, Joseph J. and Larry J. Siegel.
1981 Juvenile Delinguency: Theory. Practice, and Law.
St. Paul: West Publishing Co.
Shaw, Clifford R. and Henry McKay.
1979 Juvenile Delinguemncy and Urban Areas. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
294
Skolnick, Jerome H. and Elliott Currie
1982 Crisis in American Institutions. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Co.
Smith, Charles P., David J. Berkman, Warren N. Fraser, and 
John Sutton.
1980 A Preliminary national Assessment of the Status 
Offender and the Juvenile Justice System: Bole 
Conflicts, Constraints, and Information Gaps. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Spiro, Brooke E.
1984 "Abolishing Court Jurisdiction Over Status
Offenders: Anticipating Unintended Consequences."
[pp. 77-93 in Scott Decker, Juvenile Justice Policy. 
Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
Stanford, Bose Mary.
1984 "Implementing the Multigoal Evaluation Technique of
Diversion Programs." (pp. 59-74 in Scott Decker, 
Juvenile Justice Policy. Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications.
Steiger, John C.
1981 "Juvenile Justice Beform: making the Punishment Fit 
the Crime." (Paper delivered at Law and Society 
Annual Meeting. Amherst College: Amherst, 
Massachusetts. June 12).
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
1979 Commonwealth v. Fisher. (pp. 156-162 in Faust and 
[1905] Brantingham, Juvenile Justice Philosophy. St. Paul: 
West Publishing Co.).
Tappan, Paul W.
1979 "Treatment Without Trial." (pp. 173-183 in Faust and 
[ 1946] Brantingham, Juvenile Justice Philosophy. St. Paul: 
West Publishing Co.).
Thornton, Mary.
1983 "Critics See Juvenile-Justice Nominee Emphasizing 
Punishment." Wash inqton Post. April 3. (5A).
United States Bureau of Census.
1976- Statistical Abstract of the United States.
1981 Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office.
United States Supreme Court.
1967 Kent v. United States. (1045 in Supreme Court 
[1966] Reporter. St. Paul: West Publishing Co.).
1968 In JRe Gault. (1428 in Supreme Court Reporter. St.
[ 1967] Paul: West Publishing Co.).
295
1971 In Re Binship. (1068 in Supreme Court Reporter.
[1970] St. Paul: Best Publishing Co.). ” ”
1972 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania. (1976 in Supreme Court
[1971] Reporter. St. Paul: Best Publishing Co.).
1977 Breed v. Jones. (1779 in Supreme Court Reporter.
[ 1975] St. Paul: Best Publishing Co.).
(United Bay Juvenile Code Committee.
1978 The Hew Juvenile Code: Its First Three Months in 
Cumberland County. Augusta: Haine Criminal Justice 
Planning and Assistance Agency, November.
Bigmore, John H.
1979 "Juvenile Courts vs. Criminal Courts." (pp. 170-173 
[1926] in Faust and Brantingham, Juvenile Justice
Philosophy. St. Paul: Best Publishing Co.).
